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By the end of the twentieth century, and after a long line of conflicting case law, the 
question about the basis of liability in nuisance was settled: in Scotland, damages are 
awarded only upon proof of fault (RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional 
Council 1985 SC (HL) 17). Fault, in turn, can adopt many forms: malice, intention, 
recklessness, negligence, and conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage 
(Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1995 SC 95).  
Many aspects of this seemingly clear picture, however, remain problematic. On 
the one hand, the way in which this model is interpreted and applied gives place to 
particular forms of liability that can actually be characterised as strict. On the other 
hand, two other areas of the law of neighbours that overlap with the scope of 
nuisance do not fit entirely this model, namely the regulation of disputes over uses of 
water and of those arising from withdrawal of support. 
The main argument of this thesis is that damages claims in the context of 
neighbourhood are governed by two distinct rules: a general fault-based liability rule 
for nuisance, and an exceptional strict liability rule for abnormally dangerous 
conduct. For the first of these rules, the thesis offers an evaluation of the fault model 
adopted in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd, explaining the interaction between its different 
elements and highlighting the developments that can result in forms of strict liability. 
For the second of these rules, the thesis develops an analysis of its elements and 
nature, as well as a proposal that delineates its scope of application. 
This two-rule model offers a justification for the current structure of the law 
applicable to disputes over uses of water. The strict liability rule applicable to 
interferences with the natural flow of watercourses, traditionally explained as based 
upon the infringement of property rights, is better explained as danger-based. The 
regulation of disputes arising from withdrawal of support, however, is not consistent 
with this model, even though they have also been characterised as nuisances. It is 
argued that this framework entails unjustified inconsistencies, both internal and by 





In Scots law, there was a longstanding discussion about whether a person, in order to 
obtain compensation for harm caused by his neighbour’s use of property, required 
only to demonstrate that the latter caused the harm (strict liability) or, additionally, 
that he acted with fault, that is, that he was negligent – i.e. not careful enough – or 
acted with the intention to harm (fault-based liability). But by the end of the 
twentieth century, this discussion was resolved: the House of Lords established that 
fault was indeed required, and the Inner House further clarified that fault could 
adopt many different forms, namely malice, intention to harm, recklessness, 
negligence and engaging in particularly dangerous activities. 
Many aspects of this seemingly clear picture, however, are still problematic. On 
the one hand, this fault-based liability rule is sometimes applied or interpreted in a 
way in which the actual result is closer to a strict liability rule. On the other hand, 
some particular types of conflicts between neighbours are not fully subject to the 
fault-based rule: disputes over uses of shared natural water (like a river) and those 
arising from withdrawal of the physical support that lands or buildings provide to 
each other are subject to dual systems, where in some cases a fault-based rule is 
applied and in others a strict rule is applied. 
The main argument of this thesis is that neighbour disputes in general are 
actually subject to two different rules: one fault-based that is applied broadly to all 
disputes, and one strict that is applied only to particularly dangerous activities. The 
thesis explains and analyses the nature, elements and scope of both of these rules, 
highlighting all their problematic aspects. 
This model serves also to explain the way in which the law deals with conflicts 
over uses of water: the dual system for water also operates a distinction on the basis of 
danger, even though this is not the traditional explanation. The disputes about 
support, however, are treated differently by the law: the dual system is not based on 
danger, but on other elements. The thesis argues that this is not justified and that 
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1. PROBLEM AND MAIN ARGUMENT 
 
“Couple win right to sue whisky giant” was the headline in The Falkirk Herald on 3 
March 2017.1 The couple, Mr and Mrs Chalmers, of Bonnybridge, raised a damages 
claim for £100,000 against Diageo, the British multinational alcoholic beverage 
company, for the harm allegedly caused to their house and outdoor property by the 
“Angel’s Share” emanating from the defender’s neighbouring bonded warehouse. 
The pursuers argued that the ethanol evaporating from the whisky casks stimulated 
the growth of a type of fungus which covered their property in an unsightly black 
coating, amounting to a nuisance.2 In allowing a proof before answer, the Lord 
Ordinary (Ericht) remarked upon what over the last thirty years has been repeated in 
case law and literature almost like a legal mantra: “[i]t is clear from the case law that 
the essential basis for liability and reparation from nuisance is culpa”. Yet, at the end 
of the same paragraph, he warned that it was also “clear from the authorities that 
very little may be needed by way of pleading to support an assertion of fault”.3 In this 
case, the pursuers averred that, according to the state of scientific investigation, the 
defenders knew or ought to have known that the emanations were liable to cause the 
damage that in fact occurred, and these averments were considered sufficient to allow 
the case to go to proof so far as fault was concerned.4 
These remarks illustrate the legacy of the two leading modern cases regarding 
the basis of liability in nuisance: RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional 
Council5 and Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd.6 In the first of these decisions, the House of Lords 
                                                
 
 
1 The Falkirk Herald (online), 3 March 2017, available at 
http://www.falkirkherald.co.uk/news/business/couple-win-right-to-sue-whisky-giant-1-4382227. 
2 The case does not seem to be an isolated instance, and possibly other interests are involved in the 
dispute: see “The big gorilla has not chosen to be socially responsible”, The Scotsman (online), 17 
September 2012, available at http://www.scotsman.com/news/gaynor-allen-the-big-gorilla-has-not-chosen-to-be-
socially-responsible-1-2530285. 
3 Chalmers v Diageo Scotland Ltd 2017 GWD 9-126; [2017] CSOH 36 at § 11. 
4 Ibid at § 12. 
5 RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17. 
6 Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95. 
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established fault as an essential requirement for reparation claims.7 The Inner House 
clarified some years later, in the second of these decisions, that fault was not limited 
to negligence, but included other forms of fault, such as malice, intention, 
recklessness and conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage.8 
This apparently simple model is more problematic than it seems. Most of these 
forms of fault remain judicially and doctrinally underdeveloped in the context of 
neighbourhood. Some of them might be seen as incompatible – such as negligence, 
or, in the best case, of limited utility for such context – such as malice and, perhaps, 
recklessness. More importantly, some of these notions actually hide forms of strict 
liability, either in themselves – such as conduct causing a special risk of abnormal 
damage, or in the way they are construed – such as intention and recklessness. As 
suggested in the “Angel’s Share” case, very little may amount to an averment of fault 
– so little that de facto it might dispense with any relevant notion of fault. This not only 
undermines the apparent simplicity of this one-rule, fault-based, liability model, but 
also hinders the adequate understanding and development of the law. 
Furthermore, an examination of other areas of the law regulating disputes 
between neighbours shows that the seemingly simple fault-based liability model 
applicable to nuisance is not replicated across the board. Indeed, pockets of (overt) 
strict liability are found in areas such as conflicts over uses of water and withdrawal of 
support, despite the fact that these disputes have experienced a taxonomical shift, 
from their consideration as belonging in the scope of property law doctrines, to their 
increasingly consistent categorisation as nuisances. 
The original contribution of this thesis is the proposal of a more coherent and 
principled model, based on the available authority and general principles of delictual 
liability. This model is based upon two liability rules: a general fault-based liability 
rule, applicable to nuisance, and a special strict liability rule, applicable to 
abnormally dangerous conduct. On the basis of this model, solutions are offered for a 
wide number of problematic issues, either from a conceptual or a policy perspective. 
                                                
 
 
7 RHM Bakeries (n 5) at 39-45 per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton. 
8 Kennedy (n 6) at 99-100 per Lord President Hope. 
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This model serves to clarify and clear the ground for future development of this 




The thesis is concerned with a particular type of claim and a particular type of 
rule: damages claims for harm caused by non-trespassory uses of land, decided by 
reference to private common law rules. 
The restriction only to damages claims is almost self-explanatory: the thesis is 
about the role of fault, and only damages awards have fault as a pre-requisite. It is 
non-contentious that the other key remedy for nuisance, interdict, does not have such 
a requirement.9 
The restriction to non-trespassory uses of land, in turn, seeks to limit the object 
of study only to those disputes that arise from the use that a landowner makes of his 
own land, excluding encroachments. In encroachment cases, even though fault on the 
part of the defender might have a bearing in the determination of the remedy 
awarded to the pursuer, it is not a requirement of any particular one.10 
The focus on private common law rules seeks to exclude two further sets of 
rules. 
On the one hand, neighbour disputes, in particular those involving public 
authority defenders, have increasingly been analysed from a human rights 
perspective, given the invocation of article 8 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (right to respect for private and family life) and of article 1 of its First Protocol 
(protection of property) as the basis for liability under the Human Rights Act 1998, 
sometimes alongside common law liability in nuisance. This has been the case mainly 
where statutory regimes in place prevent obtaining damages awards based in 
                                                
 
 
9 RHM Bakeries (n 5) at 42. See the discussion by E Reid, “The Basis of Liability in Nuisance” [1997] 
JR 162 at 165-166 and, more generally, H Burn-Murdoch, Interdict in the Law of Scotland: with a Chapter 
on Specific Performance (1933) ch IX. 
10 See the discussion in Reid, Property § 178. 
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common law rules,11 or where the nature of the rights held by the neighbour over the 
property (or absence thereof) might affect his title to sue.12 This dimension, however, 
is not explored in this thesis, for the reasoning involved in adjudicating claims under 
the 1998 Act is one of balancing of rights that is quite distinct from the reasoning 
underlying fault assessments, which are the main concern of this thesis.  
Furthermore, some types of disputes between neighbours have been addressed 
through statutory regulations, especially in light of the industrial and urban 
development experienced by Britain from the nineteenth century onwards, limiting 
the role of common law rules. These regulations are, however, not comprehensively 
discussed in this thesis, not only for reasons of space but, more importantly, because 





The methodology of this thesis is fundamentally doctrinal. Some comparative 
as well as historical references are incorporated in aid of the arguments developed, 




The thesis is structured in five chapters. 
Chapter 1 sets the conceptual framework for the thesis. The arguments made 
in this thesis revolve around the notions of fault-based and strict liability. 
Accordingly, chapter 1 sets out what these concepts are taken to mean, as well as 
their internal taxonomy and their boundaries with neighbouring concepts. 
Chapter 2 examines the requirement of fault for damages claims in nuisance, 
discussing each of the different forms of fault offered by Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd – 
                                                
 
 
11 See, e.g. Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2004] 2 AC 42; [2003] UKHL 66 (floods caused by 
discharge of sewage); see also Hatton v UK (36022/97) (2003) 37 EHRR 28 (noise caused by the 
operation of Heathrow Airport). 
12 Contrast, for instance, Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655 with Pemberton v Southwark LBC 
[2000] 1 WLR 1672. 
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malice, intention, recklessness and negligence – as well as the notion that allegedly 
underlies and connects these forms of fault, namely the idea of the “fault 
continuum”. The model is problematic in several ways, although not necessarily 
those that legal scholars have identified hitherto: while the literature has focused on 
the alleged lack of compatibility between negligence and nuisance, it will be argued 
here that the other forms of fault are those that pose the greatest challenges, together 
with the very idea of the fault continuum.  
Chapter 3 discusses the last of the forms of fault listed by Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd: 
conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage or, as it is renamed here, 
abnormally dangerous conduct. The category is especially challenging, for neither its 
sources nor its subsequent application are particularly helpful in clarifying its 
boundaries and the nature of the liability it attracts. The position advanced in this 
chapter is that, contrary to the orthodox view, liability based on this category is 
actually strict. Therefore, it is essential to define the scope of this category, and a 
proposal is made to that effect. 
Chapter 4 is concerned with a set of rules that does not seem to replicate 
completely the fault-based model of liability for nuisance: those addressing disputes 
over conflicting uses of water. It will be argued that this category does, nevertheless, 
fit the wider two-rule model set by chapters 2 and 3, that is, the combination of the 
general liability rule applicable to nuisance with the special liability rule applicable to 
abnormally dangerous conduct. 
Chapter 5, in turn, is concerned with a further set of rules that does not appear 
to follow the fault-based model of liability for nuisance: disputes arising from 
withdrawal of support. This category does not, in fact, fit that model, nor does it fit 
the two-rule model advanced by this thesis. It will be argued, however, that the 
specific liability rules applicable to withdrawal of support are not currently justified 
and that the more consistent approach would be to address these disputes within the 
framework here proposed. 













The subject of this thesis is the basis of delictual liability in the context of 
neighbourhood. Consequently, throughout the thesis both descriptive and normative 
claims regarding this basis are made, that is, about certain conduct attracting fault-
based or strict liability. 
The distinction between fault-based and strict liability, however, is by no means 
clear-cut, so by claiming simply that liability is or should be of one or the other type, 
much is left unexplained. Moreover, the internal taxonomy of these two categories 
can also be problematic. The purpose of this preliminary chapter is, consequently, to 
set out the conceptual framework that underlies these claims, identifying which 
versions of these concepts are adopted and distinguishing them from other associated 
or similar concepts. 
This chapter is, however, of limited theoretical reach. Each concept discussed 
here probably deserves a chapter – perhaps a thesis – on its own, but this thesis does 
not aim at elucidating them generally. The aim here is to outline some operative 
concepts that will serve as a frame of reference for their use throughout the four 
chapters that develop this thesis’ argument. 
First, the notion of fault will be explored, outlining the different forms fault may 
adopt: intention, negligence, and recklessness (section 2), subsequently addressing the 














2.1. Notion and forms of fault 
 
As a general rule, liability to make reparation in delict is fault-based in Scots law, and 
strict liability is only sparingly recognised. The emphasis on fault1 has been identified 
as “the first cardinal feature of reparation in Scots law”.2 It is not entirely clear 
whether this was historically the case,3 and the principle does not arise so clearly from 
the early Institutional writers,4 though this is also a matter of contention.5 The 
historical evolution of the general basis of liability goes beyond the scope of this 
section, but it seems reasonably clear that by the mid nineteenth century, the general 
principle of fault-based liability was well established in case law.6 
The concept of fault is elusive. It is a matter of debate whether it is based on 
notions of moral blameworthiness or whether it departs from this type of 
consideration,7 and many accounts define fault by listing and describing the different 
recognised forms of fault, raising the question of whether it is possible to identify 
some conceptual unity underlying these different forms of fault.8 It is not the purpose 
of this chapter to solve this theoretical question. Instead this chapter sets out to 
                                                
 
 
1 In this thesis, the term “fault” is preferred over the similar and also widely used “culpa”, for the latter 
is used somewhat ambiguously in legal literature and judicial dicta: sometimes it signifies negligence; 
sometimes, a wider notion comprehensive of other forms of fault. See the discussion by Walker, Delict 
46-48. “Fault” is, perhaps, a more obviously comprehensive notion in this sense. 
2 H McKechnie, “Reparation” in J L Wark (ed), Encyclopedia of the Laws of Scotland, vol 12 (1931) §1063. 
3 W A Elliot, “What is Culpa?” (1954) 66 JR 6 at 7. For some insights on the development of Aquilian 
liability in Scotland, see D W McKenzie and R Evans-Jones, “The Development of Remedies for 
Personal Injury and Death” in R Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland (1995) and Hector 
L MacQueen and W D H Sellar, “Negligence” in Kenneth Reid and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), A 
History of Private Law in Scotland, vol 2 (Oxford University Press 2000). 
4 Stair, Institutions 1.3.4 bases the obediential obligation of reparation on “delinquency”; as does 
Bankton, Institute 1.10, seemingly referring to obligations that can arise from the commission of a 
crime. 
5 McKechnie (n 2) § 1063 sees the principle illustrated in Stair, Institutions 1.9.6. 
6 See e.g. the dicta by Lord Neaves in Mackintosh v Mackintosh (1864) 2 M 1357 at 1363; and by Lord 
Inglis in Campbell v Kennedy (1864) 3 M 121 at 126 and Laurent v Lord Advocate (1869) 7 M 607 at 610-
611. 
7 See e.g. the debate held in Scotland between W A Elliot and J J Gow in the 50s: W A Elliot, 
“Reparation and the English Tort of Negligence” (1952) 64 JR 1; J J Gow, “Is Culpa Amoral?” (1953) 
65 JR 17; and Elliot, “What is Culpa?” (n 3). 
8 See, e.g. the concept of “legal fault” in P Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (2002) 78, structured 
as an either-or clause denoting that the concept encompasses two distinct sorts of things. 
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provide working concepts for the different forms of fault in operation in the 
neighbourhood context. 
The two traditional forms of fault found in most accounts are those derived 
from the Roman sources:9 intention and negligence. This division finds, in Scotland, 
support in the texts of the Institutional writers,10 and served as the basis for the way 
in which the law of delict was structured since the time of Hume: in his chapter on 
obligations ex delicto, he gives account of intentional delicts, whereas obligations 
arising from negligence or inadvertency are treated as obligations quasi ex delicto.11 
Even though the term quasi-delict is no longer used in this sense, the division 
remained central in the legal literature: it was accepted by Guthrie Smith,12 and 
determined the structure of Glegg’s treatment up until its last edition.13 
There is, however, a third form of fault, the position and content of which 
requires clarification: recklessness. This notion becomes particularly relevant in the 
context of this thesis, since Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd14 listed recklessness as a separate 
form of fault that can serve as the basis of a damages claim in nuisance. These three 





2.2.1. Ends, means, and side-effects 
 
As a general rule, proof of negligence suffices to satisfy the fault requirement of a 
fault-based liability rule. Intention will be required only in particular cases. 
Moreover, negligence is the more common form of fault: more often than not, people 
                                                
 
 
9 Elliot, “Reparation and the English Tort of Negligence” (n 7) at 1. 
10 In its modern formulation, it is traced to Bell, Principles §§ 544 and 553: D Visser and N Whitty, 
“The Structure of the Law of Delict in Historical Perspective” in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A 
History of Private Law in Scotland, vol 2 (2000) at 452. The distinction between intention and negligence 
is, however, arguably perceptible in Stair, Institutions 1.9.11 and Erskine, Institute 3.1.13. See 
MacQueen and Sellar (n 3) at 524-525. 
11 Hume, Lectures ch XIV and XVI. 
12 Guthrie Smith, Reparation 3. 
13 A T Glegg, The Law of Reparation in Scotland (J L Duncan ed, 4th edn, 1955). 
14 Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95 at 99. 
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cause harm without meaning to do so. Consequently, at the level of the general 
concepts, private lawyers tend to pay less attention to intention and focus, instead, on 
the operation of negligence and its different elements. In addition, terminology 
associated with intention is unclear, as both scholars and courts use the terms 
“malice” and “intention” sometimes interchangeably, and sometimes to convey 
different meanings. Descriptions of these notions, in turn, feature a wide range of 
concepts, including “desire”, “motive”, “purpose”, “foresight”, “plan”, and many 
others.15 
The first Scottish treatises on delictual liability described intention, as a general 
concept, in very wide – and, perhaps, confusing – terms. Guthrie Smith explains that 
“malice, in law, does not mean a fixed feeling of malignity, but an intention to 
injure”,16 and later on distinguishes culpa from dole, the latter entailing injuring 
someone “by design”, a “wicked and depraved disposition”, a “bad heart”.17 Glegg, 
in turn, distinguishes malice in fact, namely “personal spite, or ill-will against a 
determinate individual”, from malice in law, i.e. “merely the intentional doing of a 
wrongful act”.18 Intention tended to be the object of a detailed consideration in those 
delicts that could only be committed with a specific intention, and the analysis was 
confined to their particular scope (e.g. assault, malicious prosecution, fraud, etc). This 
is still the case today, whereas intention as a general concept remains “ambiguous”.19 
Perhaps a good illustration of this ambiguity is the definition offered by the 
standard book on the law of delict: according to Walker, “[i]ntention or malice or 
dolus connotes that the actor directed his mind to the conduct in question and its 
natural and probable consequences, and desired those consequences to result”.20 
                                                
 
 
15 See, e.g. the different meanings attached to these terms and their relation with intention (though 
reaching diverse conclusions) in A R White, Grounds of Liability: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 
(1985) ch 6 and R A Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law 
(1990) ch 2. 
16 Guthrie Smith, Reparation 3. Malice “in law”, as distinguished from malice in fact, was of particular 
relevance in contexts where privilege required malice to be rebutted, e.g. in the case of defamation or 
actions by the police. Guthrie Smith seems to be looking at malice through this prism. 
17 Ibid 59. 
18 Glegg, Reparation 10. 
19 K McK Norrie, “The Intentional Delicts” in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private 
Law in Scotland, vol 2 (2000) at 478. 
20 Walker, Delict 43. 
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The first aspect that stands out from this concept is the abovementioned use of 
“intention” and “malice” as synonyms. In this thesis, however, the term malice is 
reserved particularly to identify what Reid calls “motive malice”,21 that is, bad or 
improper motives, as discussed below.22 
Further ambiguity derives from the fact that intention is predicated on two 
different objects: the conduct and its consequences. Conduct is intentional when it is 
deliberate, as opposed to automatic or accidental; consequences are intended when 
the conduct has the purpose to produce them.23 Intention as a form of delictual fault, 
however, relates to consequences.24 
The precise delimitation of which consequences can be considered as intended 
is the source of further discussion. There seems to be no significant challenge to the 
idea that “[i]ncluded in one’s intention is everything which is part of one’s plan 
(proposal), whether as purpose or as way of effecting one’s purpose(s)”.25 Side-effects, 
on the other hand, are slightly more controversial. On one view, foreseen 
consequences also form part of one’s intention, even when they are neither a means 
nor the end of the conduct but only its by-product.26 The reason is that, in all these 
cases, the agent has control over the alternative between a result happening or not 
happening; “his choice tipped the balance”.27 This form of intention has been called 
“oblique”28 or “indirect”.29 The alternative view sees the inclusion of side-effects, 
even if they are foreseen – and even welcome – by the agent, as a utilitarian fiction 
that does not agree with common morality and the standards by which moral 
responsibilities are assessed.30 
                                                
 
 
21 E Reid, “Malice in the Jungle of Torts” (2012-2013) 87 TulLR 901 at 904. 
22 See section 2.2.2. 
23 Cane (n 8) 79. 
24 P Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (1997) 32; Reid (n 21) at 902. 
25 J Finnis, “Intention in Tort Law” in D G Owen (ed), The Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (1997) 
229.  
26 J Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, vol 1 (R Campbell ed, 4th edn, 1873) 436-437; H L A Hart, 
Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (2008) 119-120. 
27 Hart (n 26) 121. 
28 P Cane, “Mens Rea in Tort Law” (2000) 20 OJLS 533 at 535. 
29 J Neethling and J M Potgieter, Neethling - Potgieter - Visser Law of Delict (7th edn, 2006) 133. 
30 Finnis (n 25) 243-244. P J Fitzgerald (ed), Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th edn, 1966) 368-370 
contemplates unintended foreseen consequences, but admits that there are reasons for the law to treat 
them as intended. 
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Therefore, the scope of intention can vary according to the consequences that 
are seen as encompassed within it. A different question, however, is which of these 
versions of intention is necessary to satisfy an intention requirement. The issue can be 
illustrated by comparing the intention requirement in two different torts as they have 
evolved in English law: causing loss by unlawful means and misfeasance in public 
office. 
The intention requirement in the first of these torts was analysed in the much-
discussed House of Lords’ decision of OBG Ltd v Allan.31 Before this decision, the 
distinction that dominated the discussion was between “targeted” and “untargeted” 
harm. Harm was targeted when the conduct was directed at or calculated to injure 
the claimant’s interests, and untargeted when it was a foreseen – yet not aimed at – 
inevitable (or even probable) consequence.32 Most judicial decisions and academic 
commentaries favoured the targeted harm requirement.33 In OBG, however, Lord 
Hoffmann and Lord Nichols abandoned the target test, to focus on the distinction 
between ends, means and consequences. Both judges agreed that the “mental 
ingredient” of the tort was satisfied if harm was either an end or a means to an end, 
but not if it was simply a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s conduct.34 It is 
unclear whether the two tests would lead to different results,35 and the Court of 
Appeal in the Douglas v Hello Ltd decision36 had indeed attempted a parallel between 
the two tests, concluding that the target test was satisfied (a) where harm is an end in 
itself, or (b) when harm is a necessary means to an ulterior motive.37 
                                                
 
 
31 OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1; [2007] UKHL 21. 
32 E Reid, “‘That Unhappy Expression’: Malice at the Margins” in S G A Pitel, J W Neyers and E 
Chamberlain (eds), Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (2013) at 457; H Carty, An Analysis of the Economic 
Torts (2001) 105-106. 
33 Carty (n 32) at 105-108. 
34 OBG Ltd v Allan (n 31) at § 62 per Lord Hoffman, and §§ 164-167 per Lord Nicholls. 
35 See the discussion in H Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts (2nd edn, 2010) 82-84, who 
nevertheless criticises strongly the change of approach. 
36 Douglas v Hello Ltd [2006] QB 125; [2005] EWCA Civ 595, object of one of the three appeals 
decided in OBG. 
37 Ibid at § 195. The language of the target test would, however, come back shortly after in a House of 
Lords’ decision in a case of conspiracy: Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] 1 AC 
1174; [2008] UKHL 19 at § 120 per Lord Mance, and similarly at § 44 per Lord Hope (“loss caused 
by an unlawful act directed at the claimants themselves”, emphasis added). Lord Neuberger, at § 224, 
adopted a seemingly broader notion of intention for the tort, including harm that is the “direct, 
inevitable and foreseeable result” of the conduct. 
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In contrast with the narrow approach to intention adopted for the tort of 
causing loss by unlawful means, a broader notion of intention is admitted for the tort 
of misfeasance in public office, according to the House of Lords decision in Three 
Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 3).38 The “mental ingredient” of this tort is satisfied 
not only when the public officer abuses his powers “specifically intending to injure 
the claimant” but also when he “knows that in so acting he is likely to injure the 
claimant”.39 Consequently, not only targeted intention, but also untargeted intention 
will suffice.40 
Consequently, side-effects are sometimes regarded as part of one’s intention in 
legal discourse, but the line that marks the fulfilment of an intention requirement for 
a particular wrong will shift depending on its nature. Thus, in the economic delicts or 
torts a stricter requirement is aligned with the fact that harm is, in principle, part of 
market competition, whereas misfeasance in public office is an affront-based wrong 
that justifies a more flexible approach to the intention requirement. It can also be 
noted that these side-effects are in some cases considered as intended even when they 
are not certain but only likely to result. As will be discussed in chapter 2, the notion 
of intention adopted by the Rest (2d) includes consequences that the defender knew 
were certain to happen as a result of his conduct, without distinguishing whether the 
consequence is a means to a further end or just a side-effect of the execution of his 
plan.41 Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd42 subsequently adopted this broad approach for 
nuisance, despite not being an affront-based wrong, and commentary supports the 
possibility of establishing knowledge constructively.43 
One last aspect of Walker’s notion of intention must be noted: he includes 
within the consequences deemed to be intended those that derive naturally and 
probably from the conduct. This inclusion entails the possibility of treating as 
intended certain consequences that are neither in the actor’s plan nor are they known 
side-effects of his conduct. No authority is offered by Walker to support the inclusion 
                                                
 
 
38 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1; [2001] UKHL 16 at §§ 44-46 per Lord Hope 
of Craighead. 
39 J Murphy, “Misfeasance in a Public Office: A Tort Law Misfit?” (2012) 32 OJLS 51 at 51-52. 
40 Reid, “‘That Unhappy Expression’” (n 32) at 459. 
41 See p 37 below. 
42 Kennedy (n 14) at 99. 
43 See p 54 below. 
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apart form a reference to Salmond’s chapter on intention.44 But he fails to account 
for Salmond’s view on the supposed presumption of knowledge of natural and 
necessary results: he believes that it is “much too wide a statement” that would 
eliminate the distinction between intention and negligence. In his view, it is closer to 
the truth to say that sometimes the law treats as intentional the consequences of 
recklessness, which he sees as a form of negligence,45 where foreseeability – and not 




As pointed out above, the term malice is used in legal discourse in two senses: as a 
synonym of intention, and as an indication of the wrongdoer’s motives.46 Yet, as 
Reid47 and Cane48 remark, even though they can coincide, intention and motives are 
not the same. Intention, as explained, points to whether the consequences of one’s 
action where part of one’s purpose or plan, i.e. whether the conduct was executed in 
order to bring about those consequences. Motives, on the other hand, refer to one’s 
reasons for engaging in such conduct.49 
Malice means “bad” or “improper” motives, such as those identified by 
Guthrie Smith as dole, or by Glegg as malice in fact.50 More generally, “[m]alice 
provides a general motive answer in every day speech of two slightly different kinds: 
it may mean that an act was done in order to hurt another for no particular reason at 
all, or in order to do so for a morally insufficient reason”.51 If the reason why a person 
injures someone else is the furtherance of a legitimate interest, then his motive is not 
malicious.52 But motives are often mixed, so the law resorts to the notion of 
                                                
 
 
44 G Williams (ed), Salmond on Jurisprudence (11th edn, 1957) 410 et seq. 
45 Ibid 413. 
46 Walker, Delict 50; Reid, “Malice in the Jungle of Torts” (n 21) at 903-906. 
47 Reid, “‘That Unhappy Expression’” (n 32) at 441. 
48 Cane, “Mens Rea in Tort Law” (n 28) at 539. 
49 For a more detailed discussion, see G H L Fridman, “Malice in the Law of Torts” (1958) 21 MLR 
484 at 487-491. 
50 See p 10 above. 
51 J F Lever, “Means, Motives, and Interests in the Law of Torts” in A G Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence (1961) at 56. 
52 Fridman (n 49) at 485; Lever (n 51) at 56. 
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“predominant motive”:53 malice will be present when the predominant motive is 
improper and any other proper motive is just accessory. 
It is generally submitted that motives are irrelevant for delictual liability.54 
Malice has, however, traditionally been regarded as relevant in particular contexts,55 
though even in these cases it is arguable that its role is marginal.56 One of these 
particular contexts is precisely the one with which this thesis is concerned: harms 
caused between neighbours. Chapter 2 will include a discussion of the limited scope 




Unlike intention, negligence has been widely discussed and private law literature is 
considerably more comprehensive. The concept is, consequently, in a better position 
in terms of its development, so there is no utility in reproducing much of these 
discussions here. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting the difference between 
negligence as a form of fault and what we could call the “delict of negligence”. It is 
arguable that in Scots law there is no such thing as a delict of negligence, in contrast 
with the English tort of negligence.58 It is observed, however, that nowadays both 
laws have converged in this area: Scots law has experienced a marked shift from the 
civilian tradition towards the common law in this context.59 Consequently, it should 
be noted that negligence in this section – and in most of this thesis, unless otherwise 
indicated – is not used to designate the totality of the requirements that must be 
satisfied to hold the defender liable for his negligent conduct, i.e. duty of care, breach 
of the relevant standard of care, causation, etc. If a parallel can be drawn, it is with 
the second of these elements. Chapter 2 considers a contrast between liability in 
                                                
 
 
53 Cane, “Mens Rea in Tort Law” (n 28) at 539. 
54 Walker, Delict 51; Cane, Anatomy (n 24) 35; C Witting (ed), Street on Torts (14th edn, 2015) 15. 
55 See the surveys by Lever (n 51) at 57-65 and Walker, Delict 51. For a more updated view, see Reid, 
“‘That Unhappy Expression’” (n 32). 
56 Reid, “‘That Unhappy Expression’” (n 32) at 461. 
57 See chapter 2 section 3. 
58 Smith, Short Commentary 658-659; Walker, Delict 44. 
59 See the evolution and possible reasons for this shift in MacQueen and Sellar (n 3). 
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nuisance based on negligence as a form of fault and liability based on the delict of 
negligence.60 
Negligence, as a form of fault, seems to have been described as the breach of a 
duty since the time of the Institutional writers;61 sometimes rather specific duties,62 or 
more generally a duty to take care.63  Specialised works on the law of delict, but also 
more general works, are consistent in this approach: from Guthrie Smith, who 
identified the unlawfulness in quasi delicts in “the way of doing the act […] because it 
is done without the level of required care”,64 to Walker, who explained negligence as 
involving “the existence of a legal duty to take a particular degree of care in 
particular circumstances and a failure to take the requisite degree of care”,65 authors 
writing on Scots law have all followed this line of conceiving negligence as the breach 
of a duty of care.66 
Negligence, therefore, is the failure to meet a standard of conduct, particularly 
a standard of care. Strictly speaking, it has no mental element;67 it is predicated on 
the level of care deployed by the wrongdoer. It is, nevertheless, based on the element 
of reasonable foreseeability of harm, which could be seen as an objectivised mental 
state, a mental state of knowledge that the defender is deemed to have. As Lord 
MacMillan argued in Muir v Glasgow Corp, 
 
there is a sense in which the standard of care of the reasonable man involves in its application a 
subjective element. It is still left to the judge to decide what, in the circumstances of the 
particular case, the reasonable man would have had in contemplation, and what, accordingly, 
the party sought to be made liable ought to have foreseen.68 
 
                                                
 
 
60 See chapter 2 section 5.2. 
61 Erskine, Institute 3.1.13, stating that “wrong may arise, not only from positive acts of trespass or 
injury, but for blameable omissions or neglect of duty”. 
62 E.g. when discussing obligations ex delicto, Hume, Lectures 186: “neglect duly to repair”; “neglect duly 
to fence and inclose”. 
63 Bell, Principles § 553.1. 
64 Guthrie Smith, Reparation 58. 
65 Walker, Delict 44. 
66 Glegg, Reparation10; Gow (n 7) at 24; Elliot, “What is Culpa?” (n 3) at 29; Smith, Short Commentary 
664; G MacCormack, “Culpa in the Scots Law of Reparation” [1974] JR 13 at 20; and more recently 
K McK Norrie, “Obligations: Obligations Arising from a Wrongful Act: Fault” in The Laws of Scotland: 
Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 15 (1995) § 254. 
67 Cane, “Mens Rea in Tort Law” (n 28) at 536. 
68 Muir v Glasgow Corp 1943 SC (HL) 3 at 10. 
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But this is regardless of the defender’s real mental state; actual foresight is not 
required.69 Even if actual foresight is present, it is not this mental state that 
constitutes negligence, but the defender’s conduct in the presence of such foresight. 
Negligence, in sum, “is the attribution of a quality to conduct which does not 
measure up to the standard of precautions demanded in the circumstances”.70 
Scots law’s turn from its civilian roots towards the English common law 
involved, among other elements, a shift in the delineation of the standard of care. 
The Roman distinction between the three levels of culpa – lata, levis and levissima – was 
rejected in favour of a single criterion: that of the reasonable man in the 
circumstances.71 
Consequently, the standard of care, i.e. what amounts to reasonable care, is 
highly contextualised and varies according to the circumstances of the case. It takes 
into account a number of elements, among which the level of risk, meaning the 
likelihood of harm and its magnitude, is central.72 Consequently, a more demanding 
standard of care will be attached to acts or omissions that entail a higher risk. 
Available precautions and the cost of taking them can, however, also play a relevant 
role in raising or lowering such standard, among other elements, such as the utility of 




Somewhere in-between intention and negligence lies recklessness, a notion that 
remains underdeveloped in our private law literature. 
Even though recklessness is generally described as a mental state of indifference 
to risk,74 Scots private law seems to have considered recklessness to be essentially 
                                                
 
 
69 K W Simons, “Rethinking Mental States” (1992) 72 Boston U LR 463 at 472. 
70 Walker, Delict 45. 
71 MacQueen and Sellar (n 59) at 533. See Mackintosh v Mackintosh (n 6) at 1362 per Lord Neaves. 
72 Mackintosh v Mackintosh (n 6) at 1362-1363 per Lord Neaves; Muir v Glasgow Corp (n 68) at 10 per Lord 
MacMillan; and generally Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850. 
73 See Walker, Delict 199-205; and Thomson, Delict §§ 5.10-5.16. 
74 E.g. A R White, “Carelessness, Indiference and Recklessness” (1961) 24 MLR 592 at 594; Cane, 
“Mens Rea in Tort Law” (n 28) at 535. 
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connected to negligence.75 For Guthrie Smith, recklessness seemed to be a form or 
perhaps a cause of negligence,76 whereas Glegg explained that the reason why a 
reckless person is to be liable is precisely because of their negligence.77. This 
connection is set out more clearly by Walker: 
 
Recklessness is a frame of mind in which persons may behave, an attitude of indifference to the 
realised possible risks and consequences of one’s actions, in which consequences are foreseen 
and possible but not desired, not a form of negligence but a cause of negligence.78 
 
Recklessness, then, is different from intention, in that harm is not part of one’s 
purpose. One realises that it might occur, and just does not care – and for that 
reason, does not take care. Recklessness simply explains why a person was negligent.  
What, then, is special about recklessness if it is simply a reason for negligence? 
Why would a pursuer attempt to establish this particular frame of mind that caused 
negligence if negligence is already a sufficient basis of liability? The answer lies 
precisely in the various contexts where negligence does not suffice as a basis for 
liability and intention is required: in some of these contexts, recklessness may be 
deemed enough for satisfying the intention requirement. It has so been regarded, for 
instance, in the context of delicts against the physical person,79 defamation,80 
misfeasance in public office,81 interference with contract,82 fraud or deceit,83 among 
others. It appears, therefore, that there is something special about recklessness; that 
being negligent because one tried to be careful and failed is not to be equated with 
being negligent simply because one did not make the effort to be careful. The law 
judges indifference more harshly than it does failure, equating it to intention.84 But 
negligence remains essentially connected to recklessness. 
                                                
 
 
75 See, e.g. Campbell (n 6) at 122 and Laurent v Lord Advocate (n 6) at 612. 
76 Guthrie Smith, Reparation 58. 
77 Glegg, Reparation 12. 
78 Walker, Delict 43. 
79 Reid v Mitchell (1885) 12 R 1129, esp at 1131 per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff. 
80 Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 at 145 per Viscount Dilhorne and 150 per Lord Diplock. 
81 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 3) (n 38) at § 44 per Lord Hope of Craighead. 
82 Emerald Construction Co Ltd v Lowthian [1966] 1 WLR 691 at 701 per Lord Denning. 
83 Boyd & Forrest v Glasgow and So-Western Rly Co 1912 SC (HL) 93 at 99 per Lord Atkinson. 
84 Walker, Delict 43. 
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As will be discussed in chapter 2, Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd85 listed recklessness as 
one of the possible forms of fault that could serve as ground for a damages claim in 
nuisance, alongside intention and negligence. This makes an odd inclusion: if 
nuisance is not one of those contexts mentioned above where negligence will simply 
not suffice, then what is the practical relevance of recklessness here? Moreover, even 
though Kennedy described recklessness in a way that seems to be very much in line 
with its previous understanding, as having “no regard to the question whether [one’s] 
action, if it was of a kind likely to cause harm to the other party, would have that 
result”,86 it brought with it different considerations that do not fit this understanding, 
leading to a distorted subsequent development of the notion.87 
 
3. STRICT AND “STRICTER-THAN-NORMAL” LIABILITY 
 
3.1. From fault-based to strict liability 
 
As Zweigert and Kötz explained, the distinction between fault-based and strict 
liability is not an “either-or situation”: in most legal systems “liability for fault 
imperceptibly shades into strict liability”.88 Consequently, it is possible to identify 
certain devices that fall somewhere in between these two notions, not only as 
successive steps in a historical trajectory from fault-based to strict liability, as the 
“transitional devices” recognised by Palmer,89 but actually as mechanisms that are 
designed to aid the pursuer to obtain compensation without compromising radically 
the fault principle. It is possible, then, to say that when these mechanisms operate 
liability is, borrowing Zimmermann’s terminology, “stricter-than-normal”,90 without 
becoming strict. One should be careful, however, when considering such 
                                                
 
 
85 Kennedy (n 14). 
86 Ibid at 100. 
87 See chapter 2 section 6. 
88 K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (T Weir tr, 3rd edn, 1998) 649. 
89 V V Palmer, “In Quest of a Strict Liability Standard Under the Code” (1982) 56 TulLR 1317 at 
1323. 
90 R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1996) 1133. 
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mechanisms, for on occasions they are designed or applied in a way that turns them 
into nothing but strict liability “in disguise”.91 
Both Zweigert & Kötz and Palmer identify among these devices the three 
mechanisms that Scottish lawyers have used to explain liability by virtue of 
dangerous conduct, as will be explained in chapter 3:92 heightened standards of care, 
presumptions of fault, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.93 
Therefore, this section seeks to explain the notion of strict liability stricto sensu, 
leaving the abovementioned mechanisms of stricter-than-normal liability to be 
explored later. 
 
3.2. Strict liability 
 
The idea of strict liability has received widespread academic attention, much of the 
debate focusing on its justification and compatibility with certain moral principles.94 
Paradoxically, the concept itself appears to be “left largely to intuition; all have used 
it, many have abused it, and rarely two lawyers attached the same meaning to it”.95 
Palmer has tried to flesh out this intuition, listing and analysing what he identifies as 
the key criteria to assess whether liability is strict or fault-based: an inelastic concept 
of unlawful harm, a factual test of causation that disregards proximate cause and 
omissions, and the reduction of defences available to the defendant.96 His approach 
is, however, flexible: none of these criteria is identified as the core of strict liability, 
focusing more on the overall compliance with them.97 This, of course, entails the 
understanding that some liabilities can be stricter than others, depending on how 
many – and how much – of these criteria are fulfilled. Palmer rejects the traditional 
approach that builds a binary classification on the basis of the single criterion of 
                                                
 
 
91 Ibid 1132-1133. 
92 See pp 114 and 119 below. 
93 Zweigert and Kötz (n 88) 650; Palmer (n 89) at 1323. 
94 See, among others, T Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (1999) ch 2, and R A Epstein, “A Theory of 
Strict Liability” (1973) 2 JLS 151; contrast with E J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (revised edn, 2012) 
ch 7. 
95 Palmer (n 89) at 1317. 
96 V V Palmer, “A General Theory of the Inner Structure of Strict Liability: Common Law, Civil 
Law, and Comparative Law” (1988) 62 TulLR 1303. 
97 Ibid at 1310. 
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presence or absence of fault, to understand strict liability “as a genus of liability and 
not a species”.98 
Arguably, however, strict liability does have a core. This translates indeed into 
a binary classification built upon the basis of a single criterion, but this criterion is not 
the actual presence or absence of fault, but rather whether averment and proof of 
fault is required and, consequently, whether its absence is admitted as a defence. This 
does not entail a rejection of Palmer’s criteria: it is possible to conceive stricter fault-
based liability rules (e.g. if there are devices that facilitate proof of fault) and stricter 
strict liability rules (e.g. if even defences based upon a break of the causal link are 
excluded99), though perhaps in this last case, the term “stricter” does not adopt a 
technical meaning but is only descriptive of its effect on the defender, i.e. it is a more 
stringent liability rule. 
In his landmark essay on the moral basis of strict liability, Honoré held that 
“liability is strict when it attaches to us by virtue of our conduct and its outcome 
alone, irrespective of fault”.100 But the reference to conduct in this notion can be 
misleading: strict liability does not rest on a negative judgment about conduct itself 
but only on it being the cause of a certain result. Fleming101 and Cane,102 on the 
other hand, remark that strict liability is imposed on injury that is neither intentional 
nor negligent, seemingly focusing on the actual absence of fault. But strict liability 
can be imposed when there is fault. Indeed, strict liability is in some contexts used as 
a way of relieving the victim from proving fault when it is actually present.103 As a 
more general claim, Cane argues that criteria of liability are nested, so “conduct 
which attracts strict liability may satisfy the legal definitions of negligent, reckless or 
intentional conduct”.104 Therefore, strict liability is imposed regardless of the presence 
or absence of fault, and not necessarily without or in absence of fault.105 
                                                
 
 
98 Ibid at 1310-1311. 
99 The typical example is provided by liability rules applicable to operations of nuclear installations. 
See e.g. Nuclear Installations Act 1965 s 13(4)(b). 
100 Honoré (n 94) 23. 
101 J G Fleming, An Introduction to the Law of Torts (2nd edn, 1985) 153. 
102 Cane, Anatomy (n 24) 45. 
103 Honoré (n 94) 23. 
104 Cane, Responsibility (n 23) 88. 
105 Witting (n 54) 15; J Gardner, “Some Rule-of-Law Anxieties about Strict Liability in Private Law” 
in L M Austin and D Klimchuck (eds), Private Law and the Rule of Law (2014) at 207. 
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This means two things. First, a strict liability rule does not require the pursuer 
to aver and prove fault in order to obtain compensation. Causation between the 
defender’s conduct and the harm suffered by the pursuer is a sufficient basis for 
liability. Secondly, a strict liability rule does not admit the absence of fault as a 
defence. 
The latter of these statements is linked with Palmer’s third criterion: in his view, 
liability is strict – or stricter – when admissible defences are fixed in number, are 
based upon the break of causation, and are more restricted by comparison to 
negligence.106 But the author, loyal to his flexible approach, does not pin down the 
exclusion of any particular defence as conclusive, in contrast with what is submitted 
here. 
There is one additional issue that requires to be clarified in order to delineate 
the boundaries of strict liability: the role of foreseeability of harm. It will become 
apparent in chapters 2 and 3 that, in some circumstances, foreseeability of harm is 
seen as a sufficient basis for the consideration of a liability rule as fault-based.107 On 
closer examination, however, it does not play that role. 
Foreseeability of harm is a pervasive notion in the law of negligence. It is 
present at the different stages of the negligence analysis, from the determination of 
the existence of a duty of care, to the standard of care and the delimitation of the 
scope of the defender’s liability.108 It has, indeed, been identified as one of the two 
“hallmarks” of the tort of negligence.109 Yet it is also an element that is featured as a 
requirement in some regimes traditionally described as of strict liability, most 
notably, the Rylands v Fletcher110 rule as qualified by the decision in Cambridge Water Co 
v Eastern Counties Leather plc.111 This requirement has been construed not only as 
evidence of the expansive influence of the tort of negligence112 but also as an 
                                                
 
 
106 Palmer, “General Theory” (n 96) at 1330. 
107 See chapter 2, section 4.2.3; and chapter 3, section 3.1.3. 
108 Smith, Short Commentary 669. 
109 T Weir, “The Staggering March of Negligence” in P Cane and J Stapleton (eds), The Law of 
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indication of the true nature of liability as fault-based.113 In Scots law, a similar 
position has been held by Whitty, who argued that 
 
“strict liability” in delict has reference to the requirement of the defender’s knowledge or 
foreseeability of the certainty or risk of harm to the pursuer. If liability depends on the pursuer 
establishing that the defender knew, or ought to have known, that the harm suffered by the 
pursuer was certain or likely to result from the defender’s acts or omissions, or if the defender 
can escape liability by establishing that he did not have such knowledge or constructive 
knowledge, then liability cannot be said to be “strict” in the normal sense of that term.114 
 
It is unquestionable that foreseeability of harm is an essential requirement of 
negligence-based liability. It is less certain, however, that foreseeability of harm is an 
ingredient of intention-based liability, for intention requires actual knowledge of the 
certainty of harm on the part of the defender, even though the establishment of such 
knowledge often requires resort to objective indicators.115 Foreseeability is not the 
same as knowledge. Foreseeability, moreover, is not even implied in knowledge: if 
one knows a particular consequence will certainly result from one’s action, even if it 
cannot be said to be reasonably foreseeable, it can still be considered as an intended 
consequence, depending on the notion of intention adopted.  
As Nolan has so simply articulated, “[a]lthough there can be no fault without 
foreseeability, there can be foreseeability without fault”, supporting the compatibility 
of a foreseeability requirement with a strict liability rule.116 And this is the case 
because foreseeability of harm is not concerned with the definitional elements of the 
different forms of fault as outlined above. A rule like the one in Rylands is not one of 
negligence because, as Weir pointed out, the (un)reasonableness of the conduct is still 
irrelevant; “it remains a tort of strict liability for the foreseeable consequences”.117 
Further, the fact that harm was foreseeable is not equivalent to knowing it will 
certainly occur. 
                                                
 
 
113 Cane, Anatomy (n 24) 49 and 144. 
114 Whitty, “Nuisance” (reissue) § 88. See also § 95, esp fn 7. 
115 Reid, “‘That Unhappy Expression’” (n 32) at 442. The issue is discussed further in chapter 2, 
section 4.2. 
116 D Nolan, “The Distinctiveness of Rylands v Fletcher” (2005) 121 LQR 421 at 444. 
117 Weir (n 112) at 107. In a similar line, see G T Schwartz, “Rylands v Fletcher, Negligence, and Strict 
Liability” in P Cane and J Stapleton (eds), The Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming 
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Requiring foreseeability of harm in the context of a strict liability rule is a way 
of restricting the scope of liability to exclude consequences that are simply too far-
fetched. As Cane suggests, it is arguable that even when liability is strict, 
 
people ought to be in a position to take into account of their potential legal liabilities in 
advance in deciding what activities to engage in and on what scale; and a person cannot 
reasonably be expected to take account of freakish or unexpected or unusual events.118 
 
It has even been argued that one cannot meaningfully speak about a wrong if harm is 
not a foreseeable consequence of it.119 In the context of negligence, such 
considerations are normally analysed under the notion of remoteness, but they do not 
seem to be exclusive to this head of liability. Whitty’s argument fails to take this role 
of foreseeability into account. 
In sum, the fact that liability only extends to foreseeable harm does not 
determine its nature as fault-based: strict liability may also be limited by a 
requirement of foreseeability. 
 
3.3. Heightened standard of care 
 
The first instance in which a case of stricter-than-normal liability has been identified 
is when a “heightened standard of care” operates for activities that entail a high risk. 
As explained above, negligence is the breach of a standard of reasonable care, a 
notion that is sensitive, among other elements, to risk, i.e. the probability of harm 
and/or its potential magnitude.120 Consequently, the standard of reasonable care 
associated with a given conduct will be higher if the risk created by such conduct is 
higher. This is the normal operation of the rules of negligence. Thus, a heightened 
standard of care in this sense does not entail stricter-than-normal liability. It might, of 
course, lead to a very demanding standard that will be very difficult to meet and, 
accordingly, its breach will be easier to establish and difficult to defeat. But this result 
is contingent: it will depend on the circumstance of all other relevant elements 
                                                
 
 
118 P Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (8th edn, 2013) 117-118. 
119 D G Owen, “Figuring Foreseeability” (2009) 44 Wake Forest LR 1277 at 1277-1278. 
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remaining the same, especially those that could lower the standard (e.g. high costs of 
taking precautions). 
Some authors, however, identify a heightening of the standard of care that goes 
beyond reasonable care. Walker, for instance, explains that there are “a number of 
cases where a more stringent duty than that of merely taking reasonable care to avoid 
causing unintended harm to another is exacted and where liability is imposed despite 
the absence of ‘fault’ in the ordinary sense”.121 This type of case, where what is 
imposed is the standard of the “highest possible” care or the “utmost” care, is not 
distinguishable from strict liability,122 for the standard is either designed or applied in 
a way that leads to the inescapable conclusion of its breach.123 It is an instance of 
what Zimmermann described as strict liability in disguise.124 Its explanation in terms 
of fault, argues Walker, “springs from a wish to maintain the appearance that all 
liability in Scots law depends on fault”.125 
Consequently, the only possible version of a stricter-than-normal liability based 
upon a heightened standard of care would be one where the standard lies just 
between reasonable care and the highest possible care, a possibility that appears as 
rather artificial – and unseen at least in the Scottish context.126 
 
3.4. Presumption of fault 
 
Liability can be also be conceived as stricter-than-normal when it is imposed by 
virtue of the operation of a presumption of fault. 
The treatment of presumptions in Scotland is a largely uncontroversial and 
stable matter.127 The notions outlined by the Institutional writers128 remain to a large 
                                                
 
 
121 Walker, Delict 284. 
122 Palmer, “In Quest of a Strict Liability Standard” (n 89) at 1324. 
123 Zweigert and Kötz (n 88) 650. 
124 See n 91 above. 
125 Walker, Delict 284 
126 They are conceivable, perhaps, in statutory form: Law Commission, Civil Liability for Dangerous 
Things and Activities (Law Com No 32, 1970) 2 fn 3. 
127 W D H Sellar, “Presumptions in Scots Law” in R H Helmholz and W D H Sellar (eds), The Law of 
Presumptions: Essays in Comparative Legal History (2009) at 219. 
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extent relevant and are referred to in contemporary treatises on the law of 
evidence.129 
“Presumptions”, in the words of Erskine, “are consequences drawn from facts 
notorious or already proved, which infer the certainty, or at least a strong probability, 
of other facts to be proved”.130 Consequently, in a presumption of fault, the notorious 
or proved fact of harm being caused by a certain act or omission or in certain 
circumstances leads to the inference of the certainty or strong probability of the fact 
of it being the consequence of fault on the part of the defender, relieving the pursuer 
from the burden of proving it. Yet the strength of this inference depends on the 
nature of the presumption. 
Scots law recognises three kinds of presumptions. The first kind are 
presumptions juris et de jure, or irrebuttable presumptions of law. As their name 
suggests, they do not admit evidence to the contrary.131 Therefore, where a 
presumption of fault of this type is in place, the defender cannot discharge it by 
proving absence of fault. There is, however, general agreement in that these are not 
true presumptions, but simply rules of substantive law.132 In this sense, an 
irrebuttable presumption of fault is nothing more than a rule of liability regardless of 
fault, i.e. a strict liability rule, according to the notion of strict liability adopted in this 
chapter. 
Presumptions of the second kind, juris tantum or rebuttable presumptions of law, 
are generally seen as true presumptions. These are clearly recognised by statute, 
custom or judicial decision, and their effect is to relieve the pursuer from proving the 
inferred fact, burdening the defender with the proof of the absence of such fact.133 
Thus, when what is presumed is fault, it operates a shift in the burden of proof: it is 
not the defender who will have to argue and demonstrate that the defender acted 
with fault, but the latter who will have to argue and demonstrate that he acted 
                                                
 
 
129 See M Ross and J Chalmers, Walker and Walker The Law of Evidence in Scotland (4th edn, 2015) § 3.1. F 
P Davidson, Evidence (2007) does not make express reference to the Institutional writers but the 
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130 Erskine, Institute 4.2.34. 
131 Ross and Chalmers (n 129) § 3.1.1. 
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without it to escape liability. A rule of this sort can be accurately described as one of 
stricter-than-normal liability. 
Finally the third kind, rebuttable presumptions of fact or hominis vel judicis, arise 
by reference to the facts and circumstances of the particular case.134 It is also 
questionable whether they are, indeed, true presumptions, as they appear to “involve 
no more than the drawing of the obvious inferences from the facts”,135 and they have 
been seen simply as circumstantial evidence.136 Accordingly, the court can logically 
infer the existence of fault from the proved facts of the case at issue. It does not entail 
a stricter-than-normal liability: it is still the pursuer’s burden to aver fault and to 
prove, if necessary, the facts that can allow the court to reach such conclusion. 
Consequently, rebuttable presumptions of law are the only type of presumption 
the operation of which allows the characterisation of liability as stricter-than-normal. 
 
3.5. Res ipsa loquitur 
 
The last of the devices that is identified as turning liability into a stricter-than-normal 
one is the so-called doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; “the matter speaks for itself”.137 The 
doctrine finds its traditional formulation in the English case of Scott v London and St 
Katherine Docks Co: 
 
There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where the thing is shewn to be under the 
management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course 
of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords 
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose 
from want of care.138 
 




135 Davidson (n 129) § 4.47. 
136 See discussion in Sellar (n 127) at 212-218. For Ross and Chalmers (n 129) § 3.3.1, presumptions of 
fact and circumstantial evidence are different, though they acknowledge that they are “frequently 
difficult to distinguish”. 
137 F M Wheelock and R A LaFleur, Wheelock’s Latin (7th edn, 2011) 355. 
138 Scott v London and St Katherine Docks Co (1865) 3 H & C 596 at 601. The formulation is consistently 
cited by Scottish authority: see, e.g. Ballard v North British Railway Co 1923 SC (HL) 43 at 48 per Lord 




Consequently, the doctrine affords an evidentiary aid for the pursuer: it facilitates 
proof of negligence, specifically of the breach of the standard of care, assistance that 
becomes especially relevant where the relevant information about the facts is within 
the knowledge of the defender.139 
The doctrine, however, provides moderate assistance only. According to the 
leading modern Scottish authority, Devine v Colvilles Ltd, “the maxim is of limited 
ambit”.140 It operates within restricted boundaries and even within them its effects 
are limited. 
These boundaries are well established:141 res ipsa loquitur will only operate when 
(a) the object or structure causing the accidents was under the exclusive control of the 
defender at the relevant time;142 (b) the accident is one that normally does not 
happen if proper care is taken;143 and (c) the accident remains unexplained.144 
When these requirements are fulfilled, there is prima facie evidence of 
negligence, and it is for the defender to offer an explanation that is consistent with 
the absence of negligence,145 that is, “that the accident could have happened despite 
reasonable care on the defender’s part”.146 It is important to stress this point: in some 
accounts, the doctrine is seen as a presumption of negligence, requiring from the 
defender to demonstrate his diligence in order to discharge it.147 But this is not its 
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142 See, e.g. Booth v Macmillan 1972 SC 197 at 199, where the involvement of third parties was regarded 
as enough to rule out the application of res ipsa loquitur. In the same line, see Murray v Edinburgh District 
Council 1981 SLT 253 at 256. Contrast with the more recent McDyer v The Celtic Football and Athletic Co 
Ltd 2000 SC 379 at 385-386. 
143 Ballard (n 138) at 53 per Lord Dunedin. A good example is provided by the collision in NG Chun Pui 
v Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298, where a coach travelling in one direction crossed the central 
reservation and reached a vehicle travelling in the opposite direction. 
144 Ballard (n 138) at 48 per Lord Chancellor (Cave). For this reason, res ipsa loquitur was not applicable 
in McQueen v The Glasgow Garden Festival (1988) Ltd 1995 SLT 211 at 214: the cause of the accident was 
clearly explained. See also the more recent David T Morrison & Co Ltd v ICL Plastics Ltd 2013 SC 391; 
[2013] CSIH 19 §§ 37-38. 
145 Devine v Colvilles Ltd (n 138) at 100 per Lord Guest. 
146 Smith, Short Commentary 669. 
147 See, e.g. Viscounts Haldane and Finlay’s speeches in Ballard (n 138) at 49 and 52. In Fleming’s 
view, this “heresy” gained ground in England: Fleming (n 101) 151-152. Cane, Responsibility (n 23) 46 
also identifies this as one of the interpretations of the doctrine. 
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effect; it is not a presumption of fault.148 The doctrine does not alter the onus of proof 
but only throws on the defender the burden of offering an alternative explanation 
that is consistent with diligence.149 When the defender is able to produce this 
explanation, he is not yet free from liability, but the pursuer has to then provide 
actual evidence of negligence: he is back at “square one”.150 This stands in clear 
contrast with a proper rebuttable presumption of law in regard to fault, in the sense 
described above, which actually reverses the onus and can only be discharged by 
demonstrating diligence. Once diligence has been proved, the defender escapes 
liability. It also stands in contrast with a presumption of fact in regard to fault, for in 
res ipsa loquitur the court is tightly constrained as to the circumstances from which the 
inference can be made, and also as to the effects of such inference. 
 
4. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter set out the conceptual framework of this thesis. Its arguments are 
concerned with the basis of liability in the context of neighbourhood, i.e. the 
discussion as to liability being fault-based or strict. Consequently, this chapter 
outlined the working concepts that provide necessary content for such discussion. 
First, fault-based liability was addressed. Even though it is difficult to outline an 
overarching concept of fault, some notions are offered about its different forms and 
the boundaries between them: intention, malice, negligence and recklessness. 
Secondly, strict liability was discussed. It was distinguished, on the one hand, 
from “normal” fault-based liability and, on the other hand, from forms of liability 
that can be seen as “stricter-than-normal”: heightened standards of care, 
presumptions of fault, and res ipsa loquitur. 
On the basis of these general notions, these concepts will be considered 
extensively in the different contexts of the law of neighbours, throughout the 
following chapters of this thesis. 
                                                
 
 
148 Ballard (n 138) at 54 per Lord Dunedin; see also the useful explanation by Lord Griffiths in NG Chun 
Pui v Lee Chuen Tat (n 143) at 300-301. 
149 Devine v Colvilles Ltd (n 138) at 100 per Lord Guest. 
150 Ibid at 102 per Lord Donovan. See also Lord Justice-Clerk Cooper’s explanation in Elliot v Young’s 










Since the House of Lords’ decision in RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional 
Council, and after a long line of seemingly contradictory authorities, the question 
about the basis of liability in nuisance was partially settled: damages are awarded 
only upon proof of fault, at least as a general rule.1 The settlement was only partial 
because Lord Fraser’s speech did not make completely clear what amounted to an 
averment of fault.2 
Further clarification arrived with the Inner House decision in the case of 
Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd,3 where the court outlined a catalogue of types of conduct that 
amounted to fault in this context. After reiterating fault as the basis of liability in 
nuisance, and further distinguishing liability in nuisance and liability in negligence, 
Lord President Hope stated that 
 
Culpa which gives rise to a liability in delict may take various forms. In vol 14, Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia, Nuisance, para 2087, it is stated that the usual categories of culpa or fault are 
malice, intent, recklessness and negligence. To that list there may be added conduct causing a 
special risk of abnormal damage where it may be said that it is not necessary to prove a specific 
fault as fault is necessarily implied in the result […].4 
 
Subsequently, and after considering some of the relevant authority, he proceeded to 
explain briefly these concepts: 
 
The essential requirement is that fault or culpa must be established. That may be done by 
demonstrating negligence, in which case the ordinary principles of the law of negligence will 
provide an equivalent remedy. Or it may be done by demonstrating that the defender was at 
fault in some other respect. This may be because his action was malicious, or because it was 
                                                
 
 
1 RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17 at 39-45 per Lord Fraser of 
Tullybelton. Two different accounts of this evolution are offered by R Zimmermann and P Simpson, 
“Liability among Neighbours” in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland, 
vol 2 (2000), and G D L Cameron, “Neighbourhood Liability in Scotland 1850-2000” in J Gordley 
(ed), The Development of Liability between Neighbours (2010). 
2 An aspect highlighted, shortly after, by the discussion in Argyll & Clyde Health Board v Strathclyde 
Regional Council 1988 SLT 381. For more details about this case, see p 70 below. 
3 Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95. 
4 Ibid at 99. 
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deliberate in the knowledge that his action would result in harm to the other party, or because 
it was reckless as he had no regard to the question whether his action, if it was of a kind likely to 
cause harm to the other party, would have that result. Or it may be – and this is perhaps just 
another example of recklessness – because the defender has indulged in conduct which gives 
rise to a special risk of abnormal damage, from which fault is implied if damage results from 
that conduct. In each case personal responsibility rests on the defender because he has 
conducted himself in a respect which is recognised as inferring culpa by our law. So what is 
required is a deliberate act or negligence or some other conduct from which culpa or fault may 
be inferred.5 
 
This model is currently analysed in terms of a fault “continuum”,6 placing malice on 
one end of the spectrum and negligence on the other end, whereas the position of 
conduct causing special risk of abnormal damage within the spectrum is not clear. In 
this continuum, as the term itself suggests, there are no clear delimitation lines 
between the different categories of fault. 
Apart from the questions of whether the previous authority supported the fault-
based account of nuisance and whether this is the most appropriate approach for 
nuisance, Scots law made a choice here. The choice was seemingly animated by an 
intention to reassert the civilian character of the law of delict.7 Paradoxically, the 
system that provided the model for the fault continuum was not a civilian one: as will 
be explained, the source of the model was the American Rest (2d), in what can 
perhaps be described as a partial legal transplant. This adoption, however, is not 
wholly unproblematic, and the aim of this chapter is to address those problems. 
Five arguments will be made in this chapter. The first four arguments are 
attached respectively to the first four forms of fault offered by the fault continuum.8 
The last argument evaluates the very notion of the fault continuum. The first 
argument is that malice is a mostly unnecessary and unpractical form of fault in the 
nuisance framework (section 3). The second argument is that intention, in the broad 
version adopted by Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd and subsequent case law and literature, 
comes very close to a form of strict liability, so if the aim of the courts is a firm 
adherence to the fault principle, then some adjustments are needed (section 4). The 
                                                
 
 
5 Ibid at 100-101. 
6 Whitty, “Nuisance” (reissue) § 89; Cameron (n 1) at 150. 
7 Smith, Short Commentary 534; N R Whitty, “Reasonable Neighbourhood: the Province and Analysis of 
Private Nuisance in Scots law. Part I” (1982) 27 JLSS 497 at 498. 
8 Arguments related to the last alleged form of fault – causing a special risk of abnormal damage – are 
developed in chapter 3. 
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third argument is that negligence can be accommodated as a form of fault within the 
framework of nuisance, despite the view that negligent nuisance should be dealt with 
under the ordinary principles governing negligence (section 5). The fourth argument 
is that recklessness has developed as a mental state of pure knowledge of likelihood of 
harm that cannot readily be categorised as a form of fault (section 6). Finally, it will 
be argued that the analysis of fault as a continuum in this context is unconvincing, for 
two reasons. On the one hand, the categories at the extremes – malice, intention as 
purpose, and causing special risk of abnormal damage – are by their own nature 
excluded from the alleged continuum. On the other hand, even for the remaining 
elements, depicting fault as a continuum is conceptually inaccurate and misleading 
(section 7). 
Before proceeding with the arguments, a brief analysis of this framework is 
offered. 
 
2. THE FAULT FRAMEWORK ADOPTED IN KENNEDY V GLENBELLE LTD 
 
In order to achieve a better comprehension and to provide the adequate background 
for the arguments presented in this chapter, this section offers an analysis of the fault 
model adopted by Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd for damages claims in nuisance. First, the 
origin of this model will be explained (section 2.1), and the model both in the version 
adopted in the abovementioned decision and in its sources will be described (section 
2.2). The model will then be contrasted with its “original” version, i.e. the one 
adopted in the Rest (2d) (section 2.3), concluding with an explanation of the notion of 
fault continuum used to describe the model (section 2.4). 
 
2.1. Origin of the model 
 
The origin of the model, as indicated by Lord President Hope, is para 2087 of Niall 
Whitty’s “Nuisance” entry in SME. Whitty was writing after RHM Bakeries, so the 
fault-based account of nuisance had already been adopted. In that context, he 




which of the usual categories of culpa or fault – malice (aemulatio or spite), intent, recklessness, 
negligence, and conduct causing a special risk of abnormal danger – or in other words what 
types of delictual conduct on the part of the defender are actionable by reference to the test of 
plus quam tolerabile, and which categories are actionable by reference to the ordinary principles 
of negligence. This is probably now the most important single issue in the modern Scots law of 
nuisance. Yet there is scant direct Scottish authority on that issue […].9 
 
Whitty did not mention the source of this catalogue of types of fault, apart from a 
reference to the case of Miller v Robert Addie & Sons’ Collieries Ltd10 for the last category. 
He then stated that the lines have to be drawn “by reference to general principle, 
having regard also to Anglo-American authorities which afford considerable 
assistance”.11 
In the later reissue of his “Nuisance” entry (2001), the reference to general 
principle and Anglo-American authorities was abandoned and replaced by a 
reference to Kennedy as approving the proposition made in the previous version of the 
entry.12 
The model was not derived, therefore, directly from Scottish authority. It has 
indeed been described as “an example of legal borrowing”:13 it mirrors to a great 
extent the model adopted by the American Rest (2d) for the basis of liability in 
nuisance,14 to which Whitty refers throughout his analysis, in both versions of his 
entry.15 
The content of this model will be, consequently, outlined according to the way 
it is presented by Kennedy, as well as by reference to its immediate source, that is, 
Whitty’s “Nuisance” original entry, with some refinements introduced in the reissue, 
and its mediate source, namely, the American Rest (2d), with some references to its 




                                                
 
 
9 Whitty, “Nuisance” § 2087. 
10 Miller v Robert Addie & Sons’ Collieries Ltd 1934 SC 150. 
11 Whitty, “Nuisance” § 2087. 
12 Whitty, “Nuisance” (reissue) § 87. 
13 G D L Cameron, “Scots and English Nuisance... Much the Same Thing?” (2005) 9 EdinLR 98 at 
118. 
14 Rest (2d) §§ 822 and 825. 
15 Whitty, “Nuisance” §§ 2089, 2092 and 2106; Whitty, “Nuisance” (reissue) §§ 89, 92 and 106. 
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2.2. Description of the model 
 
2.2.1. The model as presented by Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 
 
Lord Hope explained in Kennedy that if the test which is peculiar to nuisance – the plus 
quam tolerabile test – is satisfied and fault is established, the requirements of liability in 
damages for nuisance are fulfilled.16 He then listed five different types of conduct 
that, if demonstrated, would establish fault for these purposes: negligent conduct, 
malicious conduct, conduct that is deliberate in the knowledge that harm will result, 
reckless conduct, and conduct which gives rise to a special risk of abnormal damage. 
Not much can be concluded from the case itself as to the links between the different 
categories of fault, except the possible overlap between the last two types of conduct, 
suggested by Lord President Hope.17 There are, however, some interesting remarks 
that deserve to be noted about two of these categories. 
First, in the case of negligent conduct, it is submitted that “the ordinary 
principles of the law of negligence will provide an equivalent remedy”.18 The 
meaning of this statement is not fully clear and will be explored in section 5 below.  
Secondly, about conduct creating special risk of abnormal damage, “it may be 
said that it is not necessary to prove a specific fault as fault is necessarily implied in 
the result”,19 and specific reference is made to Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff’s much-
discussed dictum in Chalmers v Dixon.20 Lord Hope mentions, then, three other cases 
that followed this dictum: Edinburgh Railway Access and Property Co v John Ritchie & Co,21 
Hester v MacDonald,22 and Noble’s Trustees v Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd.23 The content 
of these dicta will be considered for the discussion of intentional harm,24 as well as for 
the discussion of conduct giving rise to special risk of abnormal damage in chapter 3. 
                                                
 
 
16 Kennedy (n 3) at 99. 
17 Ibid at 100. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid at 99. 
20 Chalmers v Dixon (1876) 3 R 461 at 464. 
21 Edinburgh Railway Access and Property Co v John Ritchie & Co (1903) 5 F 299. 
22 Hester v MacDonald 1961 SC 370. 
23 Nobles Trustee’s v Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd 1988 SLT 662. 




2.2.2. Immediate source: Niall Whitty’s “Nuisance” entry in the SME 
 
In his treatment of nuisance, Whitty makes a fundamental distinction between 
intentional and negligent harm, grouping together under the first heading malicious 
conduct, i.e. with the purpose of causing harm (in aemulationem), and conduct carried 
out with the knowledge – actual or constructive – that harm will certainly result from 
it.25 The relevance of this fundamental division is that, in his view, different tests 
operate for each category: the plus quam tolerabile test26 applies only to intentional 
harm,27 whereas negligent harm must be actionable according to “the general rules 
regulating liability for negligent conduct”.28 
Recklessness is neither explained nor placed clearly in this division, but only 
mentioned as a form of fault and located somewhere between intention and 
negligence by reference to the underlying level of risk: the risk is higher than in 
negligence but lower than in intention.29 
Conduct creating special risk of abnormal damage, which was only mentioned 
as a form of fault but not explained in the original entry, is discussed in the reissue 
and described as an “impure taxonomic category”, for it is defined by reference to a 
different element: the gravity of possible harm, as opposed to the mental element in 
the other types of conduct. Consequently, this type of conduct can overlap with the 
other forms of fault. The case of Chalmers v Dixon is mentioned simply as one of the 
“several judicial descriptions” of this type of conduct, but Whitty reproduces that 




                                                
 
 
25 Whitty, “Nuisance” §§ 2015 and 2016, division preserved in Whitty, “Nuisance” (reissue) §§ 105 and 
106. 
26 Described in Watt v Jamieson 1954 SC 56 at 58. 
27 Whitty, “Nuisance” § 2105. 
28 Ibid § 2106. 
29 Ibid § 2089. 
30 Noble’s Trs (n 23) at 664. 
31 Whitty, “Nuisance” (reissue) § 108. 
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2.2.3. Mediate source: Rest (2d) 
 
The division in the Rest (2d) is slightly different from the framework above. 
According to § 822, the invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of 
land is either (a) intentional or (b) unintentional. 
Intent, according to § 8A, denotes “that the actor desires to cause consequences 
of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result 
from it”. Intentional invasion, therefore, includes conduct carried out for the purpose 
of causing that invasion and conduct carried out with the knowledge that it will result 
(§ 825), and it is actionable if the invasion is unreasonable according to §§ 822 and 
826. 
Unintentional invasion, i.e. invasion that does not fall in the previous 
description, is actionable if it follows from negligent, reckless or abnormally 
dangerous conduct, according to the general rules applicable to each of these types of 
conduct (§ 822(b)). 
For negligent conduct, these general rules are contained in §§ 281-328D. 
Detailed explanation of these rules is unnecessary here, since in this aspect, the Scots 
model did not borrow inspiration from the American rules. 
The position of reckless conduct in the Rest (2d) is clearly on the side of 
unintentional invasions precisely because the invasion is unintended, even though the 
act or omission that causes the harm is – and must be – intentional in the sense of 
deliberate.32 But, at the same time, reckless conduct is expressly excluded from the 
definition of negligence.33 A person’s conduct is in “reckless disregard of safety of 
another”, according to § 500,  
 
if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, 
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not 
only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that 
such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. 
 
                                                
 
 
32 Rest (2d) § 500 comments b and f. 
33 Ibid § 282. 
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Recklessness, therefore, includes two types of cases: in the first type, the wrongdoer 
knows or should know those facts and, realising that such risk exists, proceeds 
deliberately with indifference to it; in the second type, the wrongdoer knows or 
should know those facts, but fails to appreciate the risk and proceeds accordingly.34 It 
can, consequently, be constructed on a double fiction: the fiction that the wrongdoer 
knows the facts that would lead him to realise the risk, because there are reasons for 
him to know even if he actually does not; and the fiction that he realises that risk 
exists on the basis of those facts, because a reasonable man would have such 
realisation, even if he actually does not. 
The difference between negligence and recklessness lies essentially on the 
magnitude of the risk, but it is a difference in degree “so marked as to amount 
substantially to a difference in kind”.35 The analysis developed in the Rest (2d) rests 
on a proportion between risk and utility: depending on the degree of disproportion, 
the conduct can be either negligent or reckless, or even get closer to intention, where 
“there is a marked tendency to give the conduct a legal effect closely analogous to 
that given conduct (sic) which is intended to cause the resulting harm”.36 Thus, 
reckless conduct takes elements both from intentional invasions and from negligent 
conduct: the rules for determining liability for reckless conduct are the same that 
apply to negligence,37 but with certain exceptions that bring reckless conduct closer 
to intention. First, recklessness can be taken into account to determine the existence 
of a causal link that would not be found where the conduct is merely negligent;38 
secondly, the victim’s contributory negligence does not bar recovery for recklessly 
caused harm as it would if it were caused only negligently;39 thirdly, reckless conduct 
might serve as justification for a punitive damages award.40 
Abnormally dangerous activities, in turn, attract strict liability, according to § 
519. Liability, it is stated, is neither based upon intention nor on negligence, either in 
carrying out the activity itself or in the way it is carried out; it is based simply upon 
                                                
 
 
34 Rest (2d) § 500 comment a. 
35 Ibid § 500 comment g. 
36 Ibid § 282 comment e. 
37 Ibid § 501 (1). 
38 Ibid § 501 (2). 
39 Ibid § 503 (1). 
40 Ibid § 908 (2). 
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the abnormal danger it creates, whatever the level of care displayed to prevent the 
damage.41 The determination of what is “abnormally dangerous” depends on a 
number of factors listed in § 520, none of which is necessarily sufficient, nor is there 
need for all of them to be present:42 the degree of risk, the inability to eliminate the 
risk with reasonable care, the place where it is carried out and its social value, among 
others. The difference with negligence lies, again, in the contrast between utility and 
risk, but in this case the line is drawn where the proportion is reversed: if utility 
outweighs risk, negligence is conceptually excluded because, in this case, risk is not 
unreasonable,43 but strict liability based upon abnormal danger remains open.44 It is 
not clear how this rule is to be reconciled with the rules indicating the factors that 
must be taken into account to determine utility (§ 292) and risk (§ 293) for the 
purposes of negligence. As observed elsewhere,45 there is such an overlap between 
these factors that the distinction between an abnormally dangerous activity and 
negligent conduct might be nothing more than procedural. This and other criticisms 
were noted by the drafters of the Rest (3d)46 so that the new rules for abnormally 
dangerous activities exclude several of the overlapping elements – most notably, 
social value – and the remaining ones are considered necessary requirements (§ 20). 
 
2.3. Rest (2d) and Scots model contrasted 
 
The treatment of intentional and negligent harm in the Rest (2d) coincides largely 
with Whitty’s version of the model for Scots law. In both models, a broad sense of 
intention is adopted, including not only those consequences the defender has the 
purpose to bring about (henceforth, “intention as purpose”), but also those the 
defender knows will certainly result (henceforth, “intention as knowledge”). A further 
test is required to assess that harm: in the Rest (2d), the unreasonableness test; in the 
                                                
 
 
41 Ibid § 510 comment d. 
42 Ibid § 520 comment f. 
43 Ibid § 291. 
44 Ibid § 520 comment b. 
45 See p 102 below. 
46 § 20, reporters’ note to comment k. 
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Scots version, the plus quam tolerabile test, also based on reasonableness.47 Malicious 
conduct is, in the Rest (2d), not only intentional but also unreasonable;48 whereas 
according to Whitty, the primary purpose of the conduct causing the invasion is one 
of the relevant factors taken into account to determine whether the invasion is plus 
quam tolerabile, so when this purpose is malicious, the invasion will be considered to 
fulfil the test.49 It is possible, nevertheless, to identify some relevant differences in 
these models’ approach to the different forms of fault. 
The first difference concerns the role of malice. The Rest (2d) is clear in 
pointing out that for an invasion to be intentional there is no need for it to be 
malicious.50 Malice, i.e., “the sole purpose of causing harm”, plays its role essentially 
in the reasonableness test.51 Whitty did not draw this line so clearly. Throughout his 
exposition, malice is indeed defined in accordance with the Rest (2d),52 but is 
identified as the first form of intention, namely intention as purpose. The author 
distinguishes, as forms of intention, malice – as the sole purpose to harm – from 
intention as knowledge,53 and this is the distinction that is reflected in Kennedy;54 
whereas the Rest (2d) distinguishes, as forms intention, intention as purpose from 
intention as knowledge, leaving malice outside the picture. Paradoxically, intention in 
its more obvious sense – as purpose – seems to fall through the cracks in Whitty’s 
model. But if knowledge of certainty of harm is treated as a form of intention by the 
model, it is only logical that the purpose of bringing about harm must be treated 
accordingly. 
There is a further difference in the treatment of intention. In Whitty’s model, 
intention as knowledge includes not only the consequences that the defender actually 
                                                
 
 
47 Whitty, “Nuisance” (reissue) §§ 39-41. It is possible, however, to note differences between both 
understandings of reasonableness: compare Rest (2d) §§ 826-828 with Lord President Cooper’s 
formulation in Watt v Jamieson (n 26) at 58. 
48 Rest (2d) § 829 (a). 
49 Whitty, “Nuisance” § 2068. 
50 Rest (2d) § 825 comment c. 
51 Ibid § 829 (a). 
52 Whitty, “Nuisance” §§ 2069, 2089 and 2015. 
53 Whitty, “Nuisance” § 2087 and 2089. 
54 Kennedy (n 3) at 100 per Lord President Hope: “This may be because his action was malicious, or 
because it was deliberate in the knowledge that his action would result in harm…”. 
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knew would result, but also those he ought to have known would result.55 §§ 8A and 825 
of the Rest (2d) and their comments, on the contrary, do not seem to incorporate 
those consequences which the defendant should have known would result, limiting 
the definition to actual knowledge. Both issues related to intention are discussed 
further below.56 
Negligence, in contrast, receives a similar treatment in both models: in the Rest 
(2d) negligence is assessed according to the general rules on liability for negligence, 
just as it should in Scots law according to Whitty. In this point, both models resort to 
their own well-established systems of rules. The question about the rules applicable to 
negligent nuisance, however, has not been free from debate in Scots law.57 
Recklessness is treated differently and certainly in more detail in the Rest (2d). 
As explained, reckless conduct is on the side of unintentional invasions. Apart from 
the particularities of the required – or imputed – knowledge and the specific level of 
underlying risk, determination of liability follows the rules of negligence, but some of 
the consequences associated with intentional invasions are attached to reckless 
invasions. Recklessness in the model adopted for Scots law, on the other hand, is not 
developed, but only listed as one of the possible forms of fault,58 and placed 
somewhere between intention and negligence.59 The precise position of recklessness 
with regard to the fundamental intentional/negligent harm division and their 
respective tests, and the different consequences possibly attached to reckless conduct 
– if any – are not spelled out. The point is revisited later in this chapter.60 
Dangerous activities receive, at least on the surface, a different treatment. In 
the Rest (2d), liability for abnormally dangerous activities is based upon the creation 
of the relevant risk, and not on fault. There is a complex system of rules designed to 
determine when such risk has been created, and once this is verified, liability is strict. 
Conversely, conduct creating a special risk of abnormal damage is considered in the 
Scottish model as a form of fault. Nevertheless, in neither system are the rules clear-
                                                
 
 
55 Whitty, “Nuisance” § 2105. 
56 See sections 3.2 and 4.2. 
57 See section 5 below. 
58 Whitty, “Nuisance” § 2087. 
59 Ibid § 2089. 
60 See section 6.1 below. 
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cut. In the Rest (2d), it was pointed out that the overlap of the elements listed in § 520 
for abnormal danger and the elements listed in §§ 292-293 for unreasonable risk has 
the consequence of blurring the distinction between strict liability and negligence, 
leading to a subsequent adjustment in the Rest (3d), as noted above.61 In Scotland, 
although the orthodox view characterises the rule as fault-based, there are good 
reasons to argue that it is in fact a strict liability rule, as will be discussed in chapter 
3.62 
In sum, despite the clear inspiration found in the Rest (2d) by the model 
adopted in Kennedy from Whitty’s proposal, a closer look shows that there are several 
differences in the way these models approach particular forms of fault or particular 
aspects of them. Consequently, these differences must be taken into account when 
looking at the Rest (2d) as a source for interpretation of the Scottish version of the 
model. Each of these aspects is considered in detail in the following sections. 
 
2.4. Sense in which the model features a continuum 
 
When presenting the different types of conduct causing harm, Whitty explains that 
there is “a continuum moving from intent down through recklessness to negligence”.63 
To explain this notion, he refers to § 8A of the Rest (2d): 
 
All consequences which the actor desires to bring about are intended, as the word is used in this 
Restatement. Intent is not, however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor 
knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still 
goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result. As the 
probability that the consequences will follow decreases, and becomes less than substantial 
certainty, the actor’s conduct loses the character of intent, and becomes mere recklessness, as 
defined in § 500. As the probability decreases further, and amounts only to a risk that the result 
will follow, it becomes ordinary negligence, as defined in § 282.64 
 
                                                
 
 
61 See p 39. 
62 See chapter 3 section 3. 
63 Whitty, “Nuisance” § 2089, italics in the original. 
64 Comment b. 
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In the reissue of his entry, Whitty added that this continuum was recognised in Scots 
law by Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd, quoting the section of Lord President Hope’s dictum 
reproduced above.65 
In the Rest (2d), therefore, the type of fault seemingly depends on a continuum 
of probability of harm, a view that has been endorsed in Scottish literature. The 
continuum notion is, consequently, transferred to fault itself, making the distinction 
between different forms of fault a matter of degree, where there are no clear 
demarcation lines between intentional and unintentional harm.66 
The continuum model from the Rest (2d), however, seems to be more complex 
than its description in § 8A. The notion of continuum is revisited later in the Rest 
(2d), when commenting on the definition of negligence in § 282. According to this 
section’s comments, the difference between intention, recklessness and negligence is 
based upon a risk/utility ratio.67 Likelihood of harm is only one element of risk; risk is 
the product of likelihood and extent of harm.68 Consequently, it is conceivable to 
locate conducts “higher” in the continuum even if likelihood is rather low, when the 
possible harm is great in extent. Further, it should be possible to locate conducts 
higher in the continuum when risk is low, but utility is even lower. This more 




One of the ways to demonstrate fault according to the continuum model adopted by 
Whitty and, as a consequence, by Kennedy, is by proving that the defender acted 
maliciously. 
It has been discussed earlier how the notion of malice in Scots law is used in 
two different senses: in the sense of bad motives or spite, and in the sense of intention 
                                                
 
 
65 See n 5. 
66 Cameron, “Neighbourhood Liability in Scotland 1850-2000” (n 1) at 150; Cameron, “Scots and 
English Nuisance” (n 13) at 59; F Du Bois and E Reid, “Nuisance” in R Zimmermann, D Visser and 
K Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South 
Africa (2004) at 590-591. 
67 Comment e. 
68 Rest (2d) § 822 comment k. 
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without spiteful motive.69 It was also explained that Whitty seems to have adopted 
the first sense,70 and this is the sense in which it is discussed in this section. Intention 
without malice is, in turn, addressed in the following section.71 
Whitty submitted that malice is present where “the defender intends the harm 
to result in the sense that he knows that it is certain or substantially certain to result 
from his conduct, and in addition he acts with the spiteful motive of causing the harm 
without benefit to himself”,72 asserting consistently the synonymy between malice 
and the Latin term aemulatio.73 
Malicious conduct in the context of neighbour relations is, accordingly, the 
object of the doctrine of aemulatio vicini. It is not the aim of this section to discuss the 
doctrine in detail; it will be described only briefly and its relation with the law of 
nuisance will be sketched out (section 3.1). The main purpose of this section is to 
evaluate the position of malice as a form of fault for nuisance damages actions. It will 
be argued that malice in the context of nuisance, though not excluded in principle as 
a form of fault, has a marginal role given its practical shortcomings. Indeed, one of its 
few roles may be in cases where the particular invasion that resulted was not one the 
wrongdoer intended to cause (section 3.2). 
 
3.1. The doctrine of aemulatio vicini and its relation with nuisance 
 
Interferences with the use and enjoyment of land are actionable, according to the 
doctrine of aemulatio vicini, when the sole or predominant motive of the defender’s 
conduct is a desire to harm the pursuer,74 tested objectively by the absence of any 
                                                
 
 
69 See p 10 above. 
70 See p 40 above. 
71 Section 4 below. 
72 Whitty, “Nuisance” § 2089. 
73 Ibid §§ 2005, 2008, 2087, 2089 and 2104. 
74 Walker, Delict 51. 
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benefit for the defender.75 The doctrine finds Institutional authority76 as well as 
support in judicial dicta.77 
Doubts about whether this doctrine belonged to Scots law were raised by Lord 
Watson’s widely discussed dictum in the English case of Mayor of Bradford v Pickles. 
After questioning the foundations of Bell’s recognition of the doctrine and referring 
to the “loose” usage of the expression in aemulationem vicini by Scots lawyers, Lord 
Watson stated that he knew 
 
of no case in which the act of a proprietor has been found to be illegal, or restrained as being in 
aemulationem, where it was not attended with offence or injury to the legal rights of his 
neighbour. […] The law of Scotland, if it differs in that, is in all other respects the same with 
the law of England. No use of property, which would be legal if due to a proper motive, can become illegal 
because it is prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious.78 
 
Nowadays, however, there is general agreement in that at least the emphasised text is 
not an accurate description of the position in Scots law.79 The reasons that have been 
advanced for this conclusion were summarised in More v Boyle,80 a Sheriff Court 
decision in which aemulatio vicini was held to be relevant: (a) Lord Watson’s 
observations in the Pickles case were obiter; (b) the very Lord Watson, two years before, 
had recognised the principle as part of Scots law in Young & Co v Bankier Distillery Co;81 
(c) his dictum is inconsistent with the principle as stated by the Institutional writers 
and applied by courts; and (d) the Court of Session recognised the existence of the 
principle and applied it in a subsequent case (Campbell v Muir82). 
                                                
 
 
75 Whitty, “Nuisance” § 2008. 
76 Bankton, Institute 1.10.40; Kames, Equity 56; Erskine, Institute 2.2.2; Hume, Lectures 207-208; Bell, 
Principles §§ 964.4 and 966. 
77 For an enumeration of the judicial authority, see H McKechnie, “Reparation” in J L Wark (ed), 
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79 Walker, Delict 51; Whitty, “Nuisance” (reissue) § 34. 
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Doctrinal recognition of the principle has also been stable,83 with possibly only 
two exceptions. Rankine, on the one hand, challenged the soundness of the 
Institutional writer’s explanations and questioned the doctrine’s practical relevance, 
as “it must seldom happen that an act of enjoyment of property should be actuated 
solely by malice”.84 Mitchell, on the other hand, doubted that the doctrine belonged 
in Scots law, relying on Rankine’s view and Lord Watson’s dictum.85 
The principle has been recognised as part of the law of Scotland in more recent 
cases, mainly interdict cases and most of them decided by the Outer House.86 The 
principle, however, has only been recognised but not actually applied in these cases, 
suggesting that aemulatio vicini is, as it was by the time Lord Watson wrote his speech, 
a marginal doctrine,87 although not exactly for the reasons he advanced in his 
dictum, as will be explained: the doctrine operates fundamentally at the margins of 
nuisance. 
Ascertaining the relation between the doctrine of aemulatio vicini and the law of 
nuisance is not a straightforward exercise. The simple answer to this question is that 
they overlap: there are invasions done in aemulationem that cannot be characterised as 
nuisances; there are nuisances where the sole or predominant motive is not 
malicious; and there are invasions that can be described as nuisances and where the 
sole or predominant motive is malicious. In this area of overlap, therefore, we must 
determine how these principles interplay, whereas outside the boundaries of this 
overlap, each doctrine operates its own principles. 
The answer provided by Whitty for the way in which these principles interplay 
in the overlap area is that in nuisance aemulatio has been absorbed by 
                                                
 
 
83 Guthrie Smith, Reparation 380-381; Glegg, Reparation 258; McKechnie (n 77) §§ 1076-1078; Smith, 
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reasonableness.88 When courts assess whether a disturbance is plus quam tolerabile, the 
defender’s motive can be taken into account, and if this conduct is malicious it can 
“tip the scales”,89 making actionable an invasion that would not be so were the 
purpose legitimate. Malice “negatives reasonableness”,90 as suggested in Armistead v 
Bowerman.91 A recent example of this exercise can be found in Summers v Crichton,92 
where the purpose of installing a set of outside lights was considered when trying to 
determine whether they were substantially intrusive so as to amount to a nuisance 
and, therefore, whether they should be removed. Malice was one of the elements that 
were considered in the interference’s assessment. The case, however, illustrates some 
of the aspects that will be discussed below, namely the evidentiary difficulty and its 
marginal role. Malice was considered not established, based on the defender’s 
argument that the lights benefited him: since there had been some acts of vandalism, 
the lights were installed allegedly to prevent further incidents. This did not prevent 
the court from finding that the lights were substantially intrusive, regardless of the 
absence of malice.93 
If malice is subsumed in the notion of reasonableness, “the distinctive role of 
aemulatio vicini [seems to be] to apply in cases where the doctrine of nuisance does not 
apply”,94 that is, outwith the overlap area. In general, it is submitted that the doctrine 
might find application where, rather than an invasion to the pursuer’s proprietary 
rights, he is deprived from a benefit to which he has no express right,95 or, in the 
words of Whitty, “extrinsic benefits enjoyed de facto”:96 an uninterrupted view, access 
to light or air, privacy from neighbours overlooking to one’s property, and casual 
water percolating to such property.97 Cameron argues that it would also operate 
where, despite proof of malice, aemulatio is not applicable but nuisance would be: 
                                                
 
 
88 Whitty, “Nuisance” (reissue) § 70. 
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“where an occupier’s interest in heritable property has been invaded by an activity 
that cannot be classed as use of land”.98 Unfortunately, we lack a case law example of 
this situation. 
 
3.2. Malice as a form of fault in nuisance 
 
The contention, however, that in nuisance malice has been fully absorbed by 
reasonableness entails denying malice’s role as a form of fault, a consequence that 
appears to be in conflict with the very model of fault adopted by Kennedy. It will be 
argued that although malice’s exclusion as a form of fault might be justified from a 
practical viewpoint, it is not excluded in principle and, moreover, there might still be 
(limited) room for it to operate as a relevant form of fault in nuisance. 
 
3.2.1. The practical shortcomings of malice 
 
When the only remedy sought by the victim of a nuisance is interdict, the analysis of 
malice as subsumed in reasonableness is sufficient: the only consideration is whether 
the invasion is plus quam tolerabile, and malice is absorbed by this test.99 Malice will be 
relevant when the invasion does not satisfy the “objective” factors of the test; if it 
does, recourse to malice is unnecessary, as it was in Summers v Crichton.100 When the 
remedy sought is damages, however, proof of fault is required, and this requirement 
could be fulfilled by proving malice. 
In the model presented by Whitty, therefore, malice serves a double function: it 
excludes reasonableness and it constitutes fault. The first is predicated on the 
invasion or interference, even if it does not affect the invasion objectively; the second, 
on the motive of the conduct. The consequence is that if in a given case malice is 
irrelevant for the first test, that is, if the test is satisfied by the invasion’s objective 
features, it might still be relevant for the second test, as the type of fault upon which 
                                                
 
 
98 G D L Cameron, “Muddy Pavements and Murky Law: Intentional and Unintentional Nuisance 
and the Recovery of Pure Economic Loss” [2001] JR 223 at 224. 
99 See, e.g. the English case of Christie v Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316 at 326-327. 
100 Summers v Crichton (n 86). 
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the case rests. This would mean that it is still necessary to prove malice, not to turn 
the invasion into an unreasonable one, but to be able to fulfil the fault requirement of 
the damages claim. 
The most obvious practical shortcoming of malice is evidentiary. Not only does 
it suffer from the inherent difficulty of proving mental states, which requires resort to 
mostly circumstantial evidence, but also the very configuration of malice makes it 
difficult to prove. Malicious conduct is motivated solely or predominantly by the 
desire to cause harm, so it requires proof of the absence of any other motive or, 
alternatively, that any other motive was just incidental. Although the absence of 
other motive is allegedly tested objectively by the absence of benefit for the defender, 
in the context of property use it will be rather difficult to find such total absence.101 
As for the incidental character of other motives, it is difficult to see how it can be 
tested objectively. 
But besides being difficult to prove, malice seems unnecessary, given the 
availability of intention as a form of fault, and especially since the model adopted a 
broad notion of intention. If the sole or predominant motive is harming the pursuer, 
and harm occurs, then one can straightaway conclude that harm was in fact 
intentional: the wrongdoer either acted in order to cause it or at least knew that it 
would result precisely because it is the reason he acted in the first place. Malicious 
conduct, therefore, implies that it was intentional.102 If this is the case, and 
considering that intention is easier to prove than motives,103 then “there seems no 
reason why pleaders would give themselves the additional burden of proving 
malice”.104 So just as it is for the reasonableness test for invasions that are objectively 
plus quam tolerabile, malice is also unnecessary for the fault test. This conclusion, 
nevertheless, has a weakness. 
 
 
                                                
 
 
101 See e.g. “Corporation of Bradford v Pickles (Note)” (1895) 7 JR 413, arguing that the defendant’s 
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3.2.2. The limited role of malice 
 
For the conclusion outlined above to hold, the invasion or harm to which motive and 
intention refer must converge. But it is possible that they do not, and here lies the 
conclusion’s weakness: the defender might have considered causing harm to his 
neighbour as the sole or main motive to act, and yet not have envisaged the 
particular harmful consequences that ensued. I can start a fire very close to my 
neighbour’s window only to disturb him (malice), and the particular consequence 
that I plan to cause or that I know will result is his house being filled with smoke to 
his inconvenience (intended consequence), but I do not mean to and ignore that the 
smoke will permanently stain his walls (unintended consequence). The issue, of 
course, depends on the level of generality with which we describe consequences. But 
in this case, strictly speaking, the particular consequence cannot be seen as covered 
by intention, neither in the sense of purpose nor in the sense of knowledge. A 
possibility of qualifying this harm as intentional would be open if we can rely upon 
the notion of constructive knowledge: even if I did not know that my neighbour’s 
walls would be stained, I should have known. But the possibility of establishing 
knowledge constructively for the purposes of intention is at least questionable. An 
argument is made below105 to justify the exclusion of this possibility, and if this 
argument is sound, then the only possibility to succeed in proving fault in a case like 
the described would be by proving malice. 
To this situation can be added that where the invasion, absent malice, would 
be reasonable. For in this case, the defender will need to prove malice and it will in 
this case play both roles: it will turn the invasion into an unreasonable one and it will 





                                                
 
 
105 See section 4.2. 





It can be concluded that malice in the context of nuisance, though absorbed by 
reasonableness for the purposes of assessing the invasion itself, is not, in accordance 
with Kennedy, excluded in principle as a form of fault tending to fulfil the fault 
requirement imposed by RHM Bakeries. It has, however, a marginal role in this field 
given its practical shortcomings: it is difficult to prove and is mostly unnecessary 
given the possibility that is open for the pursuer to aver and prove other – easier – 
forms of intention. Its main role is limited to interferences that, if malice where 
absent, would not amount to a nuisance and, possibly, in those cases of nuisance 





The model adopted by Whitty and subsequently by Kennedy considered intention or 
intent as the second form of fault that can be alleged in an action for damages in 
nuisance. 
This section seeks to outline the scope of this notion of intention. First, an 
explanation of the notion is offered, by reference to Kennedy, its sources, and 
subsequent case law (section 4.1), followed by more specific discussion of a particular 
aspect of the way of establishing intention: the possibility of establishing knowledge 
constructively. It will be argued that this possibility is problematic and should be 
reconsidered (section 4.2). 
 
4.1. A broad notion of intention 
 
As has been explained above, the concept of intention adopted in the model is a 
broad one. It was also explained that on a close reading, it seems that intention as 
knowledge is included, while actually intention as purpose is not. Yet it is assumed 
that this was not intended and, more importantly, it would be logically unsound to 
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hold such a view.107 Consequently, this section proceeds on the assumption that both 
versions of intention are effective forms of fault in nuisance. 
This broad notion of intention includes not only the core content covered by all 
notions if intention, that is, the purpose or plan to achieve the action’s consequences, 
either as an end or as means to an end (what we have called so far “intention as 
purpose”), but also the knowledge of the consequences that are substantially certain 
to result from the action, even if not desired and only a side-effect of the conduct 
(what we have called so far “intention as knowledge”). This has been called 
“oblique”108 or “indirect”109 intention. 
According to Kennedy, indeed, the requirement of culpa can be established when 
action “was deliberate in the knowledge that his action would result in harm to the 
other party”.110 This reproduces largely Whitty’s description of intentional conduct: 
“[t]he defender has knowledge that the harm will result, or is substantially certain to 
result, from his otherwise lawful and even laudable conduct”,111 which in turn 
coincides with the way intention as knowledge is defined in the Rest (2d), both in 
general and for the purposes of nuisance.112 Prosser and Keeton, commenting on the 
Rest (2d), identified as one of the three most basic elements of intention the fact that 
it “extends not only to having in the mind a purpose (or desire) to bring about given 
consequences but also to having in mind a belief (or knowledge) that given 
consequences are substantially certain”.113 It does not cover “mere knowledge of 
statistical probability where there is no certainty in the concrete instance”.114 
This is the form of intention that has been pleaded in cases following Kennedy, at 
least as one of the alternatives advanced to assert fault. In Anderson v White, the 
contention that the third defenders knew, because of the complaints made to them, 
that their actions – causing the water level of a dam to rise – were causing damage 
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was considered a relevant averment of fault.115 In Powrie Castle Properties Ltd v Dundee 
City Council, in turn, the knowledge of certain damage – caused by failing to 
waterproof a wall – was pleaded by the pursuers and admitted by the defenders.116 In 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers, like in Anderson, it was held that after the first 
defenders were alerted by the pursuers of the existence of the nuisance – 
contamination by the emanation of deleterious substances from the defenders’ land – 
the pursuers were in a position to found upon an intentional nuisance that entitled 
them to an inquiry.117 More recently, in the case of Chalmers v Diageo Scotland Ltd, the 
pursuers argued that “the defenders knew or ought to have known that the release of 
ethanol vapour from their property would be liable to cause loss”,118 though the use 
of the word “liable” in this context hinders the determination of the particular type of 
fault averred, i.e. whether they were averring intention or recklessness. In the case of 
Morris Amusements Ltd v Glasgow City Council, however, the pursuers’ pleading of 
intention was considered short of an averment of the specific state of knowledge 
required by Kennedy.119 The pursuers had been unable to aver specific knowledge on 
the part of the defenders about the certain or likely harmful consequences that 
demolition works would cause to the support of the pursuer’s building.120 
As for Kennedy itself, it has been seen as a case of intentional nuisance as well,121 
but this cannot be concluded so clearly from the report. Certain paragraphs 
describing the pursuers’ pleadings point to the defenders’ knowledge of the certainty 
of the harm, while others, to their knowledge of its likelihood, so it could be 
understood that the fault alleged was located “towards the reckless […] end of the 
intentional part of the continuum”.122 
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4.2. Constructive knowledge? 
 
It might be questionable whether it is appropriate to extend the notion of intention so 
as to include knowledge of the consequences that will certainly follow from the 
conduct as its side effects, that is, to admit intention as knowledge as a form of 
fault.123 This is, however, the position that Kennedy undoubtedly inherited from 
Whitty and the Rest (2d). 
But Whitty’s position went even further. In his view, harm is also intentional 
when the defender “knew, or ought to have known, that the invasion was certain, or 
substantially certain, to result from his conduct”.124 Knowledge, then, can be 
established constructively. In the words of Cameron, 
 
[it] appears from the dicta cited above [excerpts from Chalmers, Edinburgh Rly Access & Property Co 
and Noble’s Trs quoted by Lord Hope in Kennedy] that there is no need to inquire into the state 
of mind of the defender to determine his or her knowledge. Just as negligence is concerned with 
what the reasonable person in the defender’s position ought to have foreseen when directing his 
mind to the likely consequences of his conduct, so too in this form of intentional liability, courts 
will impute constructive knowledge.125 
 
This possibility is problematic for three reasons: first, it seems to conflate the mental 
state that constitutes intention with the way of proving it; secondly, the authority 
cited does not provide enough support for this contention; thirdly, and more 
importantly, it appears to be contrary to the fault-based liability rule enshrined by 
RHM Bakeries. Each of these problems will be addressed below. 
 
4.2.1. Mental states: content and proof 
 
Mental states entail an inherent difficulty of proof; intentions are not “directly 
observable”.126 For this reason, the pursuer is limited as to the elements upon which 
he can rely to prove such mental state. If the defender’s own account does not help, 
then the pursuer is left only with inferences from the conduct and its 
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circumstances.127 But it is a different thing to say that intention extends to the 
consequences that the defender ought to have known, if by this we mean what he 
should have known according to an objective standard. As has been said in the 
context of criminal law, “[i]ntention, then, is subjective, but is proved objectively”, 
meaning that evidence might be circumstantial but this does not turn knowledge into 
an objective standard.128 The distinction is clearly set out by Prosser and Keeton, 
again commenting on the Rest (2d): 
 
Since intent is a state of mind, it is plainly incorrect for a court to instruct a jury that an actor is 
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of the actor’s conduct; but it is 
correct to tell the jury that, relying on circumstantial evidence, they may infer that the actor’s 
state of mind was the same as a reasonable person’s state of mind would have been.129 
 
The approach indicated by Cameron seems to extend intention from the foreseen 
consequences to the foreseeable consequences, and consequently objectivise 
knowledge, a concession that changes the nature of the concept. This “inferred 
intention”, in the words of Cane, “is not a frame of mind at all; rather it consists of a 
contextualised interpretation of what the accused did and said based on a judgment 
about the way people normally (ought to) behave”.130 
In the context of justifying the inclusion of intention as knowledge, Cameron 
points to South Africa as a jurisdiction that admits it as a form of fault (dolus eventualis), 
and the point of objective knowledge is addressed. He explains that the difference 
between Kennedy’s notion of intention and the South African dolus eventualis is that 
 
in the latter, knowledge of the harmful consequence must be subjective and actual. In Scotland 
it appears that knowledge can be treated objectively. The South African authors consider that 
objective knowledge belongs properly to recklessness which they equate with gross negligence. 
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However, he then justifies dispensing with the requirement of actual knowledge by 
clarifying that Scotland did not follow South African but American law.131 This is, 
however, a curious reason to disregard the requirement: American law – as 
explained132 – does not admit constructive knowledge either and, moreover, objective 
knowledge in the Rest (2d) also belongs to recklessness, which is essentially tied to 
negligence,133 just like it is in South African law. 
The relevance of distinguishing between proving actual knowledge objectively 
and relying upon an objective standard of knowledge lies in the admission of 
ignorance as a defence. If the requirement is actual knowledge, the pursuer might be 
able to say that any reasonable person in the defender circumstances would have had 
the knowledge, and that the defender is a reasonable person, so he must have had the 
knowledge; but the defender can lead evidence in order to show that he is justified in 
his ignorance. If the requirement is just constructive knowledge, the pursuer only 
needs to go as far as the first statement. 
Of course, one could argue that the reasons that justify ignorance can be 
factored into the “circumstances”, but to the extent that these reasons are exclusive 
to the particular defender, this entails abandoning the idea of a standard of 
knowledge. For instance, in a given case a reasonable person would have known that 
harm would result but the particular person adopted additional precautions to avoid 
it, precautions that turn out to be ineffective. If his constructive knowledge is 
determined by what a reasonable person that took those adequate precautions would 
have known, then we are building the “standard” to fit the particular defender. What 
in effect is established is his actual knowledge. 
In stating that for intentional harm, knowledge could be established 
constructively, Cameron himself would appear to have foreseen the possibility of 
justified ignorance: 
 
There is of course scope to argue that a defender did not and could not have known that a 
particular consequence would transpire. We do not yet have case law on this point. When the 
issue does emerge, as doubtless it will given time, Scots courts should avoid the English solution 
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of imposing a requirement of reasonable foreseeability as happened in Cambridge Water Co v Eastern 
Counties Leather,134 simply because this terminology belongs properly to negligence and its use in 
the context of Scots nuisance will serve only to confuse the doctrines once more.135 
 
If this statement is correct, as is consistent with the argument here advanced, then 
what does it mean that in intention, knowledge can be established constructively? 
This must entail that it can be proved objectively. 
 
4.2.2. Scottish authority (or its absence) 
 
The fact that the very source of the model, i.e. the Rest (2d), does not contemplate 
the possibility of establishing knowledge constructively would not, of course, be a 
sufficiently strong reason to reject the concession if support for it could be found in 
Scots law. But this is doubtful. 
Even though Kennedy’s fault model is borrowed from Whitty, as quoted above136 
Lord President Hope’s definition of intention did not include knowledge of the 
consequences that the defender ought to have known.137 Cameron, in turn, finds 
support in the authorities cited by the Lord President, cases where he found the 
distinction between intentional and negligent harm. These cases, however, were 
decided in the context of dangerous activities, identifying a special treatment of fault 
for this type of operations, and, furthermore, the distinction made in these cases is 
not between intentional and negligent conduct, but between avoidable and 
unavoidable harm. This requires a more detailed explanation. 
The line of cases begins with Chalmers v Dixon, where Lord Justice-Clerk 
Moncreiff pronounced his famous dictum in the context of an activity that was 
considered hazardous: 
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If a man puts upon his land a new combination of materials, which he knows or ought to know, are 
of dangerous nature, then either due care will prevent injury, in which case he is liable if injury 
occurs for not taking that due care, or else no precautions will prevent injury, in which case he 
is liable for his original act in placing the materials upon the ground.138 
 
His conclusion was that “culpa [did] lie at the root of the matter”, but that in the case 
it was “not necessary to prove specific fault [as it was] necessarily implied in the 
result”.139 Lord Moncreiff’s distinction must be understood in this light: he was 
arguing that, when someone engages in activity that he knows or ought to know that is 
dangerous, fault could be inferred from the fact that damage has resulted: if damage 
was not avoidable, then fault consisted in engaging in the activity in the first place; if 
it was avoidable, then fault consisted in not taking due care to avoid it. 
The dictum does not seem to afford sufficient authority for the possibility of 
establishing knowledge constructively, in the sense of an objective standard for the 
purposes of pleading intention, at least not generally. Because of the context in which 
the dictum was pronounced, it is possible to conclude that it sought to present a 
regime applicable to dangerous activities.140 For this reason, knowledge (actual or 
constructive) is considered relevant and its object is the dangerous nature of the 
activity. Indeed, Lord Moncreiff explains that actual knowledge of the danger is not 
necessary, because requiring it could introduce an arbitrary difference by virtue of 
which the defender who knew the dangerous nature of his activity would be liable, 
but the defender who ignored it would “escape liability in consequence of his 
ignorance”.141 Even in Kennedy itself, reference to Chalmers is made, following a colon, 
after mentioning, and in support of, conduct giving rise to special risk of abnormal 
damage as a type of fault implied in the resulting damage.142 
In any case, the distinction made in Chalmers is not coincident with the 
distinction between intention and negligence made both in the Rest (2d) and in 
Whitty’s model: in Chalmers’ distinction, the relevant element is the possibility of 
avoiding harm by the adoption of precautions, whereas the defining element that 
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underlies the distinction in the model presented by Whitty and the Rest (2d) – in its 
simple version – is simply likelihood of harm. The fact that damage is unavoidable by 
the adoption of precautions proves, of course, that harm is certain to result, but the 
converse is not true. Avoidable damage can still be certain to result if the defender 
has actually done nothing to prevent it – and precisely because of that. Furthermore, 
it is not clear from the dictum which precautions are taken as a reference to draw the 
line between the two situations, i.e. due precautions or any precautions.143 This simply 
reinforces the argument, because if the point of reference is due precautions, then 
harm is not even certain to result in the first type of case, since it could still be 
avoidable – except not by due care, but by a higher level of care. Consequently, if 
harm is not certain, then it can hardly be a definition of intentional harm in the sense 
discussed here. 
In sum, it seems that the dictum in Chalmers cannot be understood both as 
supporting a special regime for particularly hazardous activities and also, at the same 
time, as establishing the distinction between intentional and negligent conduct, 
allowing “objective” knowledge to serve as the basis of intention. 
In Edinburgh Rly Access & Property Co the distinction seems to serve a similar 
purpose to the one in Chalmers: it is used as the basis of certain inferences of fault. If 
the necessary or natural result of the activity is damage, then the defender is not 
entitled to carry out the operation; if damage is not the necessary or natural 
consequence but in fact happens, there is an inference of negligence.144 In this case, 
however, reference to knowledge is omitted, so the inference seems to be based only 
upon the nature of the activity, which reinforces the point: we cannot use this dictum 
as authority for the admission of objective knowledge. Furthermore, the dictum 
comes from the Lord Ordinary’s judgment, which was reversed by the Inner 
House,145 so its use as authority for any proposition seems questionable. 
The distinction, however, was again reproduced in the case of Noble’s Trs: 
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A landowner will be liable to his neighbour if he carries out operations on his land which will 
or are likely to cause damage to his neighbour’s land however much care is exercised. Similarly 
will a landowner be liable in respect of carrying out operations […] if it is necessary to take 
steps in the carrying out of those operations to prevent damage to a neighbour, and he […] 
does not take or instruct those steps. In the former case the landowner’s culpa lies in the actual 
carrying out of his operations in the knowledge actual or implied of their likely consequences. In the 
later case culpa lies in not taking steps to avoid consequences which he should have foreseen 
would be likely to flow from one method of carrying out the operation.146 
 
Here, however, the distinction is slightly different, which indeed confirms the view of 
it as the basis for a special regime for dangerous activities: the consequences are no 
longer certain but only likely. The key element for intention, namely the knowledge 
of harm that is certain to result, disappears in this formulation. Consequently, what 
we have here is, again, not a distinction between intentional and negligent conduct 
but between activities where harm is or is not preventable. Therefore, the reference 
to “knowledge actual or implied” can hardly be understood as referring to the 
knowledge required for intention. Noble’s Trs has indeed, like the previous cases, been 
seen as an application of the special regime for dangerous activities, in this particular 
case, in the form of a presumption of intention given the risk attached to the activity, not 
actual intention.147 
If we understand these cases as applying a special fault regime for particularly 
dangerous activities, the idea of constructive or objective knowledge in the sense of a 
standard can be consistent with such a regime. But a general admission of such a 
standard is in no sense consistent with the generality of intention cases. One could 
argue that any case where harm is certain to result is dangerous enough to justify the 
application of the special regime, so the distinction is irrelevant. And it is true that 
there is a large area of overlap. However, these rules do not completely coincide in 
their scope of application, for the special regime of liability for dangerous activities is 
not only based on likelihood of harm, but also – and fundamentally – on a certain 
extent or gravity of the potential harm.148 Slight – but not trivial – interferences that 
are certain to happen do not make an activity particularly hazardous, yet they could 
give place to a finding of intention if the defender knew they would happen. 
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The case of Anderson v White has also been referred to as authority for the 
proposition that actual knowledge is not necessary.149 In this case, it was stated that 
when the pursuer avers a deliberate action, 
 
[t]he only further requirement [is] to aver that the defenders knew that their actions would 
result in harm to the pursuers, or alternatively that they had no regard to the question whether 
their action was likely to cause such harm. The pursuers say that the defenders knew of the 
resultant harm because of complaints, and that in any event the likelihood of the harm was obvious. 
That, according to my understanding of the cases cited [RHM Bakeries, Noble’s Trs and Kennedy], 
is sufficient to make a relevant case.150 
 
It is quite clear that in the first sentence of the quoted dictum, the court was trying to 
replicate the distinction between intentional and reckless harm in the way Kennedy 
presented it. This case is probably cited to support the possibility of establishing 
knowledge constructively because of the emphasised phrase: the court considered 
that it was a relevant pleading to say that “the likelihood of the harm was obvious”. 
Now, it is not clear to which of the alternatives is the phrase referring, but most likely 
to the alternative of recklessness; it is the likelihood of harm which was allegedly 
obvious, and not the certainty of harm, so it seems that the pursuer is attempting a 
second option in case he fails to prove the knowledge required by intention. This 
displaces the question to whether the mental state described as recklessness can be 
established constructively, but at least for the purposes of intention, the case does not 
seem to support the proposition. We will come back to this question later.151 More 
recently, in the case of Chalmers v Diageo Scotland Ltd, the Lord Ordinary considered 
that the pursuers’ averment that “the defenders knew or ought to have known that [their 
conduct] would be liable to cause loss” was enough to allow the case to go to 
proof.152 This could be seen as allowing the establishment of knowledge 
constructively as long as the word “liable” is taken to mean substantial certainty, 
which seems to stretch the meaning of the word. Otherwise, just like in Anderson, the 
question about constructive knowledge is displaced to recklessness. 
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The case of Morris Amusements Ltd gave the court the opportunity of deciding 
this particular point, for the first defenders argued that knowledge both for intention 
and recklessness must be actual.153 But given that the pursuers did not actually aver 
any specific knowledge, and that for this reason the nuisance case was held to be 
irrelevant, the issue of whether knowledge had to be actual or could indeed be 
constructive was neither discussed nor decided by the court. 
In conclusion, it appears that the possibility of establishing knowledge 
constructively does not find strong support in Scottish authority. 
 
4.2.3. Elision with strict liability? 
 
There is, in addition, a possibly unnoticed consequence of admitting the possibility of 
establishing knowledge constructively: it makes liability for “intentional” harm 
tantamount to a form of strict liability, contrary to the rule established so clearly by 
RHM Bakeries. For in the end, the only thing that is required is that harm was 
foreseeable, regardless of whether the defender foresaw it. 
It must be noted that the fact that foreseeability – as opposed to foresight – is 
enough for negligence does not mean that it should be enough for intention. What 
constitutes negligence is not foreseeability of harm itself, but the breach of a standard 
of care. In other words, it is the defender’s conduct that is assessed on the face of 
foreseeable harm: the level of precautions taken in engaging with an activity. In 
intention, on the other hand, fault is not predicated on the defender’s conduct but on 
his “mental disposition” while engaging in the activity. It is this mental disposition 
that constitutes fault. Consequently, if the only thing that is required from the 
defender is constructive knowledge of the harm that would certainly follow, that is, 
foreseeability of such harm, then effectively no mental disposition is required. 
Liability is based simply on that foreseeability. And that is a form of strict liability.154 
It could be argued that the requirement here is different from mere 
foreseeability, because harm must be certain. But certainty is a separate requirement. 
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Foreseeability refers to the ability or possibility to anticipate harm; certainty, to the 
probability of its occurrence.155 Certainty of harm simply defines the scope of 
application of the liability rule, as is typical with any strict liability rule. It will be 
argued in chapter 3 that particularly dangerous activities attract strict liability, and 
the level of danger required for the application of this liability rule is defined by the 
interaction of likelihood and extent of harm, among other elements.156 In the rule 
under analysis here, certainty of harm would play a similar role: liability would be 
imposed by reference to a particular level of likelihood of harm. In both cases, harm 
must be foreseeable. It is not clear, then, why in the case of dangerous activities, we 
speak of strict liability, whereas in the case of certain harm, we speak of fault-based 
liability – more specifically, liability based on intention – in circumstances where the 
mental state of the defender is the same. 
In sum, a construction of Kennedy that allows knowledge to be established 
constructively for the purposes of intention ends up undoing partly what RHM 
Bakeries was meant to do with nuisance: finally to establish a general fault-based 
liability rule and to limit special regimes of liability or proof to special circumstances. 
It might be that certainty of harm is a special circumstance that does in fact deserve 
to be treated especially, through a rule of strict liability. But disguising this as an 
application of the general fault-based liability rule certainly does not help the 
understanding of the law, nor does it promote a conceptually adequate discussion of 
it. Otherwise, if what is intended is to adhere rigorously to the principle enshrined in 
RHM Bakeries, only actual knowledge should be accepted for the purposes of 




In sum, the model adopted by Kennedy for intentional harm features a comprehensive 
notion of intention that includes both intention as purpose and intention as 
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knowledge. The interpretation of the latter notion, however, proves problematic. 
Contrary to what has been argued by recent mainstream doctrinal work in Scotland, 
it is submitted that knowledge should actually be established; constructive knowledge 
is not enough. Admitting the latter as a possibility confuses the content of a mental 
state with its proof; it does not find adequate support in the available authority; and 
more importantly, it promotes an interpretation of Kennedy that contradicts RHM 




Unlike in the case of intentional nuisance, the issues associated with negligent 
nuisance predate the decision in Kennedy. They crystallised when RHM Bakeries 
imposed the requirement of fault for nuisance, and Kennedy certainly did not help to 
clarify them by expressly allowing negligence to be pleaded as the relevant form of 
fault for a damages claim in nuisance. For when the defender has interfered 
negligently with the pursuer’s use and enjoyment of his property, two alternatives 
would in principle be open for the latter: to ground his claim on (the delict of) 
negligence, or to ground it on nuisance and plead negligence as the required basis of 
fault.157 
In Kennedy, Lord President Hope submitted that when the requirement of fault 
is fulfilled by demonstrating negligence, “the ordinary principles of the law of 
negligence will provide an equivalent remedy”.158 The meaning of this statement is 
not entirely clear, and diverse interpretations have been offered,159 but nowadays the 
predominant doctrinal view is be that the statement must mean that where the form 
of fault pleaded is negligence, then the claim must be dealt with under the ordinary 
principles governing (the delict of) negligence.160 Two main reasons are advanced for 
this conclusion. 
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The first reason is that, if the claims are dealt with under nuisance rules, the 
plus quam tolerabile test that is peculiar to nuisance should be applied. This test, in turn, 
would not be suitable for unintentional invasions because it is conceptually 
incompatible with negligence and it sets a standard of care so high that it turns this 
allegedly negligent-based liability into strict liability, contravening RHM Bakeries. 
The second reason is that nuisance rules would introduce unjustified 
differences between defenders that have negligently caused a nuisance and defenders 
that have negligently committed other wrongs, especially with regard to the 
requirements of the pleadings, the recovery of pure economic loss, liability for 
omissions and the relevance of the pursuer’s or his property’s abnormal sensitivity. 
Both reasons will be addressed here. First, it will be argued that the plus quam 
tolerabile test can indeed be applied in the case of negligent nuisances (section 5.1), 
Secondly, it will be submitted that negligent nuisance does not introduce the alleged 
unjustified differences, and more generally that the highly contextual nature of 
negligence allows the adaptation of its different elements to the landownership 
context, reaching results that are consistent with those derived from negligent 
nuisance (section 5.2). The conclusion is that negligence can indeed be 
accommodated as a form of fault within the framework of nuisance.  
 
5.1. The plus quam tolerabile test can be applied in negligent nuisance 
 
The first suggested reason why negligent nuisances must allegedly be addressed 
according to the general rules governing (the delict of) negligence is that the nuisance 
test of reasonableness of the invasion, the plus quam tolerabile test, is not suitable for 
unintentional interferences with the use and enjoyment of property. Both of the 
reasons presented to justify this argument will be considered below, in order to argue 
that the plus quam tolerabile test can indeed be applied to negligent nuisances. It must 
be noted, however, that the practical relevance of this discussion might be rather 
limited, for in most cases of negligent nuisances, the type of invasion is physical harm 
to property161 and it is thought that, at least as a general rule, invasions of this nature 
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meet the plus quam tolerabile test.162 Nonetheless, the plus quam tolerabile test can play a 
role when the negligent conduct causes a non-physical interference, and very 
especially when economic loss follows such interference. 
 
5.1.1. Conceptual compatibility of the plus quam tolerabile test with 
negligence 
 
Whitty argues that “the plus quam tolerabile test and negligence are not overlapping but 
mutually exclusive categories”.163 This can, in his view, be appreciated from the role 
that the notion of risk plays on both tests: in the plus quam tolerabile test, the risk 
question is previous, not part of the test, and the requirement is (substantial) 
certainty; whereas in negligence, risk is a factor of the test itself. In the plus quam 
tolerabile test, reasonableness is determined regardless of risk; in negligence, 
reasonableness depends to a great extent on the level of risk.164 A similar conceptual 
problem would be faced by the notion of gravity or extent of the harm as part of the 
plus quam tolerabile test: gravity of harm is one of the elements that lead to a 
determination of the level of risk (together with its likelihood), and negligence law sets 
the standard of care in accordance with such risk. Consequently, if the plus quam 
tolerabile test is applied to negligent nuisances, gravity of the harm is taken into account 
twice, and this, in Cameron’s view, is not appropriate.165 
There is considerable force in these arguments. It is certainly true that risk is 
not relevant for the plus quam tolerabile test, because it is mostly a gravity test that 
assesses the invasion once it has occurred (or while it is occurring), irrespective of 
whether this invasion was certain to result or only more or less likely. But risk is still 
relevant for intentional invasions, not in assessing their gravity, but in determining 
whether there is fault, particularly intention as knowledge, and this is also the case in 
negligence. In both forms of fault, there is blame attached to the defender’s conduct 
in the face of a certain level of risk: carrying out his activity with the knowledge of the 
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certainty of the invasion, or carrying out his activity without taking adequate 
precautions given the foreseeable likelihood of the invasion. In other words, the fact 
that the plus quam tolerabile test does not consider risk does not make it incompatible 
with negligence. Very much on the contrary, it is quite logical that it does not 
consider risk, for it is, as explained, mostly a gravity test, whereas risk is relevant for 
the different, separate, question of fault. The statement that plus quam tolerabile 
requires substantial certainty as a previous element is simply the consequence of 
assuming that it only applies to intention. The argument is circular.  
As for the notion of gravity being taken into account twice, though it must be 
conceded that this is indeed the case, it must also be noted that it is not taken into 
account for the same purpose. The purpose of the plus quam tolerabile test is to exclude 
liability for certain invasions considered to be part of normal life in community; it 
actually sets a threshold of harm. In contrast, gravity of harm in negligence does not 
set such a threshold; negligence does not exclude in principle liability for invasions 
according to their extent. In practice, of course, the defender might not be liable for 
slight invasions simply because the standard of care in those cases must accordingly 
be rather low and easy to meet. But the extent of the potential harm is not the only 
element taken into account to determine such a standard. Both likelihood of harm as 
a component of risk, and considerations apart from risk (e.g. the cost of taking 
precautions) can raise the standard of care and make it more difficult to meet.166 So 
in those cases, the plus quam tolerabile test would have a margin to perform its 
distinctive role excluding liability. 
 
5.1.2. Standard of care imposed by the plus quam tolerabile test 
 
The second reason to reject the application of the plus quam tolerabile test is that it 
would impose too high a standard of care for unintentional invasions, lowering the 
threshold of liability to the point that it becomes strict, a result that explicitly 
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contravenes the ruling in RHM Bakeries.167 “It is unfair”, holds Whitty, “to hold [the 
defender] liable as if he intended to inflict [the harm]”.168 
It appears that this reason to reject the application of the plus quam tolerabile test 
assumes that it would be applied to unintentional invasions instead of the reasonable 
care test from negligence, and not in addition to it. If the only test for unintentional 
invasions is the plus quam tolerabile test, then Whitty and Cameron are right at least in 
the second part of the argument: liability would become strict, contravening RHM 
Bakeries. It is not clear, however, why this would impose a particularly high standard 
of care unless this statement is supposed to mean that, by imposing strict liability, it 
subjects the defender to a severe or stringent liability rule, and not that it imposes a 
high standard of care in a technical sense. Plus quam tolerabile, in fact, imposes no 
standard of care; it says nothing about the way in which the defender is expected to 
behave. It simply imposes a threshold of harm under which there will be no 
compensation. 
It is arguable, however, that the plus quam tolerabile test is not meant to replace 
the reasonable care test that is peculiar to negligence as a form of fault, but to be 
applied in addition to it. This view is more consistent with the analysis contained in 
Kennedy: “The plus quam tolerabile test is peculiar to the liability in damages for 
nuisance. Where that test is satisfied and culpa is established, the requirements for the 
delictual liability are fulfilled”.169 The two requirements are distinct and both must be 
fulfilled. In this light, the plus quam tolerabile test does not lower the threshold of 
liability. If anything, it raises it by excluding trivial invasions from the possibility of 
being compensated. 
 
5.2. Nuisance does not introduce unjustified differences 
 
The second reason why negligent nuisances must allegedly be addressed through the 
law governing (the delict of) negligence, “in all its glory with no shortcuts”,170 is that 
                                                
 
 
167 Whitty, “Nuisance” § 2089; Cameron, “Muddy Pavements” (n 98) at 230. 
168 Whitty, “Nuisance” § 2106. 
169 Kennedy (n 3) at 99 per Lord President Hope. 
170 Cameron, “Muddy Pavements” (n 98) at 227. 
 
 69 
dealing with them under nuisance rules would introduce unjustified differences 
between defenders that negligently committed a nuisance and defenders that 
negligently committed other wrongs. Thus, it is submitted that pursuers in nuisance 
not only are allowed to circumvent the requirements of negligence pleadings, but can 
also avoid the restrictions imposed by the law of negligence to the recovery of pure 
economic loss and liability for omissions. In addition, it is argued that nuisance 
introduces a difference, this time for the benefit of pursuers in negligence, in the 
treatment of abnormal sensitivity of the pursuer or his property given the availability 
of the “egg-shell skull” rule. 
In what follows, each of these aspects will be considered in order to argue that 
the so-called unjustified differences are not such or are indeed justified, 
demonstrating that the different elements of negligence adapt to the context of 
landownership to render results that are not different from those that can be reached 
through the negligent nuisance route. 
 
5.2.1. Pleadings requirements 
 
One of the apprehensions to which the consideration of negligent nuisances in the 
framework of nuisance gives rise is that “the requirements of pleadings in negligence 
may to some extent be circumvented in a nuisance action”.171 This particular 
formulation of the apprehension was a reaction to a proposal advanced by Thomson 
in his case note on Kennedy. In his view, the establishment of the existence of a duty of 
care should not be necessary in nuisance claims, because nuisance already has in 
place a liability control device: the plus quam tolerabile test. It should suffice for the 
pursuer to aver that “the defender’s conduct simply fell below the standard of 
reasonable care”.172 Against this proposal, Cameron argued that, though tempting, 
the view misunderstands the role of the plus quam tolerabile test, and goes on to explain 
its conceptual incompatibility with negligence.173 
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This argument has been addressed above,174 but it remains true that the duty 
of care in negligence and the plus quam tolerabile test in nuisance control liability in 
different ways and for different reasons. The duty of care is mostly designed to 
exclude potential pursuers or particular types of harm, in order to control the 
“floodgates” of litigation and protect defenders from what can be seen as “excessive” 
liability. The plus quam tolerabile test, on the other hand, is designed to exclude claims 
for reasonable invasions in the context of neighbourhood, in order to preserve a 
margin of “liability-free” use of property consistent with ownership. In this sense, the 
plus quam tolerabile test does not and cannot perform the same control function as duty 
of care. 
Nevertheless, the apprehension seems overstated, for in the context of nuisance, 
the risks that are normally controlled by the duty of care are naturally constrained by 
the very limits of nuisance. On the one hand, nuisance assumes a rather close level of 
(physical) proximity or at least the ability to physically reach and therefore interfere 
with someone else’s land as a consequence of the use of one’s own. On the other 
hand, insofar as nuisance only protects the use and enjoyment of property, other 
problematic categories that are controlled by the duty of care are conceptually 
excluded, such as psychiatric injury or pure economic loss.175 
In support of his view, Cameron refers to two cases where, in his opinion, 
courts showed that pursuers could not circumvent the requirements of negligence 
pleadings by turning to a nuisance claim. The first one is the Outer House decision in 
Argyll and Clyde Health Board v Strathclyde Regional Council,176 where the relevancy of the 
pursuer’s pleadings of negligence was discussed. Lord McCluskey considered that the 
pursuer’s general averment of the water authority’s duty to take reasonable care that 
water mains in their ownership did not burst was irrelevant because he failed to 
specify what proper maintenance would have been.177 This case, in Cameron’s view, 
supports the argument that the pleadings must be sufficient to establish (the delict of) 
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negligence.178 The second case is the Sheriff Court decision in The Globe (Aberdeen) Ltd 
v North of Scotland Water Authority,179 where the Sheriff considered that the pursuer’s 
averment of the water authority’s duty to ascertain ground conditions before 
engaging in works on a sewer had no factual basis.180 “The lesson”, concludes 
Cameron, “is clear. This case is indicative of the dangers where parties seek to argue 
negligence without first addressing the basis upon which a duty of care arises”.181 
It is important to distinguish the two cases cited in support of the argument, 
because the inadequacy of the averments is based upon different considerations. In 
the Argyll & Clyde Health Board case, what the pursuer failed to identify was the 
standard of care, not the duty of care: the court did not question in principle that the 
water authority had the duty to maintain the pipes; the reason to hold the fault 
averments as irrelevant was that the pursuer did not “specify in their pleadings a 
system or systems of maintenance and […] lead evidence to establish that any such 
system was ‘proper’”,182 against which the defender’s conduct could be judged and 
which the defenders could challenge. This calls for a qualification of Thomson’s 
proposal, though arguably this qualification is implied in his formulation: it is not 
enough for the pursuer to aver that “the defender’s conduct simply fell below the 
standard of reasonable care”,183 but he actually has to aver – and eventually prove – 
what this standard consists of. 
The Globe case, on the other hand, would pose a more difficult challenge, 
because the reason for the irrelevancy was precisely the pursuer’s failure to aver the 
factual basis for the duty of care. It must be noted, however, that while only this 
particular duty – to ascertain ground conditions – was deemed irrelevant, another 
duty did survive a relevancy attack: the duty “to take reasonable care to avoid 
causing a nuisance to neighbouring property”. This could be read as an 
acknowledgement of a general duty of care in nuisance given the nature of the 
                                                
 
 
178 Cameron, “Muddy Pavements” (n 98) at 226. 
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context in which these disputes arise, which is consistent with the argument presented 
above about the lack of necessity of controlling the floodgates and excessive liability 
risks in this setting. But even if there is no need to establish a specific duty of care, it is 
still necessary to establish the standard of care and its breach.184 
 
5.2.2. Recovery of economic loss 
 
It is commonplace that the law of negligence places restrictions upon the recovery of 
pure economic loss. Nuisance, however, would seemingly allow these restrictions to 
be avoided. The point became especially prominent in the Inner House case of The 
Globe (Aberdeen) Ltd v North of Scotland Water Authority.185 The pursuers were the owners 
of a pub and the defender was the water authority replacing a sewer outside the pub. 
The works, which according to the information provided by the defender were meant 
to last six weeks, lasted nine months. During this period, the pavement adjacent to 
the pub was covered in mud, and this pavement being the only access to the pub, 
patrons refrained from visiting it. The pursuers sued the authority in nuisance 
claiming, among other harms, the loss of profits caused by the drop in customers. 
The Sheriff considered that, on the authority of Dynamco Ltd v Holland & Hannen & 
Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd,186 this was pure economic loss and the pursuers did not 
relevantly aver sufficient proximity between them and the defenders to this effect.187 
On appeal, however, the Inner House was of a different opinion. The judges “[did] 
not think that it can be affirmed, without careful consideration of the authorities 
relating to pure financial or economic loss, that in a case of alleged nuisance it is 
necessarily too remote to claim mere financial loss”,188 and remitted the cause to the 
sheriff for a proof before answer. 
Superficially, when contrasted with Dynamco, the decision in The Globe seems to 
provide an advantage to pursuers in nuisance: while in Dynamco, pleaded in 
                                                
 
 
184 The plus quam tolerabile test does not “[take] the place in the nuisance action of an analysis of the 
existence of a duty of care and its breach”, as suggested by C Smith, “Scots Law of Nuisance: Kennedy v 
Glenbelle Ltd” (1995) 8 Greens Environmental Law Bulletin 4 at 5 (emphasis added). 
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187 Cansco International Plc v North of Scotland Water Authority (n 179) at 503-504. 
188 The Globe (n 185) at 394-395 per Lord Coulsfield delivering the opinion of the Court. 
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negligence, liability for pure economic loss was held to be excluded in principle,189 in 
The Globe, pleaded in nuisance, liability for pure economic loss was not so excluded. If 
pure economic loss is recoverable generally under nuisance, then the distinction 
between negligence and negligent nuisance indeed “becomes critical”,190 because it 
would, once again, allow pursuers to circumvent negligence limitations by grounding 
their claims in nuisance.191 
This contrast of The Globe with Dynamco is, however, subject to criticism. In 
Cameron’s view, the difference in result is not due to the fact that they were claimed 
in nuisance and negligence respectively, but to the nature of the harm suffered by the 
pursuer: while Dynamco was about – and remains good law for – secondary pure 
economic loss, i.e., economic loss derived from harm to property that does not 
belong to the pursuer; The Globe was about primary pure economic loss, namely, 
economic loss that is not mediated by any harm to property. As to the latter type of 
harm, the law of negligence has evolved and become more flexible, and the decision 
in The Globe would be a reflection of this evolution.192 
A different and simpler explanation can, however, be offered: when there is 
nuisance, all economic loss is consequential or derivative, even if it does not derive 
from physical damage to property. The comfortable use and enjoyment of property is 
a primary interest recognised by the law of delict; interference with it is as much a 
damage to property as physical damage to it, so much so that it can theoretically be 
compensated by itself. That makes economic loss that arises as a consequence of such 
interference, not pure. It is true that some concepts of pure economic loss rely on its 
independence from physical harm to the person or property,193 but this is not always 
the case.194 In some relevant English nuisance cases of non-physical interference, 
economic harm has, in fact, been treated as consequential.195 
                                                
 
 
189 Dynamco (n 186) at 267 per Lord Migdale, and 268-270 per Lord Cameron. 
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This also gives a consistent explanation of some previous cases: The Globe was 
not, of course, the first case where loss of business was claimed in the context of 
nuisance. Reid points to nineteenth and early twentieth century nuisance cases that 
today would probably be regarded as negligent, and where this loss was claimed with 
success: Laurent v Lord Advocate,196 Cameron v Fraser197 and Huber v Ross.198 “Of the 
restrictions on recovery for financial loss, already being established in mainstream 
negligence, there is little sign” in these cases.199 And there should not be, for there is 
no pure economic loss. 
Accordingly, understanding economic loss in the context of nuisance as 
consequential or derivative provides a clear explanation for its recovery without 
introducing an exceptional rule to the general restrictions imposed by negligence. 
Pure and secondary economic loss are excluded by the very nature of nuisance as a 
delict that protects the use and enjoyment of property: if the origin of the economic 
loss suffered by the pursuer cannot be traced back to an interference with his 
property – physical or otherwise – then he simply does not have the possibility of 
claiming nuisance in the first place, showing the lack of necessity of the negligence 
duty of care as a control device for nuisance. For this pursuer, the only available 
route is (the delict of) negligence.  
Moreover, it is arguable that in nuisance, recovery of economic loss, even if 
derivative or consequential, is limited in a way that it is not in negligence. An analysis 
of the nineteenth-century authority suggests that economic loss, just like non-physical 
interferences with the use and enjoyment of property, falls to be assessed according to 
nuisance principles, namely the plus quam tolerabile test.200 Consequently, admitting the 
recovery of economic loss in this way does not mean that “anything which interferes 
with property constitutes damage”, a contention that according to the Sheriff in The 
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
(5th edn, 2014) § 3.002, defining pure economic loss as the done that “does not result from damage to 
the claimant’s property”, without specifically referring to physical damage. 
195 E.g. Andreae v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1938] Ch 1, a case of inconveniences caused by noise and dust, and 
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reception. 
196 Laurent v Lord Advocate (1869) 7 M 607. 
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Globe “is far too widely stated”.201 The Sheriff was right: not anything, but only 
interferences that are beyond what is reasonably tolerable in the neighbourhood, 
constitutes relevant damage for nuisance. It is arguable that reparation, construction 
and other legitimate operations performed in a neighbourhood might cause some 
acceptable inconvenience, even financial loss, to property owners, which they have to 
tolerate.202 Nuisance, thus, is the more restrictive regime in this aspect, not 
negligence, and this difference is justified by the very nature of nuisance. 
 
5.2.3. Liability for omissions 
 
The third aspect in which the distinction between negligence and negligent nuisance 
seems to be relevant is in liability for omissions. The law of delict in general is 
reluctant to impose liability for pure omissions,203 yet it seems that this reluctance is 
not so strong in the context of nuisance. 
Liability for nuisances caused by negligent omissions to control a source of risk 
present on the defender’s land but not created by him is governed by a line of cases 
initiated by the House of Lords decision in the English case of Sedleigh-Denfield v 
O’Callaghan,204 a case that has been consistently considered authoritative in 
Scotland.205 During a heavy rainstorm, a pipe placed in the defendant’s land by a 
third party became choked with leaves, and the water overflowed onto the plaintiff’s 
land. The defendant was held liable for nuisance despite not having consented to or 
known of the presence of the pipe: he was taken to know and, based on this 
presumed knowledge, it was submitted that at least he continued the nuisance.206 
According to this decision, a landowner will be liable for a nuisance that he did not 
actively create if he “continues” the nuisance, that is, “if with knowledge or presumed 
knowledge of its existence he fails to take any reasonable means to bring it to an end 
though with ample time to do so”; or if he “adopts” the nuisance, namely, “if he 
                                                
 
 
201 Cansco International Plc v North of Scotland Water Authority (n 179) at 494. 
202 See Lord Young’s dictum in Cameron v Fraser (n 197) at 29. 
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makes any use of the erection, building, bank or artificial contrivance which 
constitutes the nuisance”.207 It is possible to note here a terminology shift: as Whitty 
points out,208 the term nuisance here does not refer to the interference with the 
pursuer’s property but to the condition on the defender’s land that eventually causes 
it, that is, to the source of risk. 
The decision was followed and developed further in two important cases: the 
Privy Council decision in the Australian case of Goldman v Hargrave,209 and the Court 
of Appeal decision in the English case of Leakey v National Trusts for Places of Historic or 
Natural Beauty.210 In Goldman, a tree located in the defendant’s land was struck by a 
lightning and caught fire. The defendant cut down the tree and left it to be consumed 
by the fire, without taking further precautions in order to extinguish it. A change on 
the weather conditions reignited and spread the fire to the plaintiff’s property. The 
court held the defendant liable, recognising the existence of a general duty upon 
occupiers to protect neighbours from hazards present in their land, and extending 
the principle advanced in Sedleigh-Denfield from man-made nuisances to nuisances 
caused by the operation of nature.211 The extent of this duty, however, was said to 
depend on the particular circumstances of the defendant, in particular, his resources, 
for “the law must take account of the fact that the occupier on whom the duty is cast 
has, ex hypothesi, had this hazard thrust upon him through no seeking or fault of his 
own”.212 This is the inception of the “measured” duty of care,213 though it is more 
accurately described as a measured standard of care. The case was pleaded in 
negligence, but the possibility of the case being also classified as a nuisance was 
recognised – though not resolved.214 A similar conclusion as to the defender’s 
liability, this time clearly in nuisance, was reached by the Court of Appeal in Leakey: 
the defendants were found liable for the harm caused to the plaintiffs’ houses by the 
                                                
 
 
207 Ibid at 895 per Viscount Maugham. 
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fall of soil from a mound located in the defendants’ land. The defendants had been 
made aware of previous incidents and did not take the precautions that, according to 
the measured standard, should have taken.215 
In sum, there is no limitation in principle to recovery for nuisances caused by 
omissions, as long as some constructive knowledge of their existence can be attributed 
to the landowner, and his negligence is assessed according to a measured standard of 
care that takes into account his circumstances, especially financial. Despite the doubts 
raised in Scots law about the pertinence of following Leakey,216 there seems to be no 
distinction nowadays, for these purposes, between man-made and natural hazards.217 
The modern formulation of the rules governing recovery for negligent 
omissions is contained in the House of Lords decision in Maloco v Littlewoods 
Organisation Ltd.218 In this case, vandals entered into an empty former cinema that 
belonged to the defender and started a fire that spread and caused harm to the 
pursuer’s neighbouring property. In an often-cited dictum, Lord Goff held that a 
defender could be held liable in negligence even when the immediate cause of the 
damage is the wrongdoing of a third party 
 
where the defender negligently causes or permits to be created a source of danger, and it is 
reasonably foreseeable that third parties may interfere with it and, sparking off the danger, 
thereby cause damage to persons in the position of the pursuer [third category]. […] There is 
another basis upon which a defender may be held liable for damage to neighbouring property 
caused by a fire started on his (the defender’s) property by the deliberate wrongdoing of a third 
party. This arises where he has knowledge or means of knowledge that a third party has 
created or is creating a risk of fire, or indeed has started a fire, on his premises, and then fails to 
take such steps as are reasonably open to him (in the limited sense explained by Lord 
Wilberforce in Goldman v Hargrave at pp 663-664) to prevent any such fire from damaging 
neighbouring property [fourth category].219 
 
The defender was held not liable because, despite there being evidence of previous 
break-ins, he was neither informed nor aware of such evidence. 
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Lord Mackay’s less reproduced (but more supported within the court) dictum 
relied on a different reasoning to reach the same conclusion.220 In his view, liability 
rested on foreseeability, coupled with a requirement of high probability of harm: 
 
what the reasonable man is bound to foresee in a case involving injury or damage by 
independent human agency, just as in cases where such agency plays no part, is the probable 
consequences of his own act or omission, but […] in such a case, a clear basis will be required 
on which to assert that the injury or damage is more than a mere possibility.221 
 
However, in the more recent case of Mitchell v Glasgow City Council, Lord Goff’s 
approach was held to be preferable,222 and his list of categories was considered open 
to further development according to the three-step duty test formulated in Caparo 
Industries Plc v Dickman223.224 
Superficially, contrasted with Maloco, Sedleigh-Denfield seems to provide an 
advantage to pursuers that choose the nuisance road: in Maloco, pleaded in 
negligence, the pursuer was not successful in his claim, whereas in Sedleigh-Denfield, 
pleaded in nuisance, the plaintiff obtained compensation for the defender’s omission. 
A brief look will reveal that there might not be a real difference in approach. 
The first difference that can be identified between the cases is noted by Reid: in 
Maloco, the harm was the result of the intentional actions of third parties, whereas in 
Sedleigh-Denfield, there was nothing more than negligence on the third parties.225 But 
more importantly, it is arguable that, unless a strict view of Lord Goff’s fourth 
category in Maloco is adopted, restricted exclusively to fire, the reasoning in Sedleigh-
Denfield and Leakey is perfectly consistent with the one in Maloco:226 in Sedleigh-Denfield 
and Leakey, the defender knew or was deemed to know of the existence of the source 
of danger; in Maloco, the pursuers could not prove the defenders’ knowledge of the 
existence of the source of danger. And the narrative of Lord Goff’s dicta seems to 
allow a broad interpretation of the fourth category: he was using a fire hazard as an 
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example for the third category and might have used fire in the fourth one just to 
continue with the example. The case of Goldman is even easier, for it actually deals 
with fire, so the same logic applies without the need to have a comprehensive view of 
the fourth category. Furthermore, the notion of measured standard of care, which 
could be seen as drawing a difference between negligence and nuisance, is expressly 
considered applicable to Lord Goff’s fourth category in Maloco.227 This demonstrates 
how both the duty of care and the standard of care in negligence are flexible 
mechanisms that adapt to the context of landownership and produce results that, in 
substance, are not different from those that would be reached if the matter were 
approached from the perspective of negligent nuisance. 
More generally, while it is clear that the law of negligence imposes constraints 
upon the recovery of damage caused by omissions, nuisance does so too, first through 
the old language of continuing and adopting the nuisance from Sedleigh-Denfield, and 
now through the limits more precisely defined by knowledge of the source of danger 
– which also helps in setting straight the terminological shift. And these constrains 
seemed to have converged in Lord Goff’s fourth category in Maloco. 
In sum, the supposed difference in approach between negligence and nuisance 






5.2.4. The relevance of abnormal sensitivity 
 
The last difference that has been identified between the rules governing negligence 
and negligent nuisance is their approach to the abnormal sensitivity of the pursuer or 
his property or use.  
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In negligence, the defender assumes the risk of his victim’s or her property’s 
hyper-sensitivity by virtue of the so-called “egg-shell skull” rule: the negligent 
defender takes his victim as he finds her and is bound to compensate all harm 
suffered by her, even if the extent of the harm is the result of a particular 
vulnerability and that vulnerability is unforeseeable for him.228 It has been contended 
that the rule would not apply to hypersensitive property,229 but there is some 
authority supporting the contrary view230 and the distinction is arguably 
unjustified.231 Moreover, the distinction is not accepted in all jurisdictions,232 so the 
point ultimately depends on how the rule is justified.233 
Nuisance, on the contrary, disregards hypersensitivity of both the victim and 
her property in order to assess the gravity of the harm:234 the assessment of the 
tolerability of the interference is performed considering the perspective of a 
reasonable person235 or normally vulnerable property or use.236 
It is important, however, to distinguish properly between the egg-shell skull rule 
and the disregard for hypersensitivity featured in nuisance. These are not two 
different answers for the same question, but answers to two different questions.  
The egg-shell skull rule determines the extent of liability: if there is foreseeable 
harm, and provided the other requirements of negligence are met, there will be 
liability for the full harm, namely, the said foreseeable harm as well as any 
unforeseeable harm derived from the pursuer’s abnormal sensitivity. In the words of 
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Lord Wright in Bourhill v Young, “[t]he question of liability is anterior to the question 
of the measure of the consequences which go with the liability”.237 
Nuisance’s disregard of abnormal sensitivity, on the other hand, is part of the 
harm threshold that determines whether the defender is liable in the first place. 
Therefore, the presence of foreseeable harm is not enough if it falls below the plus 
quam tolerabile test; if this test is met only due to the unforeseeable abnormal sensitivity 
of the pursuer or his property, then the defender will neither be liable for the 
foreseeable nor for the unforeseeable harm. But the egg-shell skull rule does in effect 
apply in nuisance: if the foreseeable harm meets the plus quam tolerabile test, that is, if 
for the normally sensitive victim or property or use the interference would have been 
intolerable, then any further unforeseeable harm due to abnormal sensitivity will be 
compensated as well.238  
Consequently, once it is established that the defender is liable, both in nuisance 
and in negligence he will have to compensate the entire harm caused, even if the 
extent of it is due to the hypersensitivity of the pursuer or his property or use. In this 
sense, part of the alleged difference is illusory: the egg-skull rule applies in both. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that in negligence abnormal sensitivity is 
taken into account in order to determine whether there is a duty of care. Thus, Lord 
Wright in Bourhill v Young remarked that the “question whether there is duty owing to 
members of the public who come within the ambit of the act, must generally depend 
in a normal standard of susceptibility”.239 But even if the duty stage is passed, the 
determination of the standard of care in accordance with foreseeable harm might 
end up excluding liability. Conversely, it is arguable that some hypersensitive uses 
could be protected in nuisance when they are in line with the character of the 
locality.240 
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In sum, there seems to be no relevant difference in this context between 
negligence and nuisance. This demonstrates once again how the elements of 
negligence adapt to the particular context in which they operate, producing results 




The analysis just developed has showed that negligence can be accommodated as a 
form of fault. The plus quam tolerabile test that is peculiar to nuisance is neither 
conceptually incompatible with negligence, nor does it set too high a standard of care 
for unintentional invasions. Moreover, accepting negligence as a form of fault in 
nuisance does not introduce unjustified differences of treatment between nuisance 
and negligence: the differences are either justified – as in the case of economic loss – 
or more apparent than real, for the elements of negligence integrate factors that are 
specific to the landownership context. Consequently, and in accordance with Kennedy, 
negligent nuisance requires the fulfilment of two tests: plus quam tolerabile and breach 




Recklessness has been described as “the grey area”,241 the veil under which intention 
and negligence shade into each other.242 It has been explained in chapter 1 that 
recklessness is an underdeveloped notion in the context of private law.243 In the 
particular context of nuisance, the same picture presents itself: until its identification 
in Kennedy as a separate form of fault, it seldom appeared in nuisance cases, and when 
it did, it was mostly in connection with negligence. 
In this section, it will be argued first that Kennedy changed the understanding of 
recklessness by reducing it purely to a state of knowledge (section 6.1). Secondly, it 
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will be argued that the notion is problematic in nuisance if it is accepted that this 
knowledge can be established constructively (section 6.2). 
 
6.1. Recklessness in nuisance: before and after Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 
 
As previously stated, recklessness seldom appears in cases that today we would 
classify as nuisances. During the nineteenth century, references to recklessness were 
made mainly by the pursuers in their pleadings and normally alongside negligence. 
For instance, in the case of Campbell v Kennedy, the pursuer claimed the compensation 
of “damage sustained […] through the culpable carelessness or recklessness, or 
negligence of the defender”, caused by the bursting of a water pipe in the latter’s 
property.244 Similarly, in Paterson v Lindsay, the pursuer argued that rocks reached the 
place where he was working “[i]n the consequence of the culpable recklessness and 
gross carelessness of the defender […] in the conduct of said blasting operations”;245 
and in M’Bride v Caledonian Railway Co, the pursuers contended that the defender’s 
sewer construction operations “were conducted in a reckless, negligent, and unskilful 
manner”.246 In these cases, recklessness does not seem to adopt a meaning 
substantially different from negligence. In other cases, however, pursuers seemed to 
plead recklessness in a sense closer to a mental state, especially when they had 
warned the defender of the possible harm, e.g. “the said operations having been 
conducted improperly and illegally, and in gross and wilful recklessness of the rights 
and interests of the pursuer”;247 “notwithstanding the warnings given to him by the 
pursuer, and his promise to take precautions, the defender […] wrongfully, recklessly, 
and in total disregard of pursuer’s interest, dragged the timber…”.248  
Nevertheless, in both types of cases the courts’ reasoning was mainly focused on 
the precautions taken by the defender, i.e. a negligence reasoning, apart from any 
form of mental disposition. This is hardly surprising: in this context, intention was 
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not a requirement for liability. Consequently, as discussed in chapter 1,249 there was 
no particular reason for a pursuer to plead recklessness if negligence sufficed. 
During the twentieth century, recklessness simply disappeared from nuisance 
cases, until the notion was unearthed by Kennedy. 
The immediate source of Kennedy – Whitty’s model – did not develop the notion 
of recklessness. It was, indeed, merely mentioned alongside the other categories of 
fault included in the Rest (2d) fault continuum, and also in a quote from the Rest (2d) 
explaining the continuum, where it is stated that conduct is reckless when the 
probability of harm is less than substantial certainty but more than mere risk.250 The 
difference between intention, recklessness and negligence would be, therefore, simply 
one of likelihood of harm. Recklessness in the Rest (2d), however, is more complex 
than that. It is a form of fault determined by the rules of negligence that is treated, in 
some respects, on a par with intention given that the underlying risk is particularly 
high and the defendant is – actually or constructively – aware of it. It is, in sum, a 
judgment about the conduct coupled with a mental element, though the latter is 
highly objectivised.251 
In Kennedy, the view adopted is somewhat difficult to assess. According to Lord 
Hope, the defender is reckless if he “had no regard to the question whether his 
action, if it was of a kind likely to cause harm to the other party, would have that 
result”.252 This description seemingly coincides with the conception of recklessness 
discussed in chapter 1, i.e. the idea of a mental state of indifference to risk.253 But on 
closer scrutiny, there is a considerable difference, for this disregard of risk is, after 
Kennedy, reduced to the mere knowledge of its existence. What is remarkable, 
however, is that Kennedy’s notion of recklessness, unlike the approach adopted in its 
sources, does not attach to a particular level of likelihood of harm. It suffices that 
harm is likely, as opposed to certain. 
It is not clear whether Kennedy itself was deemed a case of reckless harm 
because, as mentioned above, the report points to both knowledge of certainty of the 
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harm and knowledge of likelihood of harm when explaining the pursuer’s 
pleadings.254 So it is risky to draw conclusions about recklessness based on how 
Kennedy was decided when what could be under analysis is actually intention. 
The literature that followed Kennedy does not provide much assistance either: it 
is limited to references to Walker’s definition of recklessness,255 who conceptualises it 
as a frame of mind of indifference to realised risks,256 or references to the Rest (2d)’s 
explanation of the continuum quoted by Whitty;257 and to the acknowledgement that 
recklessness is equivalent to intention,258 without clarifying what consequences follow 
from this assimilation. 
In the few cases following Kennedy where recklessness was in point, there are, 
however, some remarks that might throw light on the issue.  
In Anderson v White, the Lord Ordinary (Philip) remarked that, since the 
pursuers had averred a deliberate action on the part of the defenders, 
 
The only further requirement was to aver that the defenders knew that their actions would 
result in harm to the pursuers [intention], or alternatively that they had no regard to the 
question whether their action was likely to cause such harm [recklessness]. The pursuers say 
that the defenders knew of the resultant harm because of complaints, and that in any event the 
likelihood of harm was obvious. That, according to my understanding of the cases cited, is sufficient 
to make a relevant case.259 
 
Consequently, to make a relevant averment of recklessness it sufficed simply to argue 
that the defenders were aware of the likelihood of harm. Whether the defenders were 
actually indifferent to or disregarded such risk did not need to be specified. One has 
to conclude that such indifference was inferred – though it is not clear from what 
(perhaps from the fact that harm occurred?). 
The same alternative pleadings – intention and recklessness – can be found in 
the more recent case of Morris Amusements Ltd v Glasgow City Council. Here, the Lord 
Ordinary (Emslie) submitted that 
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[a]s explained by the Lord President in Kennedy, each of these alternatives requires proof of a 
specific state of knowledge on the defender’ part, and on a strict technical approach it might be said 
that the pursuers’ pleadings fall somewhat short of that requirement.260 
 
Admittedly, these are only two Outer House decisions. But there seems to be a trend: 
even though Kennedy conceptualised recklessness as a mental state of indifference, 
courts have been content with treating it as a mental state of mere knowledge. 
Indifference is absent from the analysis, and so is any consideration of negligence. 
They have, however, followed Kennedy – and not its sources – in that they do not 
require a specific level of likelihood. It is enough that harm is likely, and that the 
defender knows it. 
As a consequence, it can be established that in fact recklessness departed 
fundamentally from its treatment in the Rest (2d), for there is neither an assessment 
of the level of care taken by the defender, nor a requirement of a particularly high 
level of risk. In the latter aspect, the Scottish development converges with the 
approach adopted by the Rest (3d) in this point, where recklessness is not necessarily 
associated to a high level of likelihood.261 But the convergence stops there, for the 
Rest (3d) clearly conceives recklessness as the combination of two distinct mental 
states: one of knowledge of risk (§ 2 (a)) and one of indifference toward risk (§ 2 (b)). 
The second of these mental states is inferred from the fact that adequate precautions 
impose a very slight burden and yet they are not adopted. Consequently, the 
defendant’s indifference is assumed, but this assumption stems from the combination 
of (i) negligence and (ii) the low burden of taking precautions. This stands in sharp 
contrast with the decisions discussed above, where indifference is simply excluded 
from the analysis or, at most, assumed seemingly just from the occurrence of harm. 
Recklessness is, in sum, a state of knowledge that stands as a lighter form of 
intention, where the difference lies simply in that the harm is no longer certain to 
result but only likely. This appears, at the very least, problematic. To put it simply: 
most of our actions entail a certain likelihood of harm, and we know it. Can we be 
said to be at fault just because of that? There is clearly something missing here. The 
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issue becomes all the more problematic when we consider the possibility of 
establishing this knowledge constructively. 
 
6.2. Constructive knowledge? 
 
On the face of it, recklessness seems like a rather attractive form of fault to be averred 
in practice: the only requirement is knowledge of the likelihood of harm. Indeed, the 
dictum from Anderson might suggest that recklessness is the most attractive form of 
fault: if the assertion that likelihood of harm was obvious was deemed a relevant 
averment of recklessness, does it mean that knowledge can be established 
constructively? It is not possible to find a clear and conclusive answer from either 
Kennedy’s sources or subsequent doctrine and case law, but the possibility suffers from 
the same problems indicated for it in relation to intention. 
 
6.2.1. No clear answer provided by sources and case law 
 
It has already been highlighted that Whitty did not develop the notion of 
recklessness.262 The Rest (2d) considered the possibility of applying a reasonableness 
test to the required knowledge; but, as explained, the nature of recklessness in the 
Rest (2d) is strikingly different from that adopted by and developed after Kennedy.263 
For this reason, and despite it being one of the sources of the model, what makes 
sense in the Rest (2d) framework might not necessarily be adequate for the Scots 
notion, so a swift extrapolation is, to say the least, risky. 
Doctrinally, as indicated, recklessness is considered as equivalent to intention, 
though it is not exactly clear in what respects.264 If there is also equivalence in the 
way intention is established, then according to the current position in Scots law, we 
would have to conclude that knowledge, for the purposes of recklessness, can indeed 
be established constructively. 
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Case law is not entirely clear either, but it seems progressively more inclined to 
admit averments of constructive knowledge at least to allow the case to go to proof. 
In Anderson, the court considered that there were relevant pleadings of fault, and the 
pursuers’ contention that “the likelihood of the harm was obvious” seems to be 
directed at proving the knowledge required for recklessness.265 Now, it is not clear 
whether it was meant to assert that defenders knew the risk – i.e. the pursuer 
intended to prove actual knowledge by circumstantial evidence – or that they should 
have known because every reasonable defender in their position would have. 
Admittedly, the phrase leaves space for both interpretations. In the case of Morris 
Amusements Ltd, in turn, it was highlighted that a specific state of knowledge must be 
proved, but nothing is said about how this can be done.266 In the more recent 
Chalmers v Diageo Scotland Ltd, however, the court regarded the assertion that “the 
defenders knew or ought to have known that [their conduct] would be liable to cause 
loss”267 as a relevant averment of fault, language that more clearly points to the 
admission of constructive knowledge. The alleged knowledge was claimed to derive 
from the existence of a number of scientific papers linking the harm suffered 
(development of fungus on the pursuers’ property) to the defenders’ conduct (keeping 
a bonded warehouse in the vicinity). 
 
6.2.2. Problems of an affirmative answer 
 
Admitting the possibility of establishing knowledge constructively for the purposes of 
recklessness is, however, problematic for the same reasons indicated in relation to 
intention.268 
First, there is the problem of confusing the content of mental states and their 
proof, given the particular difficulty attached to this proof. The need to resort to 
circumstantial evidence is not the same as applying an objective test of knowledge. 
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Secondly, there is no strong basis in authority for allowing knowledge to be 
established constructively, though in the case of recklessness, the cases of Anderson and 
Chalmers v Diageo Scotland Ltd could be seen as providing some support for it. These 
are, however, Outer House cases allowing proof before answer, postponing the actual 
decision of whether liability can be imposed on this basis. In the case of Anderson, this 
decision did not arrive and is not likely to arrive in the Diageo case. 
More importantly, admitting this possibility, just like in the case of intention, 
means effectively imposing strict liability for foreseeable harm. In intention at least 
the scope of application of the rule is limited only to cases where harm is certain to 
result, whereas here, likelihood suffices, without a clear definition of how great this 
likelihood must be. It is, in sum, a broader strict liability rule that, again, goes against 
the RHM Bakeries rule. It could actually render negligence irrelevant: negligence, 
besides foreseeability of harm, requires the conduct of the defender to be in breach of 
the relevant standard of care, a requirement absent from the version of recklessness 
adopted by and developed after Kennedy. 
Consequently, if complete consistency with the general fault-based liability rule 
enshrined by RHM Bakeries for nuisance is to be achieved, then two roads can be 
followed: either the basis for a recklessness averment is limited only to actual 




From this analysis, it can be concluded that the notion of recklessness adopted by 
Kennedy for the nuisance fault model is a purely subjective one, a state of mind 
consisting of the knowledge that certain harm is likely to follow from the defender’s 
conduct. It does not assess the defender’s conduct objectively, nor is it associated with 
a particularly high level of likelihood of harm, in contrast with its counterpart in the 
Rest (2d). In this context, admitting the possibility of establishing knowledge 
constructively might lead to a broad rule of strict liability in disguise. 
 




It has been explained throughout this chapter that the fault model approved by 
Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd was taken from Whitty’s model, who in turn derived his 
inspiration from the American Rest (2d). Both Whitty and the Rest (2d) present this 
model as a “continuum” of fault that depends on the likelihood that harm will result: 
when harm is certain to follow from the defender’s conduct, harm is characterised as 
intentional, and as this likelihood decreases, the invasion becomes reckless or, further, 
just negligent.269 
It is argued in this section that this continuum is an inaccurate and misleading 
depiction of the fault framework: not only, according to its very logic, does it not 
encompass all the types of categories of fault offered by the catalogue (7.1), but also it 
is not truly a continuum. This clarification is not merely of theoretical importance 
but has practical implications for the way fault is pleaded (7.2). 
 
7.1. Conceptually excluded categories 
 
The first problem with the idea of fault as a continuum depending upon likelihood of 
harm is that it does not encompass all the five categories of fault offered by the 
Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd catalogue. On the one hand, it certainly excludes some versions 
of intention, for malice and intention as purpose do not depend on any level of 
likelihood of harm; and the category of conduct causing a special risk of abnormal 
damage does not constitute a separate category of fault. 
 
7.1.1. Malice and intention as purpose 
 
As a first observation, it is fairly clear why the very nature of malice and intention as 
purpose places them outwith the fault continuum. The reason is simply that spiteful 
motives and the purpose to harm have nothing to do with these concepts. What 
characterises these forms of fault is a mental state: the mental state of desiring certain 
effects (and believing they might result270), regardless of how likely these effects in fact 
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are, and regardless of why they are so desired. The point has been conceded in Scots 
doctrine at least with regard to malice.271 
It could be argued that, even though malice and intention as purpose are not 
part of the wider continuum, they are indeed in a continuum with intention as 
knowledge, that is, a sort of “internal” intentional harm fault continuum where 
malice is the graver version of intention.  
It is true that these are all states of mind but, in the sense they are presented by 
the model under analysis, they do not represent degrees within the same hierarchy. 
Malice and intention as purpose, insofar as they are dominated by the purpose to 
cause harm (with or without spiteful motives), are mainly mental states of desire.272 
Intention as knowledge, on the other hand, is a mental state of pure belief.273 They 
cannot be in a continuum from a conceptual perspective. 
In sum, by definition, malice and intention as purpose do not belong in the 
fault continuum generally, nor do they differ only by degree form intention as 
knowledge. 
 
7.1.2. Conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage 
 
On the other extreme of the continuum lies conduct causing a special risk of 
abnormal damage. This category is discussed in detail in chapter 3, but some brief 
lines will serve to clarify its position in the continuum. 
In contrast with the categories analysed above, i.e. malice and intention as 
purpose, this category does indeed depend to an extent on likelihood of harm, so the 
reason for its exclusion from the continuum is different. 
As Whitty himself acknowledged, 
 
Technically this is an impure taxonomic category because, unlike the other forms of culpa 
which form a series or continuum of types of conduct defined by reference to the pursuer’s 
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mental element, this has reference to the gravity of the possible harm suffered by the defender 
not to the pursuer’s mental element and therefore belongs to a different classificatory series.274 
 
Whitty’s explanation must be qualified, for not all the other categories are defined by 
reference to the mental element. More accurately, it can be said that the other 
categories assess certain elements of the defender’s behaviour on the face of a certain 
risk – his mental state or the precautions taken by him – whereas conduct causing a 
special risk of abnormal damage attributes liability regardless of these elements. 
Furthermore, the continuum depends solely on likelihood of harm, whereas 
conduct creating a special risk of abnormal damage depends on a certain interaction 
between likelihood of harm and its magnitude, so it cannot be located in a specific 
place within the spectrum, despite the intuition that, given the level of risk that is 
required, it should be “near the top rather than the bottom end of the continuum”.275 
It could, in a given case, require a lower level of likelihood than one would expect 
where the potential consequences are devastating. 
Consequently, conduct creating a special risk of abnormal damage can overlap 
with the other categories of the continuum. It is not a different category of fault but 
actually, as argued in chapter 3, a form of strict liability. 
 
7.2. Intention as knowledge and negligence: difference in nature, not in 
degree 
 
Is it possible to affirm that there is a continuum of fault encompassing the remaining 
categories, that is, intention as knowledge, recklessness and negligence? 
The idea of the continuum of fault rests upon the notion of a continuum of 
likelihood of harm, by virtue of which different degrees of fault are attached to 
different degrees of likelihood. Therefore, there is a continuum “transfer”: from the 
fact that there is a continuum of risk based on the likelihood of harm, we conclude 
that there is a continuum of fault. The argument suggested here is that this transfer is 
improper for two reasons: firstly, because even if there is a continuum of risk, fault is 
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not the materialisation of such risk; secondly, because the different types of fault are 
not all necessarily attached to a particular level of risk. Consequently, there is no such 
fault continuum. 
This conclusion is relevant because the continuum notion seems to suggest two 
misleading consequences that have practical importance. It suggests, firstly, that a 
claimant could rely upon the “lighter” form of fault if he cannot prove the “heavier”, 
i.e. if he cannot prove certainty of harm, it would be enough for him to prove its 
likelihood. In fact, merely proving likelihood would not suffice, because he would also 
need to aver and prove the rest of the elements that constitute the lighter form of 
fault. The second consequence would be that the level of risk predetermines the type 
of fault that pursuers are supposed to plead: if harm was certain, there is only room 
for a case of intention; if harm was only likely, there is only room for a case of 
negligence. Yet, as will be explained, only the latter is true. 
To facilitate the argument, the contrast between intention and negligence will 
be addressed in order to locate recklessness within the framework. 
 
7.2.1. Fault is not the materialisation of the risk 
 
Assuming that there is in fact an underlying continuum of risk, based on the 
likelihood of harm, to which each type of conduct is attached, materialisation of such 
risk is not per se sufficient to be the basis of liability. What constitutes fault is not the 
fact that harm happened, whether it was certain or just likely; risk is not the defining 
element but only the underlying element. In intention as knowledge, what constitutes 
fault is acting with the knowledge that harm will result, so the focus is on knowledge, 
that is, a mental state towards consequences; in negligence, fault is not taking due 
care, so focus is on conduct, that is, whether it complies with a certain standard or not. 
As explained by Simons in the context of American law (the source of our 
continuum), they do not belong in the same hierarchy of culpability: intention in this 
version belongs in the hierarchy of mental states of belief, whereas negligence belongs 
in a hierarchy that is not of mental states, but of standards of conduct.276 
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This is why a pursuer cannot simply rely on the lighter form of fault if he fails 
to prove the level of certainty required by the more serious one, unless his fall-back 
position includes the elements of the former that actually constitute fault. The best 
illustration of the difference can, in fact, be noted in the very case of Kennedy v 
Glenbelle. In the case, the pursuers tried two different basis of liability for the same 
“likelihood” of harm: intentional – or perhaps reckless – nuisance (art 9 of the 
condescendence) and “fault” (art 10 of the condescendence). About this second plea, 
Lord President Hope stated: 
 
[I]t is averred that the second defenders knew that the execution of the works “was likely” to 
cause damage to the pursuers’ premises of the kind which in fact occurred, and that it was the 
second defenders’ duty not to instruct and direct the carrying out of these works. If what is 
meant by these averments is that the second defenders knew that damage would inevitably 
result from the carrying out of the works, which is what the pursuers say in the preceding 
articles of the condescendence, then this seems to me to be a repetition of the case of nuisance 
which is pled in art 9. If it is being suggested that the damage was likely in the sense that, if due 
care had been taken, it might have been prevented, then the suggestion is that the second 
defenders were negligent. But the pleadings in art 10 are wholly inadequate to support a case based on 
negligence […].277 
 
This difference in nature is, indeed, the explanation for the irrelevance of the degree 
of care employed in the case of intentional harm;278 there is simply “no room for 
arguments based in the absence of negligence”279 because care is not at issue. This is, 
moreover, the reason why speaking of a “standard of care” in intentional wrongdoing 
is technically incorrect: we do not have here an “absolute”280 or “higher”281 standard 
of care, as it has been suggested, because care is not under scrutiny when the type of 
fault asserted is intention. 
 
7.2.2. Fault is not predetermined by the level of risk 
 
Furthermore, the risk continuum does not determine in an inescapable way the type 
of fault the pursuer has to plead, at least not in both ends of the spectrum. 
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The fact that certainty of harm serves as the basis for the assertion of intention 
as knowledge does not exclude the possibility of the conduct of the defender being 
negligent if he did not meet the standard of care that the circumstances required him 
to meet.282 Thus, it would be possible to plead negligence when harm was certain 
and even actually intentional;283 liability criteria are “nested”.284 The pursuer might 
want to choose this road for two reasons: because even if harm is certain, the 
defender might not have known it was, which excludes intention; or because despite 
the fact that the defender knew, negligence might be easier to prove. The standard of 
care for negligence may and probably will be very high in the face of certain harm 
and, consequently, its breach will be easier to establish. This is the only sense in 
which speaking of a standard of care for intentional wrongdoing is possible: when 
harm is in fact intentional but the type of fault pleaded is not intention, but 
negligence. 
The converse, however, is not true: intention as knowledge cannot be 
established on the face of mere likelihood of harm. If harm is simply probable, but 
not certain, only the road of negligence is open. Therefore, the degree of likelihood 
only determines the type of fault that can be pleaded in one direction, not in both. 
 
7.3. The position of recklessness 
 
It has been argued above that the developments since Kennedy have seemingly 
reduced recklessness to a mental state of pure knowledge of the likelihood of harm, 
disregarding – or at best, assuming – the element of indifference that characterised 
the notion in its traditional understanding.285 If one adopts this view, then it is 
arguable that recklessness is in a continuum with intention as knowledge, as a 
“lighter” form of fault. Where likelihood of harm turns into certainty of harm, 
recklessness turns into intention. 
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This notion of recklessness, however, does not rely on a particular level of 
likelihood of harm. Accordingly, it simply cannot be in a continuum with negligence: 
they can actually be both attached to the same level of likelihood. Moreover, this 
notion of recklessness differs from negligence in nature, not in degree, for these forms 
of fault entail an assessment of different elements of the defender’s act or omission, 
just like intention as knowledge differed from negligence.286 
As a consequence, this version of recklessness seems to be the final nail in the 




This analysis shows that the notion of continuum does not accurately describe the 
fault framework adopted for nuisance by Kennedy. On the one hand, the concept that 
underlies the so-called continuum, namely likelihood of harm, conceptually excludes 
some of the forms of fault: malice and intention as purpose, insofar as they simply do 
not depend on any notion of likelihood; and conduct creating a special risk of 
abnormal damage, for it depends on a notion that is more complex than mere 
likelihood, and it does not constitute a separate form of fault but actually a form of 
strict liability. On the other hand, the notion of a continuum suggests that fault is 
simply the materialisation of a risk and, more importantly, that the level of likelihood 
predetermines the type of fault that can be pleaded by the pursuer yet both of these 
suggestions are misleading. Perhaps only recklessness – in the rather problematic 
version adopted after Kennedy – and intention as knowledge can be understood as 
differing in degree rather than in nature, but in general, it seems better suited to 
analyse each form of fault separately rather than try to find a unifying concept that 
might lead to a misunderstanding of the nature of the different categories. 
 
8. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
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The arrival of the Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd model of fault in the Scots law of nuisance 
cannot be regarded simply as a rationalisation of the law already in place. It entailed 
the partial adoption of a foreign model that still requires to be clarified and adapted 
to its new environment. This chapter contributed to this task by analysing and 
evaluating the four forms of fault offered by the model, as well as the notion that 
seeks to explain the relation between them. 
Regarding the first form of fault offered by Kennedy, malice, its role appears very 
limited. In nuisance, malice or aemulatio has been absorbed mostly by the plus quam 
tolerabile test. As a form of fault, it has practical shortcomings that restrain its utility, 
although it is possible to envisage a case where the only possibility of establishing 
nuisance would be by averring and proving malice: where the defender had as the 
sole purpose of his actions to cause harm to the pursuer but the particular harmful 
consequence was unintended. 
The second form of fault, intention, is particularly challenging. The model 
admits as forms of intention both having the purpose of bringing about particular 
consequences and having the knowledge that those consequences will certainly 
follow. Scholars have submitted that, for the purposes of the latter form of intention, 
constructive knowledge is enough. But this contention is conceptually problematic 
and is not adequately supported in the authority. Moreover, this interpretation 
creates the undesired result of contradicting the decision of RHM Bakeries, by 
imposing what is in effect a form of strict liability. 
The third form of fault, negligence, has been the subject of more debate: for 
different reasons, it has been seen as a form of fault that does not fit the nuisance 
framework, so negligent nuisance should be treated simply as negligence and attract 
the application of the general rules of the law of negligence. It was argued here, 
however, that this is not necessarily the case, and that negligence can be 
accommodated as a form of fault in the nuisance model. The plus quam tolerabile test 
can interact adequately with the reasonable care test that is characteristic of 
negligence, and addressing negligent nuisance in the context of nuisance does not 
allow pursuers to avoid the restrictions that negligence is traditionally seen to impose. 
Recklessness is the fourth and less developed form of fault that is offered by the 
model. Departing from what seems to have been the understanding of recklessness in 
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Scots law, the notion has evolved into a mental state of pure knowledge that is not 
only problematic in itself, but also replicates the issues identified in intention related 
to the possibility of establishing knowledge constructively, with potentially wider 
consequences, as the requirement is not certainty but just likelihood of harm. 
Overall, explaining the links between these forms of fault through the notion of 
continuum is unhelpful and even misleading. The notion, based on different degrees 
of likelihood, excludes conceptually some of the forms of fault here analysed, 
specifically malice, intention as purpose, and conduct causing a special risk of 
abnormal damage. Further, it presents the remaining forms of fault as differing only 
in degree, a contention that only makes sense if we understand fault simply as the 
materialisation of the underlying risk, which is not the case; and suggests that the 
level of likelihood determines conclusively the type of fault that the pursuer can plead 
as the basis of his claim, which is not always the case. Besides the relation between 
intention as knowledge and recklessness, which comes closer to this idea of 
continuum, it is better to consider each category individually: forcing them into a 








The previous chapter discussed the first four categories of fault listed by Lord 
President Hope in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd in addressing the basis of liability in 
nuisance.1 This chapter is concerned with the fifth and last of these categories, 
namely “conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage, where it may be said 
that it is not necessary to prove a specific fault as fault is necessarily implied in the 
result”. The formulation discloses from the outset that this type of conduct is subject 
to a special treatment or regime that departs from the other four categories: instances 
of malice, intention, recklessness or negligence must be proved by the pursuer in 
order to obtain compensation, whereas in the case of conduct that meets the 
abovementioned description, there is no need to prove a specific fault, for it is 
implied. 
Neither the scope of this category nor the nature of the liability that it attracts 
have been satisfactorily explained by Scots case law and doctrine. In the words of 
Cameron, “it may be that this element of fault requires to be more fully worked 
out”.2 The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to contribute to the analysis of this special 
liability regime by explaining some of the difficulties that are present in the law as it 
stands and by exploring the possibilities for a more rational approach that would 
allow the law to move forward. 
A discussion of the sources of this category and subsequent case law and 
literature will reveal difficulties for the adequate delineation and explanation of this 
regime of liability, for three reasons. First, the sources lead to different and, on 
occasions, conflicting views about the category. Secondly, most of these sources 
remain directly or indirectly connected to the English case of Rylands v Fletcher,3 which 
was excluded from Scots law in the House of Lords decision in RHM Bakeries 
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(Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council.4 Thirdly, much of the more recent relevant 
authority is concerned with the application of a connected yet different liability rule: 
that applicable to the employer for damage caused by independent contractors. 
Despite these issues, at least one feature of Scottish doctrine as it has evolved appears 
to be uncontentious: the regime can be explained in fault terms. Precisely for this 
reason, the need to delineate with precision the scope of this regime is downplayed 
(section 2). 
Two main arguments will be advanced in this chapter. First, it will be argued 
that despite the current orthodox view that explains this liability regime as fault-
based, the rule is effectively one of strict liability. This conclusion is reached by the 
evaluation of the rule’s elements and the discussion of the shortcomings of the 
orthodox fault-based account (section 3). Secondly, it will be argued that, given the 
strict nature of the liability rule, the precise delineation of its scope becomes critical 
and should be the main focus of inquiry. Since the available authority does not 
provide enough substantive assistance in elucidating this delineation, a rational 
proposal to fill this gap is offered here. This proposal sets out the conduct’s elements, 
their interaction and restrictions, taking special account of the strict liability nature of 
the rule (section 4). 
 
2. CONDUCT CAUSING A SPECIAL RISK OF ABNORMAL DAMAGE: SOURCES AND SUBSEQUENT 
CASE LAW 
 
This section considers firstly two groups of materials that serve as the sources for the 
category of conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage: those that constitute 
the source for the fault model generally, i.e. Whitty’s “Nuisance” entry and the 
authority there considered (section 2.1); and the dicta in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd itself 
together with the authority identified in the decision for the specific category under 
discussion (section 2.2). A third group of materials is considered subsequently: case 
law and legal literature after Kennedy (section 2.3). 
                                                
 
 
4 RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17. 
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In these three groups of materials, both key aspects of the liability regime will 
be considered, i.e. the nature of the liability rule – whether fault-based, “stricter-
than-normal” or strict, according to the taxonomy set out in chapter 1 – and its scope 
of application – that is, the definition of the category of conducts to which it applies. 
 
2.1. The sources of the category (1): Whitty’s “Nuisance” entry in the SME 
 
The first source of the category under discussion considered by Lord President Hope 
in Kennedy was paragraph 2087 of Whitty’s “Nuisance” entry in the SME,5 which is 
the introductory paragraph to the section about the basis of liability in reparation. 
Here, the author sets out the fault model or “continuum” based on the American 
Rest (2d), discussed in detail in chapter 2. According to this model, the “usual 
categories of culpa” are malice, intent, recklessness, negligence, and “conduct causing 
a special risk of abnormal danger”.6 It should be noted that Whitty refers here to 
abnormal danger, and not to abnormal damage as in Lord Hope’s formulation, a point 
that will be revisited below.7 The only authority cited in support of the last category is 
the case of Miller v Robert Addie & Sons’ Collieries Ltd,8 which in turn applied the rule 
developed by the Privy Council in the Australian case of Rickards v Lothian.9 
 
2.1.1. Whitty’s model and Rest (2d) contrasted 
 
Even though the fault model adopted by Whitty is derived from the Rest (2d), by 
incorporating the type of conduct under discussion into the fault framework he 
departed conceptually from this source, where abnormally dangerous activities are 
subject to a strict liability rule.10 This departure, however, is fundamental to the 
                                                
 
 
5 Whitty, “Nuisance”. A reissue of this entry was released subsequently: see Whitty, “Nuisance” 
(reissue). Paragraph numbers in both versions are correlative: § 2087 in “Nuisance” corresponds with § 
87 in “Nuisance” (reissue). This section on the sources of the category is, however, mostly concerned 
with the original version. 
6 Whitty, “Nuisance” § 2087. 
7 See p 125. 
8 Miller v Robert Addie & Sons’ Collieries Ltd 1934 SC 150. 
9 Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263. 
10 Rest (2d) § 519. 
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nature of the applicable liability rule, i.e. fault-based as opposed to strict liability. The 
delimitation of the conduct itself in the Rest (2d), however, could still be illustrative 
for our purposes, since it seems to have informed the way in which Whitty defined 
the conduct by incorporating the notion of abnormal danger. Consequently, even 
though this type of conduct falls within a different liability regime, the Rest (2d) 
nevertheless serves as a relevant point of reference. 
Abnormally dangerous activity is defined in § 520 Rest (2d), which lists a 
number of factors that must be considered: 
 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; (b) 
likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by 
the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common 
usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to 
which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 
 
According to the Rest (2d), none of these factors is necessarily sufficient of itself, and 
normally several of them will be required, to characterise an activity as abnormally 
dangerous, but they do not need all to be present. For this reason, “it is not possible 
to reduce abnormally dangerous activities to any definition”.11 
This approach was considered problematical in several ways,12 especially due 
to the difficulty in separating clearly activities that trigger the application of strict 
liability from those that are subject to the general fault-based liability regime. The 
difference, in this model, lies in the contrast between utility and risk. If utility 
outweighs risk, then risk is reasonable and negligence is conceptually excluded, for 
negligence can only arise from unreasonable risks,13 but there is still space for strict 
liability based upon abnormal danger.14 Conversely, if risk outweighs utility, then risk 
is unreasonable and, therefore, conduct can be negligent. This, however, should not 
close the possibility of strict liability; otherwise, it could create the contradiction that 
a higher risk that is not outweighed by its utility would be excluded from the category 
of abnormal danger and liability would only depend on proof of negligence. 
                                                
 
 
11 Rest (2d) § 520 comment f. 
12 Details of the problems associated to the application of these factors can be found in the reporter’s 
notes of § 20 Rest (3d). 
13 Rest (2d) § 291. 
14 Rest (2d) § 520 comment b. 
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It seems, therefore, that unreasonable risk, unlike abnormal danger, is a 
relational concept: risk can be reasonable because of the activity’s utility, but still so 
high as to be abnormal; risk can be low so not enough to be abnormal, but still 
unreasonable if the activity’s utility is even lower.15 The inclusion of some factors in § 
520, however, undermines this conclusion, e.g. value to the community is itself an 
indicator of utility for negligence purposes.16 There is, in fact, a wide overlap between 
the factors that are taken into account to characterise an activity as abnormally 
dangerous and the factors taken into account to characterise risk as unreasonable,17 
so one is left to wonder whether in practice these tests have any substantial difference 
and whether they can in fact bring about different results. It has, indeed, been 
submitted that “when a court applies all the factors suggested in the Second 
Restatement it is doing virtually the same thing as is done with the negligence 
concept”.18 The Rest (2d) highlights a procedural difference: weighing factors that 
define an activity as abnormally dangerous is a task for the court; weighing factors 
that characterise risk as unreasonable is a task for the jury.19 Substantively, however, 
there seems to be little difference. 
It will be possible to note from the authority analysed below that some of the 
factors considered in the Rest (2d) have been identified as relevant in Scots law. For 
example, the inability to eliminate risk lies at the heart of the distinction drawn in the 
case of Chalmers v Dixon;20 and the ideas of common usage and value for the 
community could be seen as the basis for the decision in Miller v Robert Addie.21 Yet the 
fact that none of the factors is treated as necessarily decisive in the Rest (2d) 
constitutes a fundamental difference with the Scots approach. For instance, under § 
520, activities that would inexorably fall in Scots law under the general rules of fault-
based liability according to Miller22 for being common uses of land or uses for the 
                                                
 
 
15 Rest (2d) § 520 comment g. 
16 Rest (2d) § 292 (a). 
17 Compare factors in § 520 with factors in §§ 291-293. 
18 W P Keeton (ed), Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th edn, 1984) 555; see also E Reid, “Liability 
for Dangerous Activities: A Comparative Analysis” (1999) 48 ICLQ 731 at 737. 
19 Rest (2d) § 520 comment l. 
20 Chalmers v Dixon (1876) 3 R 461 at 464 per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff. 
21 Miller v Robert Addie (n 8). 
22 Discussed in the following section. 
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general benefit of the community, could still be considered as abnormally dangerous 
in the Rest (2d) if other elements are strong enough, as in the case where it is 
extremely likely that damage will follow from the activity and no precautions would 
control such risk. Consequently, the Rest (2d)’s flexible approach to the definition of 
abnormally dangerous activities stands in contrast with the sources considered by 
Whitty in defining conduct causing a special risk of abnormal danger.23 It seems, 
therefore, that the inspiration obtained by Whitty from the Rest (2d) in this point did 
not go beyond the incorporation of the “abnormal danger” wording. 
 
2.1.2. Miller v Robert Addie, its sources and aftermath 
 
We turn, then, to the only authority cited by Whitty in support of the category of 
conduct causing a special risk of abnormal danger: the case of Miller v Robert Addie.24 
This decision, paradoxically, did not apply any special liability regime. Indeed, as we 
will see, the general rules of fault-based liability were applied. 
In this case, gas escaped from service pipes, property of the defenders, and 
found its way into the pursuer’s house, causing personal injuries to herself and her 
child, and resulting in the death of her husband. One of the grounds of her claim was 
the rule in Rylands v Fletcher:25 all that was needed to establish liability, she argued, was 
that there was a non-natural use of land and that such use created a danger. There 
was no need to aver fault. The Court unanimously decided that providing gas to 
houses was not a non-natural use of land and that, for this reason, Rylands was not 
applicable.26 It adopted for the provision of gas for domestic purposes the 
qualification that Rickards v Lothian27 had introduced to the application of Rylands in 
the context of provision of water: “[i]t must be some special use bringing with it 
                                                
 
 
23 This flexible approach is abandoned in the Rest (3d): see § 20. 
24 Miller v Robert Addie (n 8). 
25 Rylands (n 3). 
26 Miller v Robert Addie (n 8) at 154 per Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison, 156 per Lord Hunter, 157 per 
Lord Anderson, and 159 per Lord Murray. 
27 Rickards (n 9). 
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increased danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or 
such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community”.28 
Thus the wording Whitty employs for his formulation “conduct causing a 
special risk of abnormal danger” seems to combine elements from both the Rickards 
definition of the conduct that triggers the application of the Rylands rule – special use 
that brings increased danger – and the definition of the conduct that attracts strict 
liability in the Rest (2d) – abnormally dangerous activities. However, the reference to a 
special use, is replaced by Whitty with the reference to a special risk, without signalling 
explicitly the reason for the change, if there was a particular one. The result is a 
redundant, and perhaps confusing definition, since it is based upon both risk and 
danger, two concepts that are not easily distinguishable.29 If risk and danger are the 
same, then we end up with two separate requirements for this risk or danger: it has to 
be both special and abnormal. It is not clear whether these are actually two different 
requirements and we do not find assistance in Whitty’s entry or his references to 
answer this question. 
There are, moreover, two fundamental issues that leave Miller in a rather 
problematic position as authority to support the category under discussion. On the 
one hand, the authority upon which Miller relies provides some insights about the 
rule’s scope and nature, but certainly does not provide clear and conclusive views (a). 
On the other hand, the case keeps the category connected with Rylands (b). 
 
(a) The central question in Miller was whether the escape of gas from the defender’s 
service pipes triggered the application of the Rylands rule, a rule that was identified 
with those applied in the cases of Kerr v Earl of Orkney,30 Chalmers v Dixon,31 and 
Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corp.32 The issue was, therefore, one about the scope 
of application of the rule, though some of the judges manifested their views about the 
nature of the rule. 
                                                
 
 
28 Ibid at 280 per Lord Moulton. 
29 The notions of danger and risk are, indeed, expressly considered to be synonyms in the 
Restatement. Rest (2d) § 282 comment c. 
30 Kerr v Earl of Orkney (1857) 20 D 298. 
31 Chalmers (n 20). 




In Kerr v Earl of Orkney33 the defender erected a large dam that only a few months after 
its construction, and as a consequence of a heavy rainfall, burst and swept away the 
pursuer’s houses and structures. 
In the decision, the judges made some relevant remarks about the nature of the 
defender’s liability, the language of which seems to point towards strict liability. Lord 
Justice-Clerk Hope submitted that, when an operation reaches a certain level of 
danger, the person engaging in such operation must afford “complete protection” to 
potential victims; he must provide security even against extraordinary events. The 
defenders “were exposed to no danger before the operation. He creates the danger, 
and he must secure them against danger”. Proof of skill and care was deemed 
irrelevant: the fact that the dam gave way immediately after its construction showed 
that it was not constructed so as to provide the security it was bound to afford. 
Damnum fatale would have exempted the defender from liability, but it was not present 
in the case.34 In the same line, Lord Murray considered that this type of operation 
required “security of all who are liable to be affected by it [and] reparation for all 
damage occasioned by its inefficiency”.35 
However, the reasoning contained in the Lord Ordinary’s decision in Kerr, to 
which the Second Division also adhered, points towards liability based upon fault 
rather than strict, though given the nature of the operations and the circumstances of 
the accident, they deserved a “special” treatment. In the Lord Ordinary’s opinion, 
the construction of the dam “was attended with some hazard, and required great 
care and caution”. The neighbours “were entitled to rely on the respondent’s availing 
                                                
 
 
33 Kerr (n 30). 
34 Ibid at 302-303. 
35 Ibid at 304. Lord Murray’s reference to the case of Macdonald of St Martin’s v Spittal’s Trs is obscure: 
there seems to be no such a case in the reports. E M Clive, “The Thirteenth Report of the Law 
Reform Committee for Scotland” [1964] JR 250 at 252, after analysing a different report of Kerr (30 
Sc Jur 158), concludes that Lord Murray was, in fact, referring to two cases: Spittal’s Trs, which in 
Clive’s view corresponds with Cleghorn v Taylor (1856) 18 D 664, and Macdonald of St Martin’s, which he 
does not identify. This second reference might be to M’Donald v Mackie and Co (1831) 5 W&S 462 – I 
thank Prof Elspeth Reid for bringing my attention to the case. The cases are of not much assistance: 
while Cleghorn seems to refer to liability of landowners for the wrongs of their contractors, M’Donald is 
concerned mostly with contractual liability. 
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himself of the best skill, the best materials, and the best workmanship”,36 language 
that appears to point to a very high standard of care. The fact that the accident 
occurred “in reference to a recent work, constructed by a private party for his own 
pleasure, must be held to throw on the respondent the burden of explaining the fact 
on some footing consistent with the strength and sufficiency of the work”.37 It is not 
clear, however, whether what operates here is a presumption of fault in the strict 
sense, or the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.38 The wording seems to point to the latter, since 
it does not burden the defender with the proof of diligence but only with the 
provision of an explanation that is consistent with it.39 
With regard to the scope of application of this special regime, Lord Justice-
Clerk Hope identified danger as the key element: complete protection is the 
condition for operations involving “great risk to the safety of life and of property”. 
Lord Murray, on the other hand, seems to have focused on the “novelty” of the 
operations, that is, on the introduction of something that was not previously in the 
land, by linking the duty to provide security and to compensate with the notion of 
novum opus.40 This notion had been used by the Lord Ordinary, who defined it as “an 
innovation […] voluntarily erected for the benefit or pleasure of the respondent”.41 
 
Ten years later, Rylands v Fletcher was decided by the House of Lords.42 Over time, the 
case provided the label for the special liability regime; “the Rylands rule”. The facts 
are widely known and, to an extent, similar to those in Kerr: the defendant employed 
an engineer and a contractor to build a reservoir on his land, who in turn failed to 
block certain disused shafts and passages that connected the defendant’s land with 
the plaintiff’s coalmines, located under neighbouring land. As a result, the water 
introduced into the reservoir flowed through these shafts and passages, flooding the 
                                                
 
 
36 Kerr (n 30) at 300. 
37 Ibid. 
38 For the distinction, see chapter 1 section 3.5. 
39 Reid (n 18) at 749 supports the latter view. 
40 Kerr at 303. 
41 Ibid at 300. The novum opus terminology can also be found in the case of Potter v Hamilton and Statheven 
Railway Co (1864) 3 M 83; and more recently in the Sheriff Court case of D McIntyre & Son Ltd v Soutar 
1980 SLT (Sh Ct) 115, where this terminology was considered more satisfactory than that of non-
natural use. 
42 Rylands (n 3). 
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aforementioned mines. The Exchequer Chamber, reversing the Court of 
Exchequer’s decision, held that the defendant was liable for the damage caused, and 
the latter decision was upheld by the House of Lords. 
The dicta contained in this decision point more clearly towards a strict liability 
rule. In the words of Lord Chancellor Cairns, owners engaging in this type of 
operation act “at their own peril”, becoming liable if damage results “in consequence 
of their doing so, or in consequence of any imperfection in the mode of their doing 
so”. Quoting Blackburn J’s dictum in the Exchequer Chamber decision,43 the Lord 
Chancellor highlighted the limited availability of defences: the defendant could 
escape liability by showing that the accident was the consequence of the plaintiff’s 
own fault, or of vis major or an act of God, which were not present in the case.44 Lord 
Cranworth, agreeing with the Lord Chancellor, considered that the owner engaging 
in such operation was “responsible, however careful he may have been, and whatever 
precautions he may have taken to prevent the damage”, referring to authority that 
supported the irrelevance of skill and care.45 
Now, to what type of operations did this liability rule apply? The Exchequer 
Chamber’s decision focused on the element of danger: “the person who, for his own 
purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it 
escapes”, mentioning if almost incidentally – in parenthesis – the fact that the thing 
brought into the land “was not naturally there”.46 In the House of Lords decision, the 
Lord Chancellor expanded this qualification: the plaintiff cannot complain if the use 
falls within the “ordinary course of enjoyment of land”.47 For the defendant to be 
liable, the use had to be  
 
a non-natural use, for the purpose of introducing into the close that which in its natural 
condition was not in or upon it, for the purpose of introducing water either above or below 
ground in quantities and in a manner not the result of any work or operation on or under the 
land.48  
 
                                                
 
 
43 Fletcher v Rylands (1865-66) LR 1 Ex 265 at 279. 
44 Rylands (n 3) at 339. 
45 Ibid at 340-341. 
46 Fletcher v Rylands (n 43) at 279 per Blackburn J (emphasis added). 
47 Rylands (n 3) at 339-340. 
48 Ibid at 340. 
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The next of the four cases considered by Miller was Chalmers v Dixon.49 In this decision, 
some of the judges in the Inner House explicitly brought liability by virtue of the 
Rylands rule back to a fault framework. The defenders had accumulated a bing of 
refuse which caught fire and kept burning for a substantial period of time, emitting 
noxious vapours and smoke that reached the pursuer’s land, causing inconvenience 
and injuring his crops. 
Despite considering that, according to Rylands and Kerr, these operations “are 
only lawful where injury does not happen to the neighbours”, Lord Justice-Clerk 
Moncreiff submitted that 
 
A good deal has been said as to the necessity of proving culpa. I think that culpa does lie at the 
root of the matter. If a man puts upon his land a new combination of materials, which he 
knows, or ought to know, are of a dangerous nature, then either due care will prevent injury, in 
which case he is liable if injury occurs for not taking that due care, or else no precautions will 
prevent injury, in which case he is liable for his original act in placing the materials upon the 
ground.50 
 
As a consequence, “it is not necessary to prove specific fault. Fault is implied in the 
result”.51 In a similar line, Lord Gifford considered that in this type of operation, the 
defender is to be liable “even though it be not possible to bring home negligence or 
fault in the ordinary sense”. The foundation of this liability was, in any case, culpa, a 
notion that he considered flexible: “much lighter fault may make a person liable in 
some circumstances than in others”.52 Only Lord Ormidale departed from this line of 
argument, highlighting that the defenders were only entitled to do what they did “at 
their own peril and risk, as regarded injurious consequences to their neighbours” and 
specifically quoting Lord Cranworth’s dictum from Rylands.53 
Regarding the type of activity that would trigger the application of the Rylands 
rule, each judge employed a different terminology. Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff 
drew a distinction between ordinary uses of property, “to which a neighbour is 
bound to submit, although they may cause incidental injury to him”, and an opus 
                                                
 
 
49 Chalmers (n 20). 
50 Ibid at 464. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid at 467. 
53 Ibid at 466. 
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manufactum, “the bringing an article upon the land which creates a hazard which did 
not exist before. […] The present case is a strong illustration of the distinction. The 
material which caused damage was entirely foreign to the surface of the land”.54 
Consequently, the two central elements of the notion of opus manufactum in Lord 
Justice-Clerk Moncreiff’s view were danger and novelty. Lord Ormidale, in turn, 
preserved the terminology from Rylands, considering that the defenders’ use of land 
was unusual and unnatural in the sense in which those expressions were used by the 
Lord Chancellor in that case.55 Lord Gifford, however, questioned the 
appropriateness of the terms natural and non-natural use, opting for the notion of 
uses that are “exceptional or occasional, or require special erections upon or special 
preparation of the subject”.56 He considered that taking into account the presence of 
an opus manufactum was “[a]nother way of looking at the matter”, without offering a 
particular concept of such notion.57 
The decision will be revisited later in this chapter, as it is the only one of the 
four decisions cited by Miller that is considered in Kennedy as authority for the category 
of conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage. 
 
The last decision mentioned in Miller is that of the House of Lords in Caledonian Rly 
Co v Greenock Corp.58 In this case, the defenders converted a piece of land into a park, 
and for this purpose they altered the channel of a burn by enclosing it into a culvert, 
and built other works that obstructed its flow. During a period of heavy rain, the 
culvert proved to be insufficient and a flood was caused, reaching and damaging the 
pursuers’ property. 
Most of the dicta contained in the decision focused on discussing whether there 
had been a damnum fatale that released the defender from liability, a defence that the 
                                                
 
 
54 Ibid at 464. The notion of opus manufactum can be found in the previous case of Pirie and Sons v 
Magistrates of Aberdeen (1871) 9 M 412, in which is seems to be treated as a synonym of novum opus; and 
in the later cases of Fleming v Gemmill 1908 SC 340 and Stirling v North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board 
1965 SLT 229. 
55 Chalmers (n 20) at 466. 
56 Ibid at 467. 
57 Ibid at 468. 
58 Caledonian Rly Co v Greenock Corp (n 32). 
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defender failed to establish. The discussion about the basis of this liability is not 
developed in much detail. 
Lord Chancellor Finlay, taking into consideration the cases of Kerr and Tennent v 
Earl of Glasgow,59 approved Rankine’s view60 that the person who builds an opus 
manufactum on the course of a stream or diverts its flow is to be liable if (i) the damage 
would have not occurred in the absence of such construction or operation, and (ii) 
the opus has not been fortified by the operation of prescription.61 In a similar line, 
Lord Shaw, based on the case of Kerr, explained that the person collecting and 
damming up the water of a stream must make lower proprietors “as secure against 
injury as they would have been had nature not been interfered with”.62 Both 
formulations, consequently, seem to highlight causation of harm as the basis of 
liability. Lords Dunedin and Parker also identified Kerr as the relevant authority, and 
deemed it approved by the House of Lords in the case of Tennent, but did not offer 
further insights about the basis of liability.63 Lord Wrenbury, on the contrary, 
considered that the facts of Kerr did not fit the facts under discussion, that is, the flow 
of the water being thrown to a new channel given that the natural channel was filled 
up as a consequence of the defender’s works. He considered, nevertheless, that the 
defenders’ liability was based on their failure to provide a channel that was equally 
efficient as the natural one,64 focusing mainly upon the fact of their interference. 
These remarks about the basis of liability also disclose some notions about the 
scope of the liability rule applied in the case. The Lord Chancellor, by approving 
Rankine’s view, relied on the notion of opus manufactum, but his approach does not 
seem to refer to opera manufacta generally, but only to that which is constructed “on 
the course of a stream”. Diversion of the course of the stream appears as a different 
situation, but subject to the same rule. The reference to prescription emphasises the 
novelty element. In connection with the facts in Kerr, Lord Shaw simply referred to 
the case of a person “making operation for collecting and damming up the water of a 
                                                
 
 
59 Tennent v Earl of Glasgow (1864) 2 M (HL) 22. 
60 Rankine, Land-Ownership 376. 
61 Caledonian Rly Co v Greenock Corp (n 32) at 61. 
62 Ibid at 65. 
63 Ibid at 63 and 67. 
64 Ibid at 67. 
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stream” – which was not, it must be said, exactly the case in Caledonian – whereas 
Lord Wrenbury referred specifically to the facts of the case. These observations 
reveal a somewhat restrictive view of the rule’s scope of application, linked more or 
less tightly with the facts of the case, yet seemingly highlighting interference with 
nature as a defining element. 
 
The conclusion from this survey is rather evident: the decision in Miller and the 
authority cited in it provide us neither with a single explanation of the nature of the 
liability rule attached to “conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage”, nor 
with a clear delimitation of the scope of this category of conduct. 
Although the three Scottish cases cited in Miller were all identified as an 
application of the Rylands rule, on closer analysis they seemingly rest upon differing 
regimes. The reasoning in Rylands and Caledonian suggests the operation of a strict 
liability rule, founding liability on the element of causation and limiting the 
admissible defences to those that break this link. In Chalmers, on the other hand, 
liability is explained in fault terms, though different speeches highlight different 
elements of this liability: while Lord Moncreiff seemed to have relied upon some sort 
of presumption of fault, Lord Gifford appears to have stressed a particularly 
heightened standard of care for this type of activity. 
In Kerr we find elements pointing in both directions. References to the 
defender’s obligation to afford complete protection for a danger that he created, and 
to the irrelevance of diligence as a defence, suggest the recognition of a strict liability 
rule, placing the emphasis in causation. It is not clear, however, whether such 
defence was deemed irrelevant because of the nature of the liability rule or because 
the accident happened so shortly after the construction was finished, showing that it 
was not properly built, i.e., that adequate precautions were clearly not taken. 
Moreover, the Lord Ordinary’s judgment supports a fault-based reading of the 
decision. 
The dicta contained in Miller are a good reflection of this dichotomy of views. 
While recognising the existence of a special regime of liability based upon these 
decisions, Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison questioned whether the Rylands rule was ever 
 
 113 
treated in Scotland as one of absolute liability, and after quoting Lord Gifford and 
Lord Moncreiff’s dicta in the case of Moffat & Co v Park,65 he concluded that 
 
in those cases in which the doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher has been held to apply the obligation to 
take adequate precautions has been of so onerous and imperative a kind that the mere 
occurrence of damage and injury has of itself been sufficient to justify an inference of 
negligence.66 
 
Conversely, Lord Anderson considered that the acceptance of the Rylands rule as one 
of absolute obligation in Scotland was “fully documented” by the mentioned 
authorities, i.e. Kerr, Chalmers, and Caledonian.67  
The dichotomy was, again, reflected in two decisions pronounced in the 
following decade: the Outer House decision in Western Silver Fox Ranch Ltd v Ross and 
Cromarty County Council,68 a case of harm to property caused by detonation of 
explosives; and the Inner House decision in M’Laughlan v Craig,69 a case of personal 
injury and harm to property caused by an escape of gas and subsequent explosion. In 
the first case, Lord Patrick considered that the detonation of a considerable quantity 
of high explosives was an activity that the defender did at his peril, becoming liable 
for the damage caused “apart from any question of his negligence”, in application of 
the Rylands rule.70 In the second case, however, Lord President Cooper questioned, 
once again, the acceptance of the Rylands rule in Scotland, especially in light of the 
constraints imposed to the rule in England by the House of Lords in the case of Read 
v J Lyons & Co Ltd,71 decided two years earlier. He concluded that 
 
[t]here are of course cases in which there is little difference in the result between the application 
of the English rule of absolute liability and the Scottish rule of culpa, where the facts raise a 
presumption of negligence so compelling as to be practically incapable of being displaced. But, 
when it comes to extending the rule in Rylands v Fletcher to situations undreamt of by those who 
formulated it, we cannot ignore the wide distinction in principle between the two systems 
without destroying the very basis of the Scots law of delict.72 
                                                
 
 
65 Moffat & Co v Park (1877) 5 R 13.  
66 Miller v Robert Addie (n 8) at 155. 
67 Ibid at 157. 
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Lord Aitchison and Lord Cooper’s views crystallised by the 1960s as the orthodox 
view of this liability regime in the legal literature: it consists of nothing more than a 
very high standard of care, commensurate with the level of danger created by the 
activity, combined with a presumption of its breach. Liability is, accordingly, fault-
based. This view, which can indeed be traced back in the literature to Glegg,73 was 
notably held by Walker and TB Smith before it became the view of the Law Reform 
Committee for Scotland.74 
While recognising that in Kerr there were dicta that might suggest the existence 
of a strict liability rule, Walker explained it as a “decision on negligence where a 
higher standard of care than usual was demanded and fault was presumed from what 
happened rather than proved”.75 After analysing successively the cases mentioned in 
this section, he concluded that “the whole body of Scottish decisions are only 
consistent with each other on the basis that in appropriate cases fault is presumed 
from the happening”.76 This combination of a very high standard of care with an 
inference or presumption of fault was his explanation of liability imposed in cases of 
escapes of artificial accumulation of water, explosives and noxious fumes.77 What 
remains unclear is the nature of this presumption or inference of fault, for he clarifies 
that it is based on the fact that these substances escaped and caused damage, adding 
that “[i]n any event the conditions for the application of res ipsa loquitur seem to be 
satisfied”,78 implying that res ipsa loquitur is a separate device and not the source of the 
presumption. He would later label this regime as one of “strict liability”, but still 
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explain it as depending on circumstances requiring special care coupled with “a 
willingness to presume fault” by courts.79 
TB Smith held a similar position, concluding that Rylands, as a rule of absolute 
liability, had never served as the sole basis of liability in Scotland in the absence of 
negligence – often presumed, acknowledging nonetheless that the difference in 
practice might be negligible. He clearly identified the abovementioned presumption 
of negligence as a result of the operation of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.80 
These views were later reflected in the conclusions reached by the Law Reform 
Committee for Scotland in their Thirteenth Report on damage caused by dangerous 
agencies escaping from land,81 discussed in the following section. 
As to the scope of “conduct causing a special risk of abnormal danger” itself, 
the terminology used in the cases referred to by Miller is not unequivocal, featuring 
three different – yet seemingly overlapping – elements which, by themselves or in 
combination, serve to define the type of activity that will attract the application of a 
special liability rule: the creation of a danger, the introduction of something new or 
artificial onto the land, and the departure from what is considered a normal or 
natural use of the land. We only obtain, through the reference to Rickards, a clear 
exclusion: the provision of basic services for domestic purposes, such as water and 
gas. This exclusion had actually been recognised in Scots law before Rickards,82 and it 
was confirmed in subsequent case law.83 
 
(b) There is, moreover, a further problem with the reference to Miller as the key 
authority for defining the conduct and regime under discussion: even though the case 
questioned the status of Rylands in Scotland,84 it still relied on Rylands in recognising 
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the existence of a category deserving special treatment. At the time Whitty was 
writing, however, the House of Lords had already decided in RHM Bakeries that 
Rylands was not part of Scots law,85 so in this aspect, the case could be considered as 
superseded by RHM Bakeries. 
Certainly Miller was not an application of the Rylands rule, so in this sense the 
result is not inconsistent with RHM Bakeries. But Miller still recognised the existence of 
a special regime of liability and defined the conduct to which the regime was to be 
applied by reference to the case of Rickards. Rickards, in turn, meant to introduce a 
qualification precisely to the Rylands rule. Consequently, the very reason why the 
court did not apply the Rylands rule in Miller was that the facts of the case were 
outside of its scope by virtue of the Rickards qualification, and not because the Rylands 
rule was not part of Scots law. 
The subsequent exclusion of Rylands by RHM Bakeries leaves Miller as a rather 
weak support for the definition of the types of conducts or activities that create a 
special risk of abnormal damage, unless we adopt a view of RHM Bakeries that on the 
one hand denies the strict nature of the liability rule but nevertheless still recognises a 
special regime of liability generally applicable for dangerous activities. But RHM 
Bakeries provides us with little evidence of such approach, apart from the possibility of 
releasing the pursuer from proving the precise nature of the defender’s fault in 
certain circumstances that, again, are not clearly delineated.86 This possibility is 
considered in the next section. On the contrary, RHM Bakeries seems to recognise no 
special regime at all, apart from the rule applicable to the specific factual setting 
present in the Caledonian Rly Co case. 
 
2.1.3. Further references to dangerous activities in Whitty’s entry: the 
Thirteenth Report and the “separation of waters” 
 
Beyond paragraph 2087, which is the direct source mentioned in Kennedy for the 
category, Whitty deals with dangerous activities in two further occasions: (a) when he 
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explains the reasons for the (mistaken, in his view) belief that liability in nuisance is 
generally strict, and (b) when he discusses the burden of proof of fault. These 
references, however, tend to confirm what was submitted about Miller and its sources: 
they do not contribute particularly to the clarification of the category under analysis 
and they stay strongly connected with Rylands. 
 
(a) The first point is developed in paragraph 2093, according to which one of the 
reasons for the idea that nuisance was generally subject to a strict liability rule was 
the identification of nuisance with “doctrines on abnormally dangerous things or 
activities”.87 In his view, some cases confused nuisance with the rule in Rylands, “or its 
Scots analogue, the rule in Kerr v Earl of Orkney”.88 
He cites as an example of this confusion the case of Slater v M’Lellan,89 where a 
compressed cork cargo caught fire when it was reached by sparks falling from the 
locomotive that was drawing it, and burning particles from the cargo caused damage 
to the defender’s property. Damages were awarded in nuisance, without proof of 
fault. According to Whitty, the categories of “dangerous nuisances” and “class of 
distinctively dangerous things” outlined in the case are indistinguishable from the 
Rylands category, questioning the authority of Slater beyond its specific type of factual 
setting (i.e. traction engines and locomotives on the highway) after the fall of 
Rylands.90 
The second example is the case of Giblin v Lanarkshire County Council Middle Ward 
District Committee,91 where the escape of gas from pipes caused the fatal poisoning of 
the pursuer’s mother. The nuisance issue was allowed, without averments of fault – in 
fact, as an alternative to the fault issue – under the rule that “one who brings a 
dangerous agent on his land or keeps there anything likely to do damage if it escapes, 
must keep it at his peril”, a language that strongly resembles Rylands even though the 
case was not mentioned.92 Giblin, however, was considered in RHM Bakeries as 
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impliedly overruled by the cases of Miller and M’Laughlan v Craig.93 These cases, as 
discussed above, were cases of gas escapes that recognised the Rickards exclusion for 
the Rylands rule.94 So again, the reason why these cases overrule Giblin is that the facts 
of the case would not fall within the scope of application of the Rylands rule – and not 
that the rule is not part of Scots law. 
Whitty finishes the paragraph by highlighting the decline of Rylands since the 
decision in RHM Bakeries, save the only possible exception of the interference with the 
course of a natural stream according to the Caledonian Rly Co95 case.96 It is not clear, 
then, what scope and effects he ascribes to these doctrines on abnormally dangerous 
things or activities, but his view seems to be that there is now little or no space for 
them in Scots law insofar as they were applications of Rylands. His rejection, however, 
appears limited to these doctrines inasmuch they suggest a regime of strict liability 
generally applicable to nuisance, but the position of the doctrines in their limited 
scope (traction engines and interference with water courses) is not developed further, 
nor linked to his own category of conduct creating a special risk of abnormal danger. 
 
(b) The second point – onus of proof of fault – is discussed by Whitty in paragraph 
2107, where he connects his main source for conduct causing special risk of 
abnormal danger, namely the case of Miller, with the Thirteenth Report of the Law 
Reform Committee for Scotland, which deals with liability for damage caused by 
dangerous agencies escaping from land.97 
In this section he presents certain types of cases where allegedly the burden of 
proof of fault would be reversed, one of which is the treatment of “the Scots 
equivalent” of the Rylands rule – without indicating a specific case – according to the 
explanation given by the Report. He reproduces one of the concluding paragraphs of 
the Report that attaches an especially high standard of care to the introduction of 
dangerous agencies into land in certain cases,98 and then he explains that “[i]n this 
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class of case there must presumably be a ‘special use’ creating ‘abnormal danger’”, by 
reference to Miller.99 It must be noted that here the substitution of special risk for 
special use does not take place, which reinforces the impression that the change in the 
formulation of “conduct causing special risk of abnormal danger” might not have 
had a particular reason.100 
The Report examined the relevant case law for three sets of common law rules 
that were regarded as relevant for the problem of escapes of dangerous agencies: the 
law governing the rights of riparian proprietors among themselves, the law of 
nuisance, and the rules that do not fall within any of these two sets. The Committee 
believed that the law in the first and second sets was clear, but less so in the third set 
of rules.101 For this a special regime of liability was appropriate based upon the 
concept of non-natural use, whereby “proof of specific fault on the part of the 
defender is unnecessary”.102 
The Commissioners seemed to have no problem with the understanding of 
Caledonian, and even of Kerr, as applications of a strict liability rule falling within the 
first set of rules, insofar as they were both alterations of the natural course of a stream 
and, in that sense, infringements of the property rights that the law confers to 
riparian owners.103 The extension of this rule to other “escapes” was, however, 
considered inconsistent with more recent authority: the cases of Miller and 
M’Laughlan. Adopting, consequently, the views of Lords Aitchison and Cooper in 
those cases,104 they concluded that  
 
if a person brings a dangerous agency on to land, the standard of care demanded of him by the 
law – at any rate where “non-natural” use of the land is involved – is so high that his liability, 
should the agency escape and cause damage, is in practice absolute or near absolute. A person 
claiming in respect of damage suffered in such circumstances need not prove the defender 
guilty of specific fault, for the facts raise a presumption of negligence…105 
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Explaining Kerr in these terms was considered as preferable and consistent with the 
dicta in Chalmers.  
As to the nature of the liability rule, though the view adopted is clearly fault-
based, it was submitted that it made “little, if any, difference in the result whether 
one adopts what may be called the ‘absolute liability’ theory or adheres rigidly to the 
fault principle”, and recommended no changes to the existing law.106 Once again, the 
origin of the negligence presumption is not clear. TB Smith, however, was of a 
different opinion as to the need for changes: even though he supported the fault-
based view of the solution, he believed that, for the sake of clarity, Rylands should 
explicitly be excluded from Scots law, on the basis that strict liability rules should be 
adopted exclusively through statutory provisions.107 
The Committee recognised, nevertheless, it was not entirely clear to which 
conduct this regime should apply, in light of the restriction imposed on Rylands south 
of the border: at the time of the Report, the Rylands rule had been strictly limited to 
escapes “from a place where the defendant has occupation of or control over land to 
a place which is outside his occupation or control”.108 The Commissioners 
considered that the configuration of this type of case as escapes of dangerous agencies 
in the course of non-natural uses of land was unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, 
because of the difficulties in recognising a non-natural use; second, because it was 
limited to escapes only.109 TB Smith shared these concerns: he considered illogical 
limiting any special regime only to escapes, and regarded the notion of natural use “a 
nebulous concept”, among other remarks. He deemed the American approach as a 
better solution in that it was, at least, logical: the special regime of liability was 
generally applicable to the category of ultra hazardous activities.110 This reinforced 
his proposal to eliminate the Rylands rule altogether, bringing the treatment of 
dangerous agencies simply under the general liability rules. 
In sum, while TB Smith defended the treatment of dangerous activities under 
the regular rules of fault-based liability, unless a rational strict liability regime were to 
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be created by statute, the rest of the Committee favoured the special treatment of 
these activities, so that although liability remained fault-based, the regular rules in 
regard to proof of fault did not apply in the face of non-natural uses causing escapes 
of dangerous things. 
 
Eventually, TB Smith’s view triumphed, at least in principle: according to Lord 
Fraser’s well-known dictum in RHM Bakeries, nuisance was and always had been fault 
based. Moreover, the decision in Rylands “has no place in Scots law, and the 
suggestion that it has is a heresy which ought to be extirpated”.111 He submitted that 
liability in Kerr was based upon fault, relying on the Lord Ordinary’s decision, a 
conclusion that was reinforced by the language in Chalmers.112 The sole possible 
exception to this rule was the alteration of the natural course of a stream according to 
the decision in Caledonian, a decision he considered to be limited to this type of 
operation only.113 Yet he added two comments that deserve to be noted: 
 
The first is that the view that I have just expressed does not by any means imply that, in a case 
such as this, a pursuer cannot succeed unless he avers the precise nature of the fault committed 
by the defender which caused the accident. It would be quite unreasonable to place such a 
burden on a pursuer, who in many cases will have no knowledge, and no means of obtaining 
knowledge, of the defender’s fault. As a general rule it would, in my opinion, be relevant for a 
pursuer to make averments to the effect that his property has been damaged by a flood caused 
by an event on the defender’s land, such as the collapse of sewer which it was the defender’s 
duty to maintain, that properly maintained sewers do not collapse, and that the collapse is 
evidence that the defender had failed in his duty to maintain the sewer. The onus will then be 
on the defender to explain the event in some way consistent with absence of fault on his part. 
As a general rule the defences available will be limited to proving that the event was caused 
either by the action of a third party for whom he was not responsible, as the defender did in 
Gourock Ropework Co Ltd v Greenock Corporation, or by a damnum fatale. 
 
My second comment is that I do not believe that there is much difference in the practical result 
between the law as laid down in Rylands v Fletcher, and the law as laid down according to my 
understanding of Kerr v The Earl of Orkney. On that matter, I accept the majority view expressed 
in the Thirteenth Report of the Law Reform Committee for Scotland (1964), para. 22…114 
 
These comments are somewhat puzzling. On a first reading, the first comment seems 
to highlight, though in a rather imprecise language, the availability of the res ipsa 
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loquitur doctrine generally for nuisance cases, an interpretation that has been 
supported by subsequent cases,115 whereas the second comment, given the cases there 
mentioned, appears to refer to the special regime for dangerous activities under 
discussion here, reproducing the fault-based account adopted in the Thirteenth Report. 
But the limited defences offered in the first comment do not fit with its understanding 
as a description of res ipsa loquitur. They could find a more suitable place within the 
regime mentioned in the second comment, and even there, they would point towards 
a strict liability regime rather than one based upon presumed fault. Moreover, and 
more importantly, the second comment seems to undo, to an extent, what RHM 
Bakeries seeks to do: instead of eliminating any special liability regime and giving 
space for the fault rules to operate with their inherent flexibility, it preserves the 
special regime in line with the majority position of the Committee. 
In his discussion of these comments, Whitty considered that in both cases a 
reversal of the onus of proof of fault operates, but distinguished the two cases on the 
basis of the source of this reversal: whereas in res ipsa loquitur the alleged reversal 
comes from the fact that the incident suggests negligence coupled with the defender’s 
control, in the case of dangerous activities the reversal derives from a very high 
standard of care, citing the conclusion reached by the Law Reform Committee.116 
 
The sources cited by Whitty in these paragraphs bring about a distinction that Miller 
and its sources did not outline clearly. Miller grouped together Kerr, Chalmers and 
Caledonian and saw them all as applications of a single rule (the Rylands rule), subject to 
a single qualification (the Rickards qualification). But the sources considered in this 
section separate Caledonian from the group.  
Caledonian is seen as the application of a liability rule that is strict in nature and 
that is applicable to a particular type of case: the alteration of or interference with the 
natural course of a stream, for this particular course of action infringes proprietary 
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rights held by the riparian proprietors. This remained the accepted explanation of 
Caledonian until a more recent study117 sought to demonstrate that the true basis of 
liability in the case was fault. These views are discussed at length and challenged in 
chapter 4,118 so for the purposes of this chapter, the case is excluded from the 
analysis. 
For the rest of the cases, as explained above, the orthodox account is a fault-
based explanation that combines two particular aspects of negligence: a substantive 
one, namely the standard of care’s sensitivity to levels of risk, and an evidentiary one, 
i.e. a presumption, the source of which is found in the operation of the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim (as advanced by TB Smith), or in the operation of the standard of care itself 
(in Whitty’s explanation), or is left largely unexplained – as in Walker, the Thirteenth 
Report and, to an extent, RHM Bakeries). 
But despite the relatively clear answer to the question about the nature of the 
liability rule, the problems identified in connection with Miller are replicated with 
regard to the question about its scope: not only does the notion of escapes in the 
context of non-natural use remain unclear but actually connected to the Rylands rule. 
TB Smith’s position solved the two problems, for it advanced a clear rule that 
broke once and for all the link with Rylands, and this is, as explained, the position 
adopted in principle by RHM Bakeries. Nevertheless, by incorporating the category of 
conduct causing special risk of abnormal danger, Whitty seems to have considered 
that there was still a case for a special treatment of dangerous activities, and the cost 
of this option was preserving the problematic sources, in the same way Lord Fraser’s 
second comment in RHM Bakeries did. To the extent that Kennedy relied on Whitty’s 
view, the category not only remains rather unclear and connected to Rylands, but 
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2.2. The sources of the category (2): Kennedy and the authority cited by 
Lord President Hope 
 
In Kennedy, Lord President Hope listed conduct causing a special risk of abnormal 
damage as the last category of culpa and cited four decisions as authority for it.119 
Lord Hope’s dictum and the authority there considered, however, do not take us 
much further than the sources analysed so far. First, even though the nature of this 
regime remains fault-based, Kennedy undermined what at that point was the orthodox 
explanation of the regime without providing a satisfactory new account. Secondly, 
although Kennedy clearly isolates the relevant element that determines the scope of the 
category (danger), it provides little assistance in delineating its boundaries. 
 
2.2.1. Lord President Hope’s dictum 
 
Lord President Hope’s dictum in Kennedy is clear in at least one aspect: the fault-based 
nature of liability for conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage. But clarity 
ends there: by adopting Whitty’s approach from para 2087 of his “Nuisance” entry, 
i.e. listing conduct creating a special risk of abnormal damage alongside the different 
categories of fault, but then submitting that it affords an implication of fault, two 
incompatible views are juxtaposed in the same dictum. 
The language used by Lord President Hope suggests that he was perhaps 
sceptical about this conduct being a different category of fault: when he refers to para 
2087 of Whitty’s entry and lists the different categories of fault, he mentions only 
malice, intent, recklessness and negligence. “To that list”, he continues, “there may 
be added conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage where it may be said 
that it is not necessary to prove a specific fault as fault is necessarily implied in the 
result”, and refers to Chalmers as the source of this contention. Thus, Lord Hope 
separated this type of conduct from the list and attached to it a particular effect that 
is more in line with the presumption idea from the orthodox view than with it being a 
separate category of fault. 
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The idea that this type of conduct is not a different category of fault is 
confirmed later on by Lord Hope’s suggestion that it was “perhaps just another 
example of recklessness”.120 Now, whether this suggestion is accurate depends on the 
notion of recklessness adopted, on the one hand, and on the definition of conduct 
causing a special risk of abnormal damage, on the other. The issue is discussed later 
in this chapter, after outlining the relevant elements of the latter,121 but the 
conclusion can be advanced here: given the notion of recklessness adopted after 
Kennedy, considering conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage as an 
example of recklessness is practically equivalent to treating it as a form of strict 
liability. But even if the pre-Kennedy notion of recklessness is adopted, the suggestion 
holds only as a presumption rather than an example of recklessness. 
As a result, by incorporating the notion of conduct creating a special risk of 
abnormal damage in the way it did, Kennedy introduced more questions than answers, 
causing instability to what seemed to be, if not an entirely satisfactory, at least a 
rather stable explanation of the special treatment received by these cases. 
In addition, like RHM Bakeries, Kennedy set apart the case of Caledonian as a 
possible exception to the general fault-based liability rule, without expressing why this 
case would attract strict liability.122 Caledonian, therefore, is not identified with 
conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage, but as a specific case of strict 
liability. 
 
With regard to the delineation of the category itself, Kennedy isolates risk as the 
defining element, omitting any reference to the notions of opus manufactum and non-
natural user, which had been a constant presence in most previous doctrinal and 
judicial discussions. 
Here, Lord Hope departed from Whitty’s wording: whereas Whitty named this 
alleged type of fault “conduct causing a special risk of abnormal danger”; the Lord 
President replaced the word “danger” with the term “damage”. Again, we cannot be 
sure whether the replacement was deliberate and, if it was, what was the reason 
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behind it. Nevertheless, the change is welcomed for it removes from the definition the 
redundancy noted above of including both “risk” and “danger” in the notion123 and 
incorporates a second element to the definition. Conduct can amount to fault not 
only because risk is high, but specifically because the possible damage is great. This 
incorporation, however, raises a new question: is the category necessarily defined by 
the magnitude of the likely harm or can likelihood and extent of the harm interact, so 
if the possible harm is particularly highly likely but not great in extent, it will still 
amount to special risk of abnormal damage? As we will see, the authority on which 
Kennedy relied does not provide an answer to this question. 
 
2.2.2. The authority cited in support 
 
The Lord President quoted dicta from four decisions in support of the category under 
analysis: Chalmers v Dixon,124 Edinburgh Railway Access and Property Co v John Ritchie & 
Co,125 Hester v MacDonald,126 and Noble’s Trustees v Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd.127 We 
will see that the cases of Edinburgh Railway Access and Hester are questionable authority, 
and the assistance provided by the remaining two cases must be considered in light of 
the specific legal question that was being answered. 
The facts of Chalmers have been narrated above.128 Lord President Hope 
quoted in Kennedy the well-known dictum by Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff, cited 
earlier in this chapter, commenting on the cases of Rylands and Kerr, and presenting 
fault as the basis of the liability of the proprietor who places dangerous materials in 
his land and causes damage as a consequence.129 
The dictum quoted from Edinburgh Rly Access, though similar to that in Chalmers, 
must be considered carefully. In this case, the defenders’ blasting operations executed 
for excavation and subsequent building purposes caused structural damage to the 
pursuers’ house. The passage reproduced in Kennedy comes from the Lord Ordinary’s 
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judgment (Lord Low) who submitted that, even though the general rule was that fault 
was required for liability, in the case at issue the question of fault did not arise or was 
not of importance, rephrasing Lord Moncreiff’s dictum from Chalmers specifically for 
the case of blasting operations, and allowing the issue which was not based on 
fault.130 The judgment, however, was reversed by the Inner House, where the issue 
was amended by the introduction of fault,131 so the relevance attributed to the Lord 
Ordinary’s remarks is somewhat odd. 
Hester, in turn, was a case of damages for wrongful imprisonment where the 
action was held incompetent given the absolute privilege of the defenders, and 
irrelevant for lack of sufficient averments of malice. The dictum cited by Lord 
President Hope in Kennedy is Lord Guthrie’s, who affirmed the fault principle and 
stated that “[t]he culpa which gives a right of action to the sufferer from the act is 
either intentional injury or negligence. […] There are, however, cases where the 
intention is presumed, where the act itself infers the malice”.132 The facts of the case, 
however, were considered insufficient to bear such an inference. It is not clear how 
the dictum supports the category under analysis: it merely lists intention and 
negligence as forms of fault and indicates the possibility of presuming intention, but 
the facts of the case provide no indication of this presumption having any identifiable 
link with the notion of danger. The reference to the case is, in sum, altogether 
strange, since it has no connection with nuisance (the context of Kennedy) or with 
dangerous activities (the category that the Lord President was trying to outline), and 
malice has a particular meaning in the context of claims against the police that is not 
readily transferable to neighbour disputes.133 
Finally, in the Outer House case of Noble’s Trs the first defenders, in carrying 
out forestry and related operations authorised by the second and third defenders, 
riparian proprietors, created a dirt road in a manner whereby sand, silt and gravel 
were washed off the hillside into a river, causing damage to the pursuers’ 
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hydroelectric scheme located downstream. Lord Jauncey, referring expressly to Lord 
Justice-Clerk Moncreiff’s dictum in Chalmers, stated that 
 
A landowner will be liable to his neighbour if he carries out operations on his land which will 
or are likely to cause damage to his neighbour’s land however much care is exercised. Similarly 
will a landowner be liable in respect of carrying out operations, either at his own hand or at the 
hand of the contractor, if it is necessary to take steps in the carrying out of those operations to 
prevent damage to a neighbour, and he, the landlord, does not take or instruct those steps. In 
the former case the landowner’s culpa lies in the actual carrying out of his operations in the 
knowledge actual or implied of their likely consequences. In the latter case culpa lies in not 
taking steps to avoid consequences which he should have foreseen would be likely to flow from 
one method of carrying out the operation.134 
 
The main discussion of the case referred to the liability of the second and third 
defenders, which explains the specific references to the contractor in the reproduced 
dictum. The focus of the case was the defenders’ non-delegable duty of care, as will 
be explained below.135 
From the four decisions mentioned, therefore, only two of them provide some 
assistance: Chalmers and Noble’s Trs. 
 
With regard to the nature of the liability that conduct causing a special risk of 
abnormal damage attracts, these cases certainly provide authority for the conclusion 
reached in Kennedy: both cases consider this liability to be fault-based.  
It is worth noting in this respect that the dictum quoted from Chalmers in 
Kennedy, which is also referred to by Noble’s Trs, is that of Lord Justice-Clerk 
Moncreiff, which highlights the implication of fault. Lord Gifford’s speech, which 
emphasises the heightened standard of care, is not considered in Kennedy. 
 
As for the scope of the category, both decisions are consistent in drawing a 
fundamental distinction between two types of cases: in the first type, merely executing 
certain operations constitutes fault; in the second type, not adopting certain 
precautions constitutes fault. The configuration of these types of cases is, however, 
problematical. 
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In Chalmers, the first type of case occurs when no precaution can prevent injury, 
whereas the second one occurs when due care can prevent injury. This opposition, as 
noted by Clive, is a false alternative, because it does not contemplate a third option: 
where some precaution would prevent injury, but due care would not. The “true 
alternative”, he argues, is that “either due care will prevent injury… or due care will 
not”.136 
In Noble’s Trs, in turn, the distinction is between operations that will or are 
likely to cause damage however much care is exercised and operations where it is 
necessary to take steps to prevent damage, which implies that damage can in fact be 
prevented with those steps. This decision seems to shift the dividing line from due care 
to any care, and to get closer to a true alternative. 
Both cases, consequently, create a distinction between two types of danger, 
defined by the fact harm remains likely even where certain precautions are taken. But 
it is difficult to determine, based on the available authority, what these precautions 
are, i.e. whether the line is drawn where any precautions or only due precautions 
would control risk. 
It is also difficult to ascertain whether both types can be incorporated in the 
notion of conduct creating a special risk of abnormal damage. If “fault is implied in 
the result” – as Lord President Hope stated in Kennedy – in both types, namely in the 
first type merely for engaging in the dangerous operations, and in the second type for 
not taking the relevant precautions, what is then the purpose of making the 
distinction? The decision in Kennedy does not provide any indication that serves to 
discriminate between the two types of danger, for the case was one of intentional or, 
perhaps, reckless harm.137 
The dicta from the supporting cases, however, suggest that only the first type of 
danger can be characterised as conduct creating a special risk of abnormal damage. 
In both decisions, fault in the second type of danger arises from not taking precautions: in 
Chalmers, the defender “is liable if injury occurs for not taking that due care”; in 
Noble’s Trs, “culpa lies in not taking steps to avoid consequences”. But in neither of 
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them is it stated that the fact that precautions were not taken is to be inferred from 
the occurrence of the harm. This contrasts with what happens in the first type, where 
fault lies simply in engaging in the dangerous operation and is implied by the fact 
that injury was caused. The contention that fault would be inferred simply from the 
occurrence of the harm in the second type was only made in one of the cases cited by 
the Lord President in Kennedy: in Edinburgh Rly Access, the Lord Ordinary explicitly 
stated that “if injury to the pursuers’ buildings was not a necessary or natural result of 
the blasting, but injury in fact resulted, the inference is that the operation was negligently or 
unskilfully conducted”.138 Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the judgment was reversed 
and the issue was amended to include fault, which suggests that the Lords in the 
Inner House might not have regarded the possibility of this inference with approval. 
The context in Chalmers supports this conclusion: the point was precisely to 
locate fault somewhere when damage is caused even despite taking due precautions, i.e. 
even when the defenders were not negligent. The defenders, indeed, pleaded that the 
bing had caught fire for reasons that were not attributable to their lack of care and, 
further, that it was impossible for them to extinguish the fire once it started. If 
“traditional” fault (negligence) had had to be proved, it would not have been possible 
to hold the defenders liable. For Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff, however, the relevant 
question was not about the precautions taken or not taken. “[T]he question”, in his 
view, was “whether the defenders were entitled to put upon their lands a heap of 
refuse of this quality”, and he sought to locate fault in this action by saying that if the 
defenders could not have prevented the consequences that ensued, there was fault in 
doing it in the first place. The case was, thus, one of the first type of danger and fault 
was implied. Moreover, the expression “fault is necessarily implied in the result” – 
which is taken from Chalmers and replicated by the Lord President in Kennedy to 
explain the effect of conduct causing special risk of abnormal damage – is used by 
Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff in Chalmers after the assertion that the heap was 
constructed by the defenders, kept there, took fire and caused damage. No reference 
is made to the second type of case in connection with implied fault. In this context, 
the second type is arguably nothing more than an explanation of negligence, where 
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negligence can, in fact, be proved. The question of whether this negligence must be 
proved, however, was not conclusively answered, as the case did not require such an 
answer. 
Noble’s Trs neither denies nor confirms this conclusion: the pursuers failed to 
aver either type of danger and for this reason the case was considered irrelevant. But 
even if the second type of danger had been averred, liability on the part of the 
defenders would not have meant that this type ought to be included in conduct 
causing a special risk of abnormal damage. Liability, in this case, would not have 
derived from the fact that the defenders created a certain level of danger that makes 
them liable regardless of any negligence in the traditional sense. Liability would have 
derived from the fact that they contracted out the execution of the operation that 
creates such danger, i.e. they would have been liable by virtue of a non-delegable 
duty of care or, as it was commonly labelled in Scots case law, by virtue of the “Dalton 
exception”. Dalton in this context makes reference to the English case of Dalton v 
Angus,139 where the House of Lords approved Cockburn CJ’s dictum in the English 
decision of Bower v Peate, quoted in Noble’s Trs: 
 
[A] man who orders a work to be executed, from which, in the natural course of things, 
injurious consequences to his neighbour must be expected to arise, unless means are adopted 
by which such consequences may be prevented, is bound to see to the doing of that which is 
necessary to prevent the mischief, and cannot relieve himself of his responsibility by employing 
someone else – whether it be the contractor employed to do the work from which the danger 
arises or some independent person – to do what is necessary to prevent the act he has ordered 
to be done from becoming wrongful.140 
 
The principle is called the Dalton “exception” because it constitutes an exception to 
the general rule that excludes liability of the employer for the wrongful acts of an 
independent contractor.141 
It will be argued later in this chapter, when post-Kennedy case law is discussed,142 
that liability for conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage and liability by 
virtue of a non-delegable duty of care, though apparently similar, are conceptually 
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distinct and must be treated accordingly. Consequently, the configuration of the 
scope of application of one of these rules does not necessarily affect the configuration 
of the other. This distinction, however, was not clearly drawn by Lord Jauncey in 
Noble’s Trs, who identified the principle in Chalmers with the principle in Bower. 
Here lies the key to the direction that case law took after Kennedy. Lord Jauncey 
conflated two notions of danger: the danger that justifies that “fault is implied in the 
result”, as formulated in Chalmers, which seems to be only the first type of danger (i.e. 
danger that cannot be eliminated through any – or due – precautions) and the 
danger that justifies the imposition of a non-delegable duty, as formulated in Bower, 
which does not seem to be limited to such particular type. Lord President Hope, in 
supporting the category of conduct causing special risk of abnormal damage in both 
Chalmers and Noble’s Trs, perpetuated the conflation, and the two notions of danger 
seem undistinguishable in subsequent case law, to a point that even doctrinally they 
have been identified: when Cameron expressed that conduct causing special risk of 
abnormal damage needs to be worked out more fully,143 he added immediately 
afterwards that 
 
On the basis of present authorities, it may be stated that where hazardous works are instructed 
and harm results from the operation, the party instructing the works cannot evade liability by 
pleading that he engaged a competent contractor to carry out the work. It seems that this form 
of fault is applicable where there is a very high risk of serious harm. The rule does appear to 
operate on the cusp of strict liability. It is also a variation on the normal rule of vicarious 
liability, that one is responsible for the delicts of employees, but not independent contractors.144 
 
Accordingly, returning to the question above, i.e. whether the two types of danger 
distinguished by Chalmers and Noble’s Trs amount to conduct causing special risk of 
abnormal damage, the most reasonable answer is that they probably do not: only the 
first one certainly does, namely, only when precautions cannot control the danger. 
The second type is most likely simply ordinary negligence. 
If this is accepted, then the rational way of drawing the line between the two 
types follows: it must be drawn at due care (and not at any care), for this is the 
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definitional element of negligence. The category, therefore, begins where due 
diligence becomes incapable of controlling the risk. 
All in all, it seems that Chalmers provides a clearer and more accurate 
description of the conduct in these aspects, which is paradoxical since Whitty himself, 
in the 2001 reissue of his entry, chose Noble’s Trs as the judicial description worth 
transcribing.145 
A further issue that arises from the analysis of these dicta concerns the quality 
of the knowledge required on the part of the defender in order to hold him liable. In 
Chalmers, actual knowledge of the dangerous nature of the activity is unnecessary. The 
point was expressly addressed by Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff: 
 
Then, is it necessary that the danger should be known or anticipated? I think the man who 
brings new materials upon his land is bound to know the nature of these materials. It would be 
a strange result if the man who knew their nature was liable, while the man who did not know 
their nature was to escape liability in consequence of his ignorance.146 
 
Consequently, if a person develops operations that are dangerous, it is irrelevant 
whether he actually knows of this danger, because in any case he should know. Now, 
it is not clear whether the decision admits excusable ignorance as a defence, for even 
if this paragraph can be read as an absolute exclusion, other sections of the decision 
seem simply to find the defenders’ plea of ignorance, in the circumstances of the case, 
unconvincing or inexcusable. For instance, Lord Ormidale remarked that 
 
I can hardly take it from the defenders, who have had great experience as iron-masters, and in 
the working of minerals, that they and their managers, or other head people, were ignorant of 
the nature of the materials they brought up and heaped in such a mass on the surface of their 
ground. On the evidence I think they must have known…147 
 
The admission of the defence is, to an extent, confirmed by Noble’s Trs: actual or 
implied knowledge of the likely consequences is required in order to make the 
defender liable. But since Noble’s Trs was concerned with a non-delegable duty, the 
requirement might not be transferrable. 
                                                
 
 
145 Whitty, “Nuisance” (reissue) § 108. 
146 Chalmers (n 20) at 464 per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff. 
147 Ibid (n 20) at 466. 
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What is conspicuous by its absence in these formulations is any reference to the 
magnitude of the damage. Taking the dicta strictly would lead to the result that, aside 
from the level of likelihood, fault could be inferred from the occurrence of any harm, 
however slight. It would then be essential to pay due attention to the notion of 
“abnormal damage” included in the definition by Lord President Hope in Kennedy, 
since it seems to have been identified as the key element of the category by 
subsequent literature, even to the detriment of the likelihood element.148 
 
2.3. Case law and doctrine after Kennedy 
 
As noted, case law on dangerous activities after Kennedy has tended to focus upon 
non-delegable duties of care. This was the main issue in Powrie Castle Properties Ltd v 
Dundee City Council,149 Southesk Trust Co Ltd & Elsick Farms Ltd v Angus Council,150 Crolla v 
Hussain,151 Stewart v Malik,152 Morris Amusements Ltd v Glasgow City Council,153 McManus v 
City Link Development Co Ltd,154 and Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers.155 The 
dangerous nature of the different operations was discussed mostly in order to 
determine whether there was a basis for imposing liability on employers for the 
negligence of their independent contractors. The question decided was accordingly, 
in most of the cases, one of relevancy of the issue against the employer. 
Outside the realm of this issue, the development has been limited. Only two 
Outer House cases have dealt – tangentially – with the matter: Anderson v White,156 
and Viewpoint Housing Association Ltd v City of Edinburgh Council.157 Yet these cases share 
with the previous group the fact that they were about relevancy of the issue. As a 
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consequence, in both groups of cases, many of the more difficult questions were left 
for final resolution after proof, and this stage seems not to have been reached. 
Doctrinal developments after the decision have also been limited, yet some 
important points are underscored, particularly about the scope of the category under 
discussion. 
 
2.3.1. Non-delegable duties of care for dangerous activities 
 
After they were decided, the abovementioned English cases of Bower v Peate158 and 
Dalton v Angus159 became the main authority in Scotland with regard to liability of 
employers for the wrongs committed by their independent contractors in the context 
of neighbourhood and dangerous activities.160 This liability is based upon what in 
England has been called a “non-delegable duty of care”.161 It is not possible to 
provide here a full account of the many debates that have arisen with regard to the 
foundations, operation and nature of the liability derived from a non-delegable 
duty.162 Consequently, for the purposes of the present discussion, only these general 
features of this doctrine will be mentioned. 
As a general rule, employers are not liable for injuries caused by their 
independent contractors.163 Nevertheless, certain groups of “exceptions” to this rule 
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have been identified:164 first, cases where the employer has authorised, procured or 
ratified the wrong; secondly, cases where the employer has been personally negligent, 
e.g. in selecting a contractor; and thirdly, where he breaches a non-delegable duty.165 
According to the standard view, the liability imposed on the employer by the 
non-delegable duty is strict.166 An examination of the English literature shows, 
however, a lack of consistency in the mode of justifying the imposition of a non-
delegable duty, both generally and in cases such as Bower and Dalton, where harm to a 
neighbour derives from operations performed in the defender’s property, specifically 
by withdrawing support.167 One justification that has been traditionally advanced is 
risk: an employer cannot escape liability by contracting out of the execution of 
dangerous operations, and the operations in Bower and Dalton are framed in this way: 
withdrawal of support is an operation that “naturally” (as in Bower) or “necessarily” 
(as in Dalton) creates a risk to neighbours.168 Beyond the particular context of 
withdrawal of support, the “modern foundation”169 for the imposition of non-
delegable duties in the case of “inherently hazardous” activities can be found more 
generally in the case of Honeywill & Stein Ltd v Larkin Bros Ltd.170 
This is the justification that has been generally adopted by Scots case law in the 
context of neighbour disputes, in cases such as Duncan’s Hotel (Glasgow) Ltd v J & A 
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Ferguson Ltd,171 Noble’s Trs,172 Borders Regional Council v Roxburgh District Council173 and G 
A Estates Ltd v Caviapen Trustees (No 1),174 and most of the cases decided after Kennedy,175 
although the terminology of “non-delegable duty” is adopted by courts only in some 
of the most recent cases.176 
The question that arises for our purposes is whether, in framing the nature and 
scope of liability for conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage, we can rely 
on decisions that are concerned with liability based upon non-delegable duties, for 
the former is imposed on people engaging in dangerous operations, whereas the latter 
is imposed on people instructing those operations. 
Arguably, the question is irrelevant in practical terms: nowadays, no one would 
engage personally in dangerous operations; people simply hire competent 
professionals to perform them, and this is clearly reflected on the fact that recent case 
law on dangerous activities is mostly concerned, precisely, with non-delegable duties. 
Consequently, what really matters is liability for non-delegable duties, and not 
liability for conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage. The latter, however, 
preserves its practical importance mainly for defenders whose course of business 
includes dangerous operations. Moreover, it is still relevant to clarify the rule for 
those factual settings where, for whatever reason, contractors are not employed. 
At first sight, imposing strict liability on the landowner that entrusts dangerous 
operations to a competent independent contractor yet subjecting the same person to 
a fault-based liability rule when he chooses to do without one might seem anomalous. 
It even seems counterintuitive: it would entail subjecting the more dangerous choice 
to the less stringent liability rule. It is, indeed, because of this anomaly that the strict 
nature of the liability imposed by non-delegable duties has been challenged in 
England. Since case law has rejected a general strict liability rule for ultra-hazardous 
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activities,177 “[i]t seems insupportable that a defendant will be held strictly liable for 
the extra-hazardous activity of an independent contractor, when it would not be so 
liable if it carefully carried out the same activity itself”.178 
It is possible to argue, however, that this inconsistency is only apparent, and 
that the fact that strict liability is imposed on the landowner who has instructed 
dangerous operations does not necessarily justify the imposition of an equivalent rule 
if he engages in the operations personally, for the distribution of risks performed by 
the liability rule in both cases is different. 
The rule imposing liability onto a defender that has personally engaged in the 
dangerous operation distributes the consequences of risks between pursuer and defender. 
In the case of liability derived from the non-delegable duty, in turn, the rule seeks to 
distribute the consequences of risk between potential defenders, that is, the employer and 
the independent contractor, vis-à-vis the pursuer: if the contractor was negligent, the 
pursuer will obtain reparation, either from the contractor, proving his negligence, or 
from the employer, without the need to prove his negligence. But the employer could 
eventually recover from the negligent independent contractor: apart from any 
indemnities that might be provided for in the contract between employer and 
contractor, they can be considered as joint wrongdoers and, for this reason, jointly 
and severally liable.179 
This subjects them in England to the rules on recovery of contribution 
contained in the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, and in Scotland to the relief 
rules contained in s 3 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 
1940. According to these rules, the employer could, theoretically, recover from the 
contractor the entire amount paid as damages to the pursuer: in both countries, it is 
for the courts to assess the contribution according to what they deem just, and the 
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English provision refers specifically to “the extent of the person’s responsibility for the 
damage in question” as the main criterion to determine what is just and equitable.180 
The English statute explicitly allows for this contribution to result in a complete 
indemnity,181 and the possibility is not excluded in its Scottish counterpart. Walker 
argued that the employer can, in fact, recover the entire compensation from the 
contractor provided that the former was himself completely blameless and the latter 
is solvent,182 and referred to a case where this recovery was allowed: McIntyre v 
Gallacher.183 In this case, the proprietor of a house had been held liable for damage 
caused to the house below by an overflow of water originated in his house. The cause 
of this overflow was proved to be an insecurely closed pipe due to the negligence of a 
plumber that the proprietor had employed to repair the pipes in the house and, for 
this reason, the proprietor was allowed to recover from the plumber the 
compensation paid. 
In sum, the rationale justifying the shift of the allocation of risks in one case 
might not be readily transferable to the other and, consequently, both the nature and 
scope of these liability rules do not need to be determined identically. It is reasonably 
arguable that the law can be more “generous” with victims in the context of non-
delegable duties, where the defender has means of eventually recovering from the 
wrongdoer at fault. As a result, liability for conduct causing a special risk of abnormal 
damages does not have to be strict simply because liability by virtue of a non-
delegable duty is strict. Likewise, the scope of the first rule does not need to coincide 
with the scope of the second rule, so if a non-delegable duty can be imposed even in 
cases where danger can be controlled by due care (i.e. the second type of danger 
identified above184), it does not mean that the category of conduct causing a special 
risk of abnormal damage should extend to those cases. 
For these reasons, most cases decided after Kennedy provide little or no material 
upon which we can rely in trying to determine the nature and scope of the rule under 
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analysis in this chapter: they were concerned with liability of people instructing 
dangerous operations, not engaging in them. Evidently, in all these cases someone was 
engaging in the activities and not merely instructing them: the contractors. But the 
discussion was not about the grounds for their liability. The only aspect that was 
decided in these cases was the relevancy of the averments against the person 
instructing them. 
 
2.3.2. Other cases 
 
Apart from the context of the employer’s liability for the harms caused by an 
independent contractor, only two additional cases, decided by the Outer House, have 
dealt with the issue of dangerous activities after Kennedy. 
 
The first case is Anderson v White,185 a decision that was considered in chapter 2 with 
regard to the case of intentional or reckless nuisance against the third defender, 
proprietor of the land at the time of the claim, for allowing the water level behind a 
dam to rise so as to cause a flood on the pursuer’s property.186 The pursuers claimed 
damages for nuisance also against the second defender, trustee of the former 
proprietor of the land, by whose disposition the third defender became proprietor but 
who also retained the right to issue instructions to the latter and, therefore, to control 
his operations. The court held that culpa ought to be established and that, for those 
purposes, the pursuers required to aver  
 
first that the operations were either likely to cause damage to their land however much care 
was exercised, or were such that it was necessary to take steps in the carrying out of those 
operations to prevent damage to their land, and secondly, that the damage was foreseeable.187 
 
As to the first requirement, the pursuers averred the first alternative, i.e. that the 
operations were likely to cause damage regardless of the level of care deployed; and 
with regard to the second requirement, namely foreseeability, they averred that the 
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second defenders had been informed of what was happening and that, in any case, 
the occurrence of the harm was obvious. Thus, the issue was regarded relevant as an 
averment of fault.188  
It is rather clear that this is not an averment of negligence, for no submissions 
are made about the standard of care or its breach. There are, consequently, two 
alternative explanations for the conclusion that creating such risk amounts to fault: 
either the court saw the case as one of intention or recklessness, or considered that 
the sole creation of the risk, coupled with foreseeability of harm, amounted to a 
different form of fault. The language used by the court with regard to the averments 
of fault of the third defenders, which basically reproduced the notions of intention 
and recklessness contained in Kennedy, stands in contrast with the one used here 
(regarding the second defenders), which reproduces the distinction contained in 
Chalmers and Noble’s Trs. It seems more plausible, therefore, to infer that the court 
took the second approach. If this is correct, we can conclude that the case was one of 
application of the special rule under discussion in this chapter, even though the court 
neither referred specifically to conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage nor 
mentioned Kennedy when discussing the second defender’s liability. 
The conclusion that arises from this decision as to the nature of the liability rule 
is rather evident: the case continues the Kennedy analysis of the rule in fault terms. 
Unfortunately, the decision does not tell us much about the scope of the category we 
are trying to delineate. First, it does not tell us whether, had the pursuers framed 
their averments in the second alternative of the first requirement, that is, that the 
operations were “such that it was necessary to take steps…”, this would have been 
enough to establish fault or, indeed, the pursuers would have needed to prove, 
additionally, that those steps were not taken, i.e. to prove negligence in the ordinary 
sense. In other words, the case does not tell us whether the second type of danger falls 
to be treated in the same way as the first type, because the pursuer’s averments were 
framed in the latter. Secondly, the case does not tell us anything about the other 
elements of this risk, e.g. whether there is a requirement of magnitude of harm. What 
the case does tell us, however, is that harm must be foreseeable. 







The second case is Viewpoint Housing Association Ltd v City of Edinburgh Council.189 In this 
case, the pursuers suffered damage to their property as a consequence of a flood. The 
cause of the flood was, in the pursuers’ view, the inadequacy of the culverting 
arrangements constructed by the former roads authority on the burn located nearby. 
They sought compensation from the new roads authority, now owners, possessors 
and controllers of the works. 
In his decision, the Lord Ordinary (Emslie) suggested, apart from the 
negligence case, the possibility of a strict liability case based on the interference with 
the natural flow of a watercourse. The pursuers averred that, if fault could not be 
proved, they still had a case based on strict liability open. Such possibility, however, 
was excluded from the case by reference to the state of the pleadings. “If pursuers 
wished to maintain such a fallback argument”, he submitted, “an appropriate minute 
of amendment would be required”.190 It seems, therefore, that a case of strict liability, 
arguably based on the rule in Caledonian Rly Co,191 could have been possible if the 
averments were adequate and gave fair notice to the defenders. The scope of 
application of this alleged special liability rule was, consequently, defined by 
reference to the specific factual pattern present in the Caledonian Rly Co case which, as 
has been explained, is seen as an exceptional case of strict liability that is based upon 
the infringement of the rights of riparian owners,192 view that is considered and 
challenged in chapter 4.193 In this context, the decision in the Viewpoint Housing 
Association case does not contribute significantly to the delineation of the category 
beyond confirming what we already know: that interference with the natural course 
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2.3.3. Some doctrinal insights 
 
Even though case law after Kennedy sheds almost no light on the problematic aspects 
of this rule, legal literature leaves us in a slightly better position, for it discussed one 
important definitional element of the category: gravity of the potential harm. 
 
The view about the nature of the rule remains largely unchanged: it is still generally 
considered as a fault-based liability rule.194 This is not surprising given that Kennedy 
itself proclaims that liability for conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage is 
fault-based. The explanation of liability still relies on substantive and evidentiary 
elements of negligence.195 
Reid proposed a way of dealing with dangerous activities that is more nuanced 
than the orthodox view: she distinguishes accumulation of substances that are 
intrinsically dangerous from the accumulation of substances that are not intrinsically 
dangerous. In the first type of accumulation (i.e. the Chalmers type of case) liability is 
explained by a heightened duty of care that is very easily breached, and where the 
pursuer can invoke the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.196 In the second type (i.e. the Kerr type 
of case), a rebuttable presumption of fault operates. This presumption, however, 
seems to stem equally from the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.197 Consequently, there is 
significant common ground between the explanations for both types of cases and the 
nuance tends to disappear. Further, it is not clear how “non-accumulation” cases are 
to be classified, i.e. dangerous activities that do not entail the storage and subsequent 
escape of a substance. 
This understanding of liability in negligence terms is consistent with Reid’s 
scepticism about the need for conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage as a 
separate category,198 a point that seems to be conceded by Whitty, referring to Lord 
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Hope’s suggestion that it can actually just be recklessness.199 What is noteworthy 
about these remarks is that they draw a question mark over the category, 
underscoring its somewhat odd character as a form of fault. 
There is only one author that identifies in Kennedy’s implied fault what “to all 
intents and purposes” is a strict liability rule,200 but then suggests that Chalmers, the 
authority upon which this implication fault is based, “does not represent the law of 
Scotland”, for it is in his view an unwarranted extension of the strict liability rule 
applicable to opera manufacta on water courses.201 
 
With regard to the scope of the category, doctrinal writings highlight what had been 
absent from previous formulations of the required risk: the element of abnormal 
damage. Whereas Reid explains that this conduct is classified by reference “to the 
gravity of the possible harm”,202 Whitty acknowledged that conduct causing a special 
risk of abnormal damage  
 
is an impure taxonomic category because, unlike the other forms of culpa which form a series or 
continuum of types of conduct defined by reference to the pursuer’s mental element, this has 
reference to the gravity of the possible harm suffered by the defender not to the pursuer’s 
mental element and therefore belongs to a different classificatory series.203 
 
This view entails imposing a minimum gravity threshold on the category. As a 
consequence, conduct that creates a very high likelihood of harm will not fall within 
its scope if this likely harm is not material enough. It is not clear, however, where this 
threshold is to be placed, that is to say, no indications are provided to determine 
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This section has discussed both the authority that serves as the source for conduct 
causing a special risk of abnormal damage as described by Kennedy, and the 
subsequent case law and legal literature. It can be concluded from this discussion that 
the sources and subsequent materials are not consistent in that they lead to different 
views about the category, with regard to both its nature and scope. Further, many of 
these sources are connected to or directly rely on the Rylands rule, which is 
problematic given its general exclusion in RHM Bakeries. In addition, an important 
section of the cases that deal with dangerous activities are of no aid, for they are 
concerned with a related yet different basis of liability: non-delegable duties of care. 
The latter issue is particularly pervasive in case law after Kennedy. 
Possibly the one aspect of the regime that is nowadays widely agreed by both 
courts and scholars is the fault-based nature of the liability that this type of conduct 
attracts. This underplays the relevance of determining the scope of the category. 
After Kennedy, however, it is possible to see a renewed doctrinal interest in this 
definition, but this interest does not go as far as providing a full outline of what 
conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage is. 
 
3. THE NATURE OF THE RULE: A STRICT LIABILITY ACCOUNT 
 
The previous section shows that, despite the different views about the category under 
analysis, the explanation of the nature of the liability rule has reached a rather stable 
conclusion: liability is, at least conceptually, fault-based. There is, however, an 
equally stable acknowledgement of the idea that, in practice, the conceptual nature of 
the rule might not make a big difference in result: liability in these cases “behaves” 
like strict liability, even if it is not. If this is the case then, the question that arises is 
whether this is not just “strict liability in disguise”, as suggested by Zimmermann and 
Simpson.204  
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 146
An analysis of the rule shows that the answer to the question is, indeed, 
affirmative: liability for this type of activity seems to be not just stricter-than-normal, in 
the sense discussed in chapter 1, but actually strict.205 On the one hand, a survey of 
the identifiable elements of the rule according to the current authority and literature 
points strongly towards the presence of a truly strict liability rule (section 3.1). On the 
other hand, the standard explanation of this rule as fault-based features some 
shortcomings that are difficult – if not impossible – to overcome, rendering the 
explanation rather unconvincing. This conclusion highlights the paramount 
relevance of defining the boundaries of the rule’s scope of application (section 3.2). 
 
3.1. An analysis of the rule 
 
A good starting point is to contrast the elements and effects of this regime with those 
that have been identified as the determining elements and effects of strict liability. If 
we can find a coincidence, then the preliminary conclusion is that we are likely 
dealing with a strict liability regime. For these purpose, the frame of reference is that 
developed in chapter 1, where the notions of fault-based, stricter-than-normal and 
strict liability are outlined. 
 
3.1.1. Proof of fault 
 
The authority considered so far is consistent in recognising that according to the 
liability regime under analysis, the pursuer does not have to prove fault in the 
ordinary way in order to obtain compensation. Lord President Hope in Kennedy 
identified this as the main effect of conduct causing a special risk of abnormal 
damage: “it is not necessary to prove a specific fault as fault is necessarily implied in 
the result”;206 “fault is implied if damage results from that conduct”.207 
This element is consistent both with a strict liability rule and with a fault-based 
liability rule. In a strict liability rule, since fault is imposed regardless of fault, 
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obviously fault does not have to be proved by the pursuer to obtain compensation. 
But a fault-based liability rule can also be stricter in this way,208 facilitating 
compensation for the pursuer by shifting the burden of proof of fault and, 
consequently, imposing on the defender the task of demonstrating that he was not at 
fault, i.e. that he did not have the mental disposition and/or knowledge required by 
intention and recklessness, or, more commonly, that he employed the level of care 
that was due according to the circumstances. This is the effect of a rebuttable 
presumption of fault. Consequently, the fact that fault does not have to be proved 
only leaves us within the range of stricter forms of liability. 
 
3.1.2. Defences: absence of fault. 
 
We turn, then, to what was identified in chapter 1 as the key defining element of a 
strict liability rule: the admissibility of absence of fault as a defence. 
The relevant authority does not provide a clear answer to the question of 
whether absence of fault is an admissible defence in these cases. Often cited is Lord 
Justice-Clerk Hope’s dictum in Kerr where he remarked that it was “not sufficient that 
[the defender] took all the pains which were thought at the time necessary and 
sufficient”,209 and that he was “not prepared to say that any proof of the skill and 
care with which a new operation was conducted will be relevant…”.210 These 
remarks have been construed as a clear exclusion of the defence of absence of 
fault.211 A more recent view, however, holds the opposite interpretation: in Reid’s 
opinion, what operated in Kerr was a rebuttable presumption of fault by virtue of the 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, a conclusion that stems from the Lord Ordinary’s 
judgment.212 In this view, Lord Justice-Clerk Hope’s words can be explained by the 
fact that, in the case, the lack of care was so evident – and so he underlines by 
highlighting that the defender did not obtain advice from the adequate professionals 
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nor had proper plans213 – that any discussion of diligence was pointless. It appears, 
however, that there are better reasons to support the unavailability of the defence. 
First, the rest of the authority seems to point towards the exclusion of the 
defence. In Chalmers, both Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff and Lord Ormidale treated 
the issue of precautions as relevant only if fault had to be proved. The former 
submitted that “[f]ault is necessarily implied in the result, and it is unnecessary to go 
further”, to discuss the defenders’ (lack of) precautions only “if [he] were called to 
decide the question of fault”. The latter judge not only followed a similar argument, 
but actually quoted Lord Cranworth’s dictum from Rylands that specifically 
establishes the irrelevance of care as a defence.214 In Noble’s Trs, in turn, there was no 
discussion about precautions simply because the pursuers failed to aver the type of 
risk that, in the court’s view, was necessary to make a relevant averment of fault. Yet 
it is remarkable that, like in Chalmers, when risk cannot be controlled by due care (i.e. 
the first type of risk215), fault is located in the act of engaging in the dangerous activity 
itself; “the landowner’s culpa lies in the actual carrying out if his operations”.216 This 
stands in contrast with the case where risk can be controlled by due care, in which 
fault lies in not taking such care. Other cases where the rule was identified as 
applicable explicitly acknowledge that the defender is liable if harm is caused even if 
he used “the utmost care”;217 “however careful he might have been”.218 
These remarks lead to the second reason why absence of fault is not – or should 
not be – available as a defence. Fault is said to lie in engaging in the dangerous 
conduct precisely because due care is ineffective in controlling danger. Admitting due 
care as a defence defeats the very purpose of identifying fault in the act of engaging in 
this type of danger. The logical way of demonstrating absence of fault in this context 
should be to prove that the defender did not engage in a conduct that creates the 
type of danger required, i.e. to challenge the applicability of the rule. 
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It is true that in Reid’s view, the defence would be admissible only in the Kerr 
type of cases, namely accumulation of substances that are not intrinsically dangerous, 
and not in the Chalmers type of case.219 The rule in Kerr, however, has been not only 
widely identified with the rule in Chalmers, but actually identified specifically as the 
appropriate authority in cases where the substance that caused the harm could be 
described as intrinsically dangerous: pesticides220 and explosives.221 Moreover, as it 
has been remarked above,222 the presumption of fault in both types of case seems to 
stem from the same source, so defences should be consistent across both groups. 
 
3.1.3. Knowledge of danger and foreseeability of harm 
 
Overall, the authority seems to be consistent in that some element of knowledge 
and/or foreseeability is required. It is not entirely clear, however, what the object of 
that knowledge or foreseeability is. 
Some cases focus on the knowledge – actual or implied – of the danger: the 
defender will be liable without proof of fault provided that he knows, or at least ought 
to know, that the activity he is carrying out or the substance he is storing entails the 
level of required danger. This means knowing the extent of the potential harm and 
the level of likelihood of its occurrence. This is the case, for instance, in the decisions 
in Chalmers223 and Blair v Springfield.224 Other cases, however, concentrated on 
foreseeability of the consequences, i.e. the harm suffered by the victim must be 
foreseeable at least in nature. Its extent and level of likelihood are not relevant. 
Examples can be found in the cases of Western Silver Fox,225 Noble’s Trs,226 and very 
clearly Anderson v White.227 
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Arguably the distinction is not relevant, for one implies the other: if there is 
knowledge – actual or implied – of the danger, then subsequent harm is foreseeable, 
and conversely, if harm is foreseeable, it entails that the dangerousness of its source 
must have been known or knowable. The second proposition is, however, not 
correct, and the best example is Rylands itself: in that case, even though harm was 
foreseeable if there was an escape, the escape was not,228 highlighting that one does 
not necessarily imply the other. 
For the purposes of this section, we do not need to answer whether the regime 
under analysis requires knowledge of danger, foreseeability of harm, or both. What 
we need to answer here is whether an affirmative answer implies necessarily that the 
liability rule is fault-based or, on the contrary, they are compatible with a strict 
liability regime. And the answer was provided in chapter 1’s discussion of the notion 
of strict liability: requiring foreseeability of harm, or requiring the knowledge of the 
level of risk of an activity, does not mean that the liability rule is fault-based.229 This, 
however, is a distinct question from whether engaging in a particularly dangerous 
activity, with or without knowledge of its nature, can be considered as a form of fault 
in itself.230 
 
3.1.4. The rule’s “behaviour” 
 
The analysis developed so far shows that the elements of the liability rule under 
discussion coincide with those of a strict liability rule. Proof of fault is not only not 
required, but proof of absence of fault is not an admissible defence, and the 
requirement of foreseeability of harm and/or knowledge of danger does not preclude 
this conclusion. 
The rule, in sum, “behaves” like a strict liability rule. This, however, did not 
prevent some commentators from explaining it in terms of fault. 
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3.2. The shortcomings of the fault-based account 
 
As has been stated, the orthodox view does not argue that the rule behaves differently 
from a strict liability rule. The position is best summarised by the Law Reform 
Committee’s conclusion, cited by Lord Fraser in RHM Bakeries,231 that “it seems to 
make little, if any, difference in the result whether one adopts what may be called the 
‘absolute liability’ theory or adheres rigidly to the fault principle”.232 Yet the 
orthodox view explains this seemingly strict liability rule using elements of fault-based 
liability, particularly of negligence.  
There are, however, some flaws in this reasoning that render this explanation 
rather unconvincing. 
 
3.2.1. High or heightened standard of care? 
 
The first element that is deployed to explain this liability rule as fault-based, and that 
is present in most accounts, is the inherent sensitivity of negligence’s standard of care 
to risk: an activity that creates a very high level of risk will result in a very high 
standard of care. This is indeed one of the cases of “stricter-than-normal” liability 
identified in chapter 1,233 and also the explanation offered by Weinrib to make strict 
liability for this type of activity compatible with the requirement of fault demanded 
by his corrective justice justification of liability. “[T]here must be a point”, he argues, 
“where activity is sufficiently risky that lack of care can be imputed from the very 
materialization of the risk”.234 This is why, in his view, the defendant cannot invoke 
lack of fault. 
It must be noted that this explanation relies on a generalisation, for the 
standard of care depends mainly, but not exclusively, on the level of risk. The 
standard is determined by a series of factors, among which an important role is 
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played by the costs of taking precautions. If these costs are too high in relation to the 
improvement achieved by taking them in terms of safety, and especially when 
activities are considered as socially useful or valuable,235 then due care might not 
necessarily be equal to all care. It would, in sum, depend on the circumstances of 
each case whether the standard of care is high enough so as to make this alleged 
fault-based liability rule behave as a strict liability one. Weinrib argues that costs of 
taking precautions are largely ignored by English and Commonwealth courts,236 so 
the standard of care would, in his view, depend exclusively on risk. Yet a recent study 
has sought to show that “Weinrib is badly mistaken here about the state of the 
law”,237 giving examples of cases where the cost of precautions has, indeed, been 
taken into account.238 The contention is applicable to Scots law: Walker provides a 
list of cases that serve as authority for the proposition that “the expense and difficulty 
or practicability of taking certain precautions against a foreseen risk can be taken into 
account”.239 
As a consequence, mere reliance on the standard’s sensitivity to risk might lead 
to a level of care that is just not high enough so as to imply negligence from the fact 
that harm happened. It would be necessary to resort to the notion of “highest 
possible” or “utmost” care.240 In this case, where the standard of care is placed so 
high that it is virtually impossible to comply with, that is to say, due care becomes all 
care so “nothing short of not doing the act is an adequate precaution”,241 then there is 
no difference in practice with a rule of strict liability, it is “tantamount to strict 
liability”.242 
But for cases where the standard of care, though very high, is not high enough 
to reach this point, the explanation is, therefore, not sufficient: there is still a need to 
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prove that the standard was actually breached, even if this breach entails a slight lack 
of care. 
 
3.2.2. High standard of care + res ipsa loquitur 
 
The issue is solved by the orthodox view normally through the idea of res ipsa loquitur: 
the fact that harm resulted is evidence of this (slight) lack of care. 
As explained in chapter 1,243 res ipsa loquitur does not amount to a proper 
presumption of negligence. A presumption of negligence places on the defender the 
burden of proving diligence, whereas res ipsa loquitur simply charges him with the 
burden of proposing an alternative explanation of the accident that is compatible 
with diligence, throwing the burden of proof of negligence back onto the pursuer. 
Consequently, this is a weak explanation for a rule that behaves like strict liability 
and that, therefore, relieves the pursuer from proving fault. He might, indeed, see 
himself in the need of proving fault after all, if the defender can provide the 
aforementioned explanation. 
But there is a more fundamental flaw in the reasoning: one of the essential 
elements of res ipsa loquitur is incompatible with the type of activity that is 
characterised as conduct creating risk of abnormal damage, i.e. that in which due 
care cannot control the risk.244 Res ipsa loquitur operates when the accident is one that, 
in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the defender had used 
proper care.245 Therefore, if the activity is one where due care cannot control the 
risk, it is not possible to assert at the same time that harms derived from this activity 
are, in the normal course of things, due to lack of proper care. At least in two of the 
cases mentioned by Reid in support of the res ipsa-based explanation,246 the court 
explicitly recognised that danger was controllable through adequate precautions. In 
Nautilus Steamship Co v David and William Henderson Co, Lord Skerrington remarked that 
“the operation was obviously one which would be dangerous, unless precautions 
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were taken”,247 whereas in Gilmour v Simpson, the Lord Ordinary qualified the 
instrument used by the defenders as “a potentially dangerous instrument, if care was 
not duly exercised”.248 In the third case mentioned by Reid, Fitzpatrick v Melville, 
though there is no explicit recognition, the facts can easily be characterised as 
such.249 
It is true that the restriction of the category only to those cases where due care 
cannot control the risk is part of this thesis’ argument. But even if we accept a wider 
category that includes also those cases where it is necessary to take steps to prevent 
risk, this merely turns the res ipsa loquitur explanation from completely inadequate to 
partially inadequate.  
At a more general level, res ipsa operates only when the accident is 
unexplained,250 so it is, again, an unwarranted generalisation to assume that in the 
type of cases under analysis, the accident will always be unexplained. 
As a consequence, res ipsa loquitur is not a convincing explanation for presuming 
the breach. Some other explanation is needed to keep the rule within the bounds of 
fault-based liability. 
 
3.2.3. High standard of care + presumption of negligence 
 
An alternative explanation would be that there is a proper presumption of negligence 
in operation. However, no account is clear as to the nature and source of this 
presumption. In any case, the key question would then be whether the presumption 
can be rebutted. And if this is not the case, then it is difficult to see in what sense this 
remains a fault-based rule.251 The view is not new: around the same time the 
orthodox view was consolidating, a dissenting voice pointed out the inadequacy of 
the explanation of Kerr, Chalmers and Caledonian: 
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If strict liability amounts to no more than an inference or presumption of negligence, then it 
must be a good defence that in fact there has been no negligence. Of course, where a 
dangerous operation is carried on, the duty of care is high and it may even be that the onus of 
proof will shift to the defender to show that no negligence occurred. Yet, unless absence of 
negligence is irrelevant or negligence is imputed by law, it is impossible that the defender 
should be deprived of the opportunity to escape liability by proving that he exercised all the 
care that is expected of a reasonable man in the particular circumstances. This is precisely what 
the rule in Kerr v Earl of Orkney declares he cannot excuse himself by doing.252 
 
The availability of diligence as a defence is unclear. But, as argued above, the 
authority seems to point towards it not being admissible.253 If this is the case, the 
presumption would be irrebuttable, undermining in a conclusive way the orthodox 
account of the rule based upon negligence elements. 
 
3.2.4. The possibility opened by Kennedy: Recklessness? 
 
Kennedy, however, opened up a new possible fault-based account that is not based 
upon negligence. Lord Hope, when referring to conduct causing a special risk of 
abnormal damage, considered that it was “perhaps just another example of 
recklessness”. A reckless defender was described as one that has “no regard to the 
question whether his action, if it was of a kind likely to cause harm to the other party, 
would have that result”.254 
It has been argued in chapter 2, however, that the element of disregard of or 
indifference to risk has disappeared in the evolution of recklessness after Kennedy. 
Recklessness has been reduced to a state of pure – actual or constructive – knowledge 
of likelihood of harm. In this context, and insofar as conduct causing a special risk of 
abnormal damage requires knowledge of the danger, it can certainly be characterised 
as an example of recklessness. But, as concluded in chapter 2, this entails in practice a 
form of liability that is indistinguishable from strict liability.255 
Now, even if we consider the “pre-Kennedy” notion of recklessness, namely the 
notion that is still essentially defined by indifference, the conclusion does not change 
substantially. There is nothing in the configuration of conduct causing a special risk 
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of abnormal damage that indicates indifference to risk on the part of the person 
engaging in the conduct. If such indifference is inferred from the fact that the person 
decided to engage in the conduct despite the risks that are involved, then this is a 
presumption, not an example, of recklessness. Depending on whether the defender is 
allowed to demonstrate the absence of recklessness, i.e. whether the presumption is 
rebuttable, this can be seen as in effect a strict liability rule.256 
We are, therefore, back at square one: to leave the realm of strict liability, we 
take the recklessness route, but this route seems to lead us straight back to strict 
liability. 
 
3.2.5. The last option: fault by endangering? 
 
There is, however, a different way in which this rule could be explained on the basis 
of fault: by considering that there is fault in the sole creation of a foreseeable risk like 
the one discussed in this chapter, regardless of the precautions taken. This is the 
explanation offered by Middleton for the outcome of Kerr: 
 
He was made responsible, not merely because his dam gave way, but because he had chosen to 
create a risk of harm to other people. He could said to be blameworthy in so far as he 
deliberately did something which he either foresaw, or ought to have foreseen, might be 
dangerous. Otherwise there could be no blame, since nobody can guard against something that 
he cannot foresee. But while there was fault, there could not be said to be negligence […]. It is 
necessary to recognise the existence of a variety of culpa which consists in creating a hazard, or 
initiating an activity which is potentially harmful to others. Absence of negligence is not a 
defence in this case, for culpa is involved in deciding to start the potentially harmful activity, not 
merely in failing to exercise due care once the decision to start it has been made.257 
 
This view returns us to what seemed to have been Whitty’s first approach: 
considering the creation of a special risk of abnormal damage a separate category of 
fault, alongside malice, intention, recklessness and negligence. This would also 
explain why the absence of negligence or intention is not a defence, and the view 
seems to be consistent with the language in Chalmers, Noble’s Trs and Anderson, which 
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all highlight the idea of culpa lying in the act of engaging in the dangerous activity 
itself. 
There is, however, wide agreement on the opposite conclusion. Engaging in 
dangerous activities does not entail fault. “To say that someone was at fault in 
behaving as they did is to say that they should have behaved differently”.258 But this 
is not the case here: the law does not forbid these activities nor can they be enjoined, 
because their value justifies taking the risk.259 The law’s reaction is simply to impose a 
condition in order to allow people to engage in these activities: they must compensate 
the victims if risk materialises;260 “society’s consent” depends on such condition.261 
The last explanation, therefore, does not provide a satisfactory fault-based 




The analysis and evaluation developed in this section shows that the rule under 
discussion is, indeed, one of strict liability. The elements and effects of this regime are 
coincident with those that have been signalled as key for the definition of a strict 
liability rule, and all the different fault-based accounts of the rule suffer from grave 
shortcomings, turning them into fairly unconvincing explanations. 
The acknowledgement of the strict liability nature of the rule, consequently, 
underscores the relevance of defining adequately the category to which it applies. 
 
4. DEFINING THE CATEGORY: A PROPOSAL 
 
Most of the literature concerning the regime under discussion here has concentrated 
upon the rule’s nature, and more precisely, in explaining it in fault terms. As a 
consequence, the definition of the scope of the category to which the regime applies 
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does not appear as a fundamental concern. Yet this definition is crucial for a liability 
regime that is exceptional in a system committed to the fault principle. 
The present section therefore proposes a framework of the relevant elements 
that should be taken into account in defining “conduct causing a special risk of 
abnormal damage”, making choices based upon the available authority and general 
legal principles of liability. It will argue that the strict liability rule should be applied 
to abnormally dangerous conduct (section 4.1), defined as that which creates a high 
risk of grave physical damage (section 4.2), and restricted to those cases where risk 
cannot be adequately controlled by reasonable care and is not of common usage 
(section 4.3), and where risk and its magnitude are known or at least reasonably 
expected to be known by the defender (section 4.4). 
The proposal takes its inspiration from the models adopted by the American 
Rest (3d) and the PETL for abnormally dangerous activities, but with significant 
differences and qualifications. The Rest (3d) is a helpful working model because its 
formulation was based on the judicial experience of applying the previous versions, in 
particular the Rest (2d) formulation which was so influential for Whitty, taking into 
account the elements that were problematic in practice. The PETL, in turn, provide 
a useful framework because they try to “encompass the lowest common denominator 
as a minimum standard” between the different jurisdictions considered.262 
 
4.1. Terminology: from “conduct causing a special risk of abnormal 
damage” to the simpler “abnormally dangerous conduct” 
 
The first element of this proposal is one of terminology. As explained above,263 the 
expression coined by Lord Hope in Kennedy to describe the conduct to which this 
special liability regime applies seems to be the result of an evolution in which the 
changes suffered by the formulation are neither explained nor explicitly justified. 
From a “special use bringing with it increased danger to others”, qualification 
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introduced by Rickards v Lothian264 to the Rylands rule, which found its way into Scots 
law through the case of Miller v Robert Addie;265 it evolved into Whitty’s “conduct 
causing a special risk of abnormal danger” as a form of fault;266 later finding itself in 
Lord Hope’s dictum as “conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage”. We 
can only speculate as to the reasoning underlying these changes, and we can even 
evaluate these changes as positive, but the expression remains a source of 
uncertainties. It is unclear (i) what makes a risk “special” – whether it is only defined 
by a high likelihood of harm or it incorporates other elements such as the nature of 
the source of the risk, i.e. an “uncommon” activity; (ii) what makes damage 
“abnormal” – whether it is only its magnitude or also its nature; and (iii) to what 
extent these two elements can interact – whether a particularly “high” presence of 
one can lower the requirement of the other one, or is there a minimum threshold for 
one of them. 
The expression “abnormally dangerous conduct” seems preferable since it 
imposes a single requirement of abnormality and, in defining danger, allows for a 
margin of interaction between likelihood and magnitude of harm. Certainly the 
expression itself does not necessarily convey much more meaning in terms of how we 
define abnormality, that is, it does not solve conclusively uncertainties (i) and (ii) listed 
above. This is, of course, an objection that can be made to any general standard that 
is embodied in one term. But by deploying one single notion and one single 
requirement, the formulation proposed here does not preclude the interaction of 
elements as explained in (iii), allowing a more flexible approach, and eliminates 
possible redundancies in the notion. Uncertainties (i) and (ii) are, in turn, clarified by 
the other elements of the proposal explained below. 
This terminological element highlights two further substantive points regarding 
the determination of the category: first, it focuses on dangerous conduct, and not on 
dangerous things; and secondly, as a consequence, it is a broader notion than that of 
escapes of things, which defines the current understanding of the Rylands rule’s scope of 
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application in England.267 It is true that the authority upon which the category is 
based consists mainly of cases that could be characterised as escapes, yet it is difficult 
to see why a conduct that creates a similarly relevant level of danger should be 
treated differently simply because it does not entail the movement of a substance 
from one land to another. This point was clearly made in the Thirteenth Report,268 and 
was also recognised as a source of potential anomalies by the English Law 
Commission.269 Furthermore, Kennedy itself departed from these notions by describing 
the category in terms of risk-creating conduct. 
Furthermore, the notion of “conduct” is preferred here over the term 
“activity”, adopted both by § 20 Rest (3d) and article 5:101 PETL, because the latter 
might be seen as requiring active conduct, excluding, for example, omissions such as 
in Anderson v White, where the rule was considered as applicable: the second defenders 
failed to prevent the level of water being raised to a dangerous point.270 Of course 
this particular omission could be seen as part of a positive activity: controlling a dam. 
But this is problematic, for a broad definition of an activity tends to “dilute” risk, that 
is, the overall activity might be seen as less dangerous than a particular conduct 
carried out in its context, restricting enormously the application of the rule.271 
Consequently, the terminology proposed here is clearer than that currently 
available and, at the same time, reflects judicial trends. 
 
4.2. The basic elements of abnormal danger and their interaction: high 
risk of grave physical damage 
 
Most human behaviour creates danger. “Dangerousness can thus hardly serve as the 
exclusive justification for deviations from general rules of tort law. […] We therefore 
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need to find some way to measure the degree of danger”.272 It is proposed here that, 
as a starting point, an abnormally dangerous conduct is one that creates a high risk of 
grave physical damage. 
 
4.2.1. High risk 
 
Risk is composed of two elements: the magnitude of the potential harm and the 
likelihood of its materialisation. Therefore, the risk of a particular harm can be high 
because the likelihood of its occurrence is very high, even though its magnitude is not 
particularly material, or vice versa. This is the approach adopted both by § 20 Rest 
(3d)273 and article 5:101(3) PETL. The formulation proposed here, however, sets a 
minimum threshold of gravity of harm for the activity to be characterised as 
abnormally dangerous: danger will be abnormal only when the potential harm is 
grave. In any case, there can be different levels of gravity over this threshold, and 
within this margin there is space for interaction between magnitude and likelihood. If 
the potential harm is devastating (e.g. death, total collapse of buildings), a lower 
likelihood of its materialisation can justify the characterisation of the conduct as 
abnormally dangerous, whereas in the case of potential harms of less significance, but 
still grave (such as, for instance, severe but non-fatal bodily injury or structural 
damage of buildings), a higher likelihood should be required to justify such 
characterisation. 
 
4.2.2. Grave physical damage 
 
Physical damage encompasses both bodily injury and damage to property. Scots case 
law has not discriminated between these two types of damage when deciding the 
scope of application of the special liability regime. It is true that in most of the cases 
considered in section 2 where the harm suffered by the victim was death or personal 
injury, the rule was not applied. This result, however, had nothing to do with the 
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type of injury suffered: the rule was excluded because the activity developed by the 
defender was one of common usage. In turn, the limitation that south of the border 
has been imposed on the Rylands rule, in that its application is restricted only to 
property damage,274 is tightly linked with its current understanding as a property 
protection rule.275 
This proposal, in contrast, includes both types of harm. It is only logical that a 
regime that seeks to impose liability for abnormal danger should encompass the 
gravest possible consequences that a person can suffer, i.e. death or severe personal 
injury.276 
The harm, however, must be physical. The starting point in the common law is 
that there is no generally recognised right to economic or mental integrity, even if 
harm is inflicted with fault.277 Therefore, for pure economic loss or pure mental harm 
to be actionable the law imposes one or more additional requirements: gravity 
thresholds, specific proximity tests, and/or particular forms of fault. When economic 
or mental harm are, on the contrary, the consequence of the infringement of a 
recognised right, such as property or physical integrity, they are compensated by 
operation of the principle of full compensation.278 Whether the common law’s 
approach is justified is a question that goes beyond the scope of this thesis; the 
proposal here advanced simply seeks to be coherent from a systemic viewpoint. 
Hence, the regime under discussion disposes of the requirement of fault, under 
certain circumstances, for the infringement of a recognised right, where fault would 
have indeed been a sufficient basis of liability. But when that would have not been 
the case, this regime does not provide a way of circumventing the additional 
requirements imposed by the law. Consequently, pure economic loss and pure 
mental or emotional harm should be actionable only under the general rules of fault-
based liability insofar as they meet these specific requirements. 
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In order to meet the minimum threshold, however, it is obviously not enough 
that damage is physical. Physical harm can, in fact, be negligible. Harm must also be 
grave, that is, of a considerable magnitude. Examples of grave physical damage to the 
person include death and serious impairment or illness. Examples of grave physical 
damage to property include collapse of buildings, severe structural damage, and 
destruction of moveable property such as crops, vehicles or furnishings. The purpose 
of setting this minimum threshold is to exclude from the special regime of liability 
injuries that are certain or almost certain to be suffered but are of more limited 
magnitude, avoiding, in this way, the “blending of two extremes” that are socially not 
comparable.279 Consequently, trivial or less significant harms, even if highly likely – 
or almost certain – to materialise do not justify the characterisation of the conduct as 
abnormally dangerous. It has been highlighted above280 that discussion of the 
magnitude of the harm was virtually absent from Scots case law and that this could 
create a problem of over-inclusiveness, even though the label of the category 
seemingly stresses “abnormality” of damage. Setting a minimum threshold of 
damage, therefore, seeks to prevent this problem and aligns with doctrinal views of 
the category as focused chiefly on the gravity of the possible harm.281 
 
4.2.3. Abnormal sensitivity 
 
A further problem arises in determining whether potential harm is grave enough to 
justify the characterisation of the conduct as abnormally dangerous: the incidence of 
abnormally sensitive persons or abnormally sensitive property. Seemingly the 
question here is whether we should extend the “egg-shell skull rule”, accepted in 
negligence cases,282 to this special liability regime, i.e. whether the defender is liable 
for injury the magnitude of which is augmented by some pre-existing condition that 
makes the victim or his property abnormally sensitive. And, again seemingly, there 
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could be a case for distinguishing between abnormally sensitive persons and 
abnormally sensitive property, extending liability only in the first case.283 
On a closer analysis, however, it is possible to note that the question is a 
different one. The egg-shell skull rule, understood as described above, is a matter of 
extent of compensation. It tells us what the defender is liable for, i.e. which injuries 
he will be bound to repair. But a different problem arises when we incorporate a 
certain magnitude threshold in the liability rule, because in this case the question is 
not about the extent of the defender’s liability but actually whether he is liable at all. 
This is what happens, for instance, in nuisance: the plus quam tolerabile threshold is 
incorporated in the liability rule, so liability depends on a certain gravity of the 
interference, and the law generally disregards abnormal sensitivity in determining 
such gravity, favouring a standard set by reference to persons or property of normal 
sensitivity.284 In the special liability regime proposed here, the magnitude of the 
potential harm would not exactly determine whether there is liability, but rather 
according to which rule of liability the defender will be assessed, so that if the 
potential harm is not grave enough, general fault-based liability rules – of nuisance or 
negligence – must be applied. 
The question in this context is, therefore, whether a conduct can be regarded 
as abnormally dangerous when the potential harm would not have been grave had 
the victim or his property been of normal sensitivity, but it turns out to meet the 
minimum gravity threshold precisely because the sensitivity is abnormal.  
The Rest (3d) does not deal with this question; it only deals with the egg-shell 
skull rule.285 But the Rest (2d) did address the issue, excluding the application of the 
strict liability rule “if the harm would not have resulted but for the abnormal sensitive 
character of the plaintiff’s activity”.286 It can be noted that the exclusion is framed in 
very restrictive terms: the liability rule does not apply only if harm would not have 
resulted, seemingly allowing the application of the rule when harm would have still 
resulted, but not met the gravity threshold but for the abnormal sensitivity. Moreover, the 
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rule is excluded only due to the abnormal sensitivity of the plaintiff’s activity, which 
could ordinarily be seen as encompassing his property, but probably not his person. 
It is not possible to find a straightforward answer to this question in the Scottish 
authority considered so far, but the case for disregarding abnormal sensitivity of 
property in the application of the Rylands rule was made in a South African case 
decided by the Privy Council: Eastern and South African Telegraph Co v Cape Town 
Tramways Co. In this case, electricity from the tramlines operated by the defenders 
escaped and interfered with the telegraphic communications system operated by the 
pursuer. Lord Robertson submitted that 
 
A man cannot increase the liabilities of his neighbour by applying his own property to special 
uses, whether for business or pleasure. The principle of Rylands v Fletcher, which subjects to a 
high liability the owner who uses his property for purposes other than those which are natural, 
would become doubly penal if it implied a liability created and measured by the non-natural 
uses of his neighbour’s property.287 
  
This argument was put forward by the defenders in the Western Silver Fox Ranch case. 
They submitted that the silver fox breeding business run by the pursuers was a 
“special use” in the sense the expression was used by Lord Robertson. Although the 
Lord Ordinary’s response to the argument is initially rather puzzling, for it sought to 
solve the issue applying the non-natural use test to the pursuer’s activity288 – possibly 
in light of Lord Robertson’s words, it provides some light on the matter. After 
acknowledging some level of special sensitivity on the part of the foxes, he added that 
 
This, however, does not alter the quality of the risk to which he who blasts subjects his 
neighbour, but only the quantity of the damage the neighbour may suffer. Thus, upon the 
uncontradicted evidence […], some of the sows in a pig-breeding farm would have been 
affected by the blasting in this case, just as the silver fox vixens were, and with similar results.289 
 
The implication seems to be, therefore, that if harm would be equally suffered by 
normally sensitive property, the fact that the property in the case was abnormally 
sensitive does not exclude the application of the rule. But if the gravity threshold is 
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met only due to hypersensitivity, then the application of the rule should be excluded 
and general nuisance or negligence rules apply. 
There could be a case for restricting this reasoning only to property: in the case 
of hypersensitive property there seems to be an element of choice on the part of the 
pursuer that is absent in the case of hypersensitive persons. The pursuer chooses to 
engage in telegraphic communications or to breed silver foxes, like in the cases 
commented above, but he does not choose to suffer a condition that makes him 
hypersensitive. But the reason why hypersensitivity is disregarded when assessing 
gravity of harm is not because the pursuer should suffer the consequences of his 
choice. The reason is that the defender cannot be expected to foresee such a result 
and, as will be argued below, the rule should only be applicable when the defender 
knows or is reasonably expected to know of the level of danger that he is creating.290 
This reasoning applies equally to hypersensitive persons and hypersensitive property. 
This answer does not prevent the application of the actual egg-shell skull rule 
when the regime under analysis is applicable, i.e. the compensation of injuries in 
their actual extent even when their gravity is higher due to abnormal sensitivity, 
provided that a person or property of normal sensitivity would have suffered injury 
that is grave enough to meet the minimum threshold.291 
 
4.2.4. Victim’s contribution to risk 
 
A similar problem in the determination of the risk’s magnitude is encountered when 
the conduct of the victim is a decisive factor in raising the risk to a level that justifies 
the characterisation of the conduct as abnormally dangerous, that is, when the level 
of risk – either due to its likelihood or the gravity of the harm – would have fallen 
below the standard required to make application of the strict liability rule but for the 
fact that the victim contributed with his conduct to the increase of such risk, by 
failing to take reasonable care for his own safety or the safety of his property. 
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The problem is solved in the Rest (3d) through the rule’s description of the risk 
as that which is highly significant “even when reasonable care is exercised by all 
actors”,292 including the victim.293 The justification offered is that “[w]hen the conduct 
of actors other than the defendant has a significant influence on the number of 
injuries, the defendant cannot fairly be identified as the exclusive cause of the risk”.294 
This proposal includes explicitly other agents’ contribution to the risk in the rule. § 20 
simply states that the relevant level of risk is that which is created by the activity, 
implying the exclusion of risk contributions from other agents in the determination of 
such level, and that remains over the required level even when reasonable 
precautions are taken, without specifying the actors that are expected to take such 
precautions. Consequently, if what brings the level of risk over the standard is the 
victim’s failure to take reasonable care of his own safety or his property’s, then not 
only is the relevantly high level of risk not exclusively created by the defender, but 
also it would not meet the required level if reasonable precautions had been taken by 
the victim. 
This does not mean that the defence of contributory negligence is excluded as a 
way of seeking apportionment of liability. According to s 1(1) of the Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, 
 
Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of 
any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason 
of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof 
shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the 
claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage[.] 
 
The interpretation given to the term “fault” for the purposes of the application of the 
Act to Scotland is provided by s 5: “the expression ‘fault’ means wrongful act, breach 
of statutory duty or negligent act or omission which gives rise to liability in 
damages…”. Consequently, the term “fault” is not taken in the Act in the sense 
adopted in chapter 1.295 It is here certainly a broader notion. The question that 
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arises, therefore, is whether conduct that attracts strict liability can be considered as 
falling within this broader notion. And the answer seems to be affirmative. 
On the one hand, the defence is available in Scotland for liability regimes that 
are clearly identified as strict. For instance, contributory negligence is admitted in a 
related strict liability regime: the one for harms caused by dangerous animals. 
According to s 1(6) of the Animals (Scotland) Act 1987, “[f]or the purposes of the 
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, any injury or damage for which a 
person is liable under this section shall be treated as due to his fault as defined in that 
Act”. In a similar tone, s 6(4) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 provides that  
 
Where any damage is caused partly by a defect in a product and partly by the fault of the 
person suffering the damage, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 […] shall 
have effect as if the defect were the fault of every person liable by virtue of this Part for the 
damage caused by the defect. 
 
In the same line, in the Scottish Law Commission’s Report on Civil Liability – 
Contribution, the availability of the plea of contribution was accepted in the case of 
interference with the course of a stream, considered by the Commission as a conduct 
attracting strict liability.296 
On the other hand, however, it is arguable that conceptually, despite the label, 
the availability of the defence entails introducing a fault element that moderates the 
strictness of the rule.297 In Cane’s words, “[a]s a matter of principle, it may be argued 
that if fault is irrelevant to the issue of whether [the defendant’s] conduct attracts 
liability, it should also be irrelevant to the issue of whether [the plaintiff’s] conduct 
gives rise to a defence”.298 Yet it appears that the admission of the defence does not 
change the basis of the defender’s liability but only takes into account the causal 
relevance of the pursuer’s conduct for the severity of the harm suffered, which is 
consistent with a rule that grounds liability in causation. Further, it seems fair to 
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“require victims to take reasonable care for their own safety”.299 Consequently, the 
defence is not incompatible with a strict liability regime. 
In sum, if the victim’s contribution is the decisive factor that brings the level 
over the risk threshold, then the conduct is not itself abnormally dangerous and the 
special liability regime is not open for the victim. He can pursue liability according to 
the general rules and his contributory negligence will likely trigger the application of 
the apportionment rule. If the risk would be relevantly high regardless of the victim’s 
contribution, then the conduct is abnormally dangerous and the special liability 
regime applies, but the apportionment rule is not excluded and compensation may 
be reduced to reflect such contribution. 
 
4.3. Controllability of risk, common usage and social utility 
 
There are three further elements that can be determinative of the type of conduct 
characterised as abnormally dangerous. These elements are the possibility of 
controlling the risk created by the conduct through certain precautions, the 
characterisation of the conduct as one of common usage, and the conduct’s social 
utility. In contrast with the elements discussed in the previous section, where Scottish 
authority was virtually non-existent, is possible to find some support in the available 
authority for the elements considered here. 
 
4.3.1. Possibility of controlling risk 
 
It is proposed here that the risk that makes a conduct abnormally dangerous is that 
which remains relevantly high even when reasonable precautions are taken. In other words, it 
is a risk that remains at a high level even if the defender’s conduct is diligent (as 
opposed to negligent). This element marks the point where negligence ends and, 
therefore, the defender would not be liable unless a different type of fault is present 
(i.e. intention) or a special liability regime is available. 
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This proposal seeks to make a special liability regime available: it takes the 
standard of care the breach of which would serve as the basis of a finding of 
negligence, and utilises this standard as a control device for the definition of the 
relevant risk, making applicable the special liability regime only where complying 
with the standard is irrelevant in controlling such risk and bringing it to a “normal” 
level. 
This does not mean that a negligent execution prevents the conduct from being 
characterised as abnormally dangerous; on the contrary, it can be so described when 
the level of risk would have remained relevantly high even if execution had been 
diligent, regardless of whether it was, in fact, executed in such way. If this is the case, 
the pursuer has a choice: either to pursue liability based on the general rules (i.e. 
negligence, or nuisance if applicable), or to pursue liability under the special regime 
based on the abnormally dangerous character of the conduct. More precisely, the 
victim can choose either to aver that the standard of care was breached or to aver 
that the standard of care would not be effective in controlling the risk. 
As for the defender, the rule allows him to make a decision, provided he wishes 
to engage in the conduct despite the high risk involved: he can either assume the 
costs of taking additional precautions that would in fact control the risk, or assume 
the costs of potential liability claims if the risk materialises. In other words, it 
“induces an actor either to set aside money for victims or, if it is cheaper, to make 
better choices when engaging in the activity”.300 
The determination as to which precautions are reasonable is to be made in the 
same way as in negligence: the standard of care will take into account not only the 
likelihood of the harm and its gravity, but also the costs of taking precautions, among 
other considerations.301 This is, indeed, the reason why, even though the standard of 
care is determined by reference to the elements of risk, it does not necessarily control 
the risk effectively: there might be other considerations that make effective 
precautions unreasonable. 
                                                
 
 
300 P M Gerhart, Tort Law and Social Morality (2010) 150. 
301 See p 17 above. 
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The fact that risk cannot be effectively controlled by reasonable precautions 
has been singled out by the Rest (3d) as the key element considered by courts in 
characterising activities as abnormally dangerous.302 It is useful to remember here 
that the Rest (2d) differed in the way it determined what constituted an abnormally 
dangerous activity:303 § 520 contained a list of factors of which none was necessary 
nor necessarily sufficient of itself. The Rest (3d) surveys the application of § 520 by 
courts, concluding that the reasonable care factor was the most relevant and, 
consequently, incorporates it as a necessary factor in the rule set out in § 20.  
The same approach is adopted by article 5:101(2) PETL, according to which  
 
An activity is abnormally dangerous if 
a) it creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of damage even when all due care is 
exercised in its management and 
b) it is not a matter of common usage. 
 
It is possible, moreover, to find support in Scots authority for making this element a 
defining factor of the category: as discussed,304 the two relevant cases cited by Lord 
Hope in Kennedy305 to support the implication of fault in the category of “conduct 
causing a special risk of abnormal damage”, Chalmers306 and Noble’s Trs,307 attempt a 
distinction between cases where danger can and cannot be controlled through 
precautions, and clearly identify implied fault in the latter case. Certainly it is not as 
clear whether they extended the implication of fault to the former and, further, they 
are not consistent, internally and between each other, in drawing the line that 
separates the two types of cases. This proposal, consequently, seeks to solve the two 
problems by, first, limiting the special treatment only to the second type of case 
(where danger cannot be controlled), and draws the line where reasonable 
precautions are ineffective in bringing the level of danger down to an acceptable 
level. 
                                                
 
 
302 Rest (3d) § 20, reporter’s note to comment h. 
303 See p 102 above. 
304 See p 128 above. 
305 Kennedy (n 1) at 99-100. 
306 Chalmers (n 20). 
307 Noble’s Trs (n 127). 
 
 172
This is consistent with the cases in which the rule is unequivocally said to be 
applicable: they were cases where the first type of danger was present. In the case of 
Western Silver Fox Ranch v Ross and Cromarty CC, in defending the application of the 
Rylands rule – identified with the rule in Kerr and Chalmers – to the facts of the case, 
the court remarked that “however carefully high explosives are used, their effect can 
only be localised to a very limited extent”.308 In the case of D McIntyre & Son Ltd v 
Soutar, where harm was caused by weed-spraying operations, the Sheriff seemingly 
extended the rule to both types of dangers, when he stated that “[i]t makes no 
difference to say that the substance is safe if handled properly; this is a tautology, 
even radioactive substances, even a nuclear bomb, are safe if handled properly. The 
point is that it is dangerous if it escapes”.309 The implication seems to be that the possibility 
of controlling the risk by due care is irrelevant to determine the scope of application 
of the rule, yet the emphasised phrase acknowledges that, in the case, risk could not 
be controlled: even if the likelihood of escape is low, the potential harm is so grave 
that it justifies the application of the rule. The examples given are illustrative of this 
conclusion: these are paradigmatic cases of activities where the risk remains very high 
even when due care is taken. Furthermore, he continues by saying that the 
substance’s “dangerous character is enhanced because it is liable to escape by drift 
and because it is volatile”,310 effectively denying the unlikelihood of the escape. Other 
examples can be found in Gemmill’s Trs v Alexander Cross & Sons Ltd (manufacture of 
sulphuric and other acids in premises located on sloping ground),311 and Blair v 
Springfield Stores Ltd (storage of weevilled grain).312 
The adoption of this limit is, however, not free from problems. It imposes a 
high burden on the victim: he needs to aver both the standard of reasonable care and 
that it would not control the risk. It has even been said that this requirement means 
that the pursuer has effectively to prove that he cannot prove negligence.313 The 
criticism, however, ignores the fact that, while imposing a high burden on the victim, 
                                                
 
 
308 Western Silver Fox Ranch (n 68) at 605. 
309 D McIntyre & Son Ltd v Soutar (n 41) at 177, emphasis added. 
310 Ibid. 
311 Gemmill’s Trustees v Alexander Cross & Sons Ltd (1906) 14 SLT 576. 
312 Blair v Springfield Stores Ltd (n 218). 
313 Boston (n 271) at 631-639. 
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the rule opens up a possibility of compensation where the rules of negligence would 
offer none: the victim can recover damages even if reasonable care has been taken. If 
it has not, then it is for the victim to assess the best strategy, according to the 
information available. 
This limit can be seen also as problematic for the defender, forcing him to 
shoot his own foot: he cannot challenge the applicability of the rule because it would 
require him to acknowledge that risk was controllable through due care. One of the 
Scottish cases that discussed the rule noticed the paradox:  
 
[O]nce [the defender] argues that [the substance] will not cause harm if handled with 
reasonable care and it is proved that in fact it has caused harm here, it follows, I think, that 
they must concede lack of reasonable care.314 
 
In other words, in order to challenge effectively the application of the rule, the 
defender will not only have to aver that the risk was controllable by due care, but also 
that he employed such care, and that harm happened because due care still left a 
margin of risk not big enough to be abnormally dangerous, which in fact 
materialised. The strategy is complex and perhaps too risky. But this does not mean 
that the defender is out of defences: he can always challenge the application of the 
rule through the other elements, i.e. questioning the level of risk that the conduct 
creates, or relying on its “common usage” nature if that is the case, as will be 
discussed below. 
In sum, the limit is effective in restricting the strict liability rule to cases where 
diligence is incapable of controlling the risk and, though burdensome on the parties, 
it seems to be equally demanding on both of them. For the rest of the cases, the 
normal rules of negligence apply, where substantive and evidentiary elements will aid 
the victim who has been exposed to a high risk. 
 
4.3.2. Common usage and social value 
 
                                                
 
 
314 D McIntyre & Son Ltd v Soutar (n 41) at 118. 
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The second element that is relevant in determining the abnormal character of a 
danger is the nature of the conduct which causes it, particularly whether it is one of 
common usage and whether it is one of a high social utility. These elements are not 
uncontroversial. 
The element of common usage is key in the Rest (3d) definition of an 
abnormally dangerous activity (§ 20 (b)(2)): if an activity can be qualified as of 
common usage, it excludes the application of the strict liability rule.315 The notion of 
common usage is seen as the heir of the “natural use” notion from Rylands.316 The 
same approach is adopted by article 5:101(2)(b) PETL.317 
This exclusion is generally justified by the reciprocity of risk:318  
 
[A] victim has a right to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and different in 
order from those created by the victim and imposed on the defendant – in short, for injuries 
resulting from nonreciprocal risks. Cases of liability are those in which the defendant generates 
a disproportionate, excessive risk of harm, relative to the victim’s risk-creating activity.319 
 
As a consequence, strict liability would only be justified when the risk imposed on the 
victims can be characterised as non-reciprocal. The notion, however, has been 
criticised, not only because of the difficulty of distinguishing between reciprocal and 
non-reciprocal risks,320 but because it excludes activities the benefits of which are 
widely spread.321 In this sense, perhaps a better justification for the common usage 
exclusion lies not on the distribution of risks but on the distribution of benefits, i.e. 
whether the benefit derived from the conduct is shared by the whole community or, 
at least, the class of potential victims.322 Consequently, a strict liability rule would 
only be justified for conducts that impose widespread risks rendering benefits that are 
                                                
 
 
315 In contrast with its role in the Rest (2d), where it was only one of the many elements that could be 
taken into account: § 520. 
316 Rest (3d) § 20 comment j. 
317 See the text at p 171 above. 
318 See Rest (3d) § 20 comment j and reporters’ note to comment j. 
319 G P Fletcher, “Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory” (1972) 85 HarvLR 537 at 542. See also J L 
Coleman, “Moral Theories of Torts: their Scope and Limits: Part I” in M D Bayles and B Chapman 
(eds), Justice, Rights and Tort Law (1983) at 60-61; and more recently K W Simons, “The Restatement 
Third of Torts and Traditional Strict Liability: Robust Rationales, Slender Doctrines” (2009) 44 Wake 
Forest LR 1355 at 1362. 
320 Gerhart (n 300) 153. 
321 Epstein (n 228) at 349. 
322 Simons (n 319) at 1364. 
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concentrated only in a few.323 Thus, it should exclude not only activities widely 
carried out by a significant part of a community, but also those that despite being 
carried out by a limited number of people, produce benefits for a significant part of 
the community – or its entirety. These are not “abnormally” dangerous, in that they 
are not “outside of the bargain of those risks which must be accepted as part of group 
living in our society”.324 
Scottish authority points almost unequivocally to the restriction of the rule only 
to cases where the danger is not “common”, taking as a starting point the Rickards 
qualification to the Rylands rule.325 The restriction takes both forms enunciated 
above: it excludes activities that are ordinary and pervasive, like in the cases of 
Miller,326 Spiers v Newton-on-Ayr Gas Co,327 and M’Laughlan v Craig;328 or it excludes 
activities that render benefits that are widely distributed, like in Clarke v Glasgow Water 
Commissioners329 and in the Western Silver Fox Ranch case.330 
The notion of general or widespread benefits should be distinguished from the 
element of social value. The fact that a conduct has a high social value does not mean 
that this value is widely distributed; it does not turn it into a common usage in the 
sense explained above.  
The element of social value, formerly a relevant factor in the context of § 520 of 
the Rest (2d) was excluded from § 20 of the Rest (3d). And the elimination is justified: 
                                                
 
 
323 Büyüksagis and van Boom (n 279) at 1364. 
324 Stevens, Torts and Rights (n 277) 113. 
325 See n 28 above. 
326 Miller v Robert Addie (n 8) at 154 per Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison: “the provision of coal gas in an 
ordinary service pipe […] is a familiar everyday use both in urban and in rural areas” (emphasis added). 
327 Spiers v Newton-on-Ayr Gas Co (n 83) at 236: a leak of gas will “involve liability only on proof of 
negligence [when it consists of an] escape from domestic apparatus installed for the comfort and convenience 
of ordinary life” (emphasis added). 
328 M’Laughlan v Craig (n 69) at 611 per Lord President Cooper: “the introduction into dwelling-houses 
of a domestic gas or electricity supply has not only been the invariable practice in urban Scotland for 
generations but has long been obligatory under aedilic regulations and housing statutes” (emphasis 
added). 
329 Clarke v Glasgow Water Commissioners (n 82) at 15: “The law laid down in Rylands v Fletcher […] relates 
to private individuals storing water or other dangerous elements on their own land for their own 
private purposes. […] But in the case of a public body who carry on a public undertaking for behoof of 
the whole community […] the same principle does not apply” (emphasis added). 
330 Western Silver Fox Ranch (n 68) at 605: “the detonation of a considerable quantity of high explosive is, 
in a different category altogether from the provision of water or gas in houses for the benefit of the general 
community. The use of high explosives benefits a section only of the community, and not the whole 
community or substantially the whole community” (emphasis added). 
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there is an underlying assumption that activities that are subject to the strict liability 
rule are, indeed, socially desirable.331 This is, precisely, the reason why these activities 
are tolerated,332 even though they create an abnormal danger, instead of being 
prohibited. But the fact that they create social benefits does not justify the assumption 
of the costs by random victims.333 In contrast with the element of common usage, 
Scots courts have not ruled out the application of the rule purely on the basis of the 
social utility of a particular conduct. 
 
4.4. The knowledge required on the part of the defender 
 
It is proposed that the risk and its magnitude must have been known or at least 
reasonably expected to be known by the defender at the time he carries out the 
conduct that creates it. Therefore, it is not relevant whether he actually knew; it suffices 
that he could have known according to the information available at the time he 
engaged in the conduct and the research that can reasonably be expected from a 
person engaging in such conduct. This entails reading Chalmers v Dixon with a 
qualification: even though it is submitted that knowledge of the danger is irrelevant, 
because he who “brings new materials upon his land is bound to know the nature of 
these materials”,334 the irrelevance must be understood as referring to actual 
knowledge. What he is bound to know must be limited by what he could have known 
and was expected to know.335 
The purpose of this requirement is to enable the defender to make a reasoned 
decision about his engagement in the activity and, at the same time, to avoid 
paralysis of activities that might be socially useful. The strict liability rule advanced 
here entails that there is a certain level of risk that the defender is willing to accept 
and, in economic terms, internalise in this activity. Permitting this assessment to be 
altered ex post by information that was not reasonably discoverable at the relevant 
                                                
 
 
331 Boston (n 271) at 624. 
332 F Werro and E Büyüksagis, “The Bounds Between Negligence and Strict Liability” in M Bussani 
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time could create a level of uncertainty that might jeopardise the development of 
economic activity, especially when it involves innovation. 
This requirement of actual or implied knowledge of the risk and its magnitude 
supposes that harm is foreseeable. There is no need for a separate requirement of 




Since the regime under discussion in this chapter has been identified as one of strict 
liability according to the features set out in chapter 1,336 then the delineation of the 
scope of application of such regime becomes fundamental. The present section 
proposed the relevant elements that should determine the boundaries of abnormally 
dangerous conduct attracting strict liability. The proposal, based upon the currently 
available authority and general principles of delictual liability can be summarised as 
follows: strict liability should apply only to conduct that: (i) creates a high risk of 
grave physical harm which risk remains even if reasonable precautions are adopted; 
(ii) is not the consequence of a common usage; and (iii) that is known or should be 
known by the person engaging in such conduct. 
 
5. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has sought to contribute to the discussion of conduct causing a special 
risk of abnormal damage as a special category of fault in the context of neighbour 
liability. An analysis of the category’s sources and subsequent case law and literature 
has shown that both the nature and scope of this category are in need for substantive 
clarification. It was argued here that, contrary to the orthodox view, the liability that 
this category attracts does not merely operate in practice like strict liability, but is 
indeed conceptually strict. This conclusion highlights the relevance of outlining more 
clearly the type of conduct to which this exceptional liability regime applies. 
Consequently, this chapter argued that this strict liability rule should apply to 
                                                
 
 
336 Chapter 1 section 3.2. 
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abnormally dangerous conduct, setting out and explaining the elements and 








Opening his chapter on “Water”, Rankine remarked that “[n]o part of the law of 
neighbourhood has given so many difficult and delicate questions as the law which 
relates to right in water”.1 The volume of litigation on the matter is a good 
illustration of the statement: a significant proportion of the decided Scots cases 
between neighbours throughout the nineteenth century involved a dispute about the 
use of water running through or present in their lands. Use of water was, of course, of 
critical importance for Scotland’s pre-industrial agricultural economy as well as for 
the industrialisation process in the second half of the nineteenth century. Litigation 
rates dropped by the turn of the century, probably due to the incidence of statutory 
regulation.2 But over the past three decades, water disputes have regained a 
prominent position in the neighbourhood context, disputes that are mostly derived 
from the harmful consequences of larger-scale construction projects, including public 
works. The types of uses complained of are varied and include activities that 
contaminate a stream or loch, consumption of water naturally present on the land, 
alterations of the bed of a river, construction and operation of dams. 
Disputes over uses of water, even if only involving private water rights, carry 
with them a public dimension, of which the most obvious aspects are public health 
and environmental protection. These concerns were historically addressed in the 
framework of common law and local regulations.3 Industrialisation in Britain, 
however, created unprecedented pollution problems for which common law was 
insufficient as a control tool.4 Provisions aimed at controlling water pollution can be 
                                                
 
 
1 Rankine, Land-Ownership 511. 
2 See p 180 below. 
3 See, e.g. Magistrates of Inverness v Skinners of Inverness (1804) Mor 13191, making reference to local 
council acts. An old (1606) Scottish Parliament statute dealing with the issue is identified by Ferguson 
as exceptional: J Ferguson, The Law of Water and Water Rights in Scotland (1907) 369. 
4 M Lobban, “Tort Law, Regulation and River Pollution: The Rivers Pollution Prevention Act and its 
Implementation, 1876-1951” in TT Arvind and J Steele (eds), Tort Law and the Legislature Common Law, 
Statute and the Dynamics of Legal Change (2013) at 329. 
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found in several nineteenth century statutes.5 The first special act to restrain such 
pollution was passed in 1876,6 leading to a succession of statutory regulations 
directed specifically to this end throughout the twentieth century up to the present 
day.7 
Specific uses of water have similarly been regulated by statutes in an attempt to 
protect diverse interests of public relevance. This is the case for activities such as 
drainage,8 management of watercourses and embankments,9 irrigation,10 
construction and management of reservoirs,11 and abstraction of water.12 
This extensive regulation possibly accounts for the decrease in litigation rates 
over the twentieth century. Nonetheless, common law retains a fundamental role, 
particularly in deciding reparation claims, for which most statutes do not provide 
special rules. The basis of liability in these claims, as in other types of disputes 
between neighbours, has not always been entirely clear. On the one hand, the 
categorisation of disputes over uses of water has evolved, leading to the current 
standard position of categorising them as nuisances. On the other hand, the liability 
rules applicable to the categories within which water disputes have been adjudicated 
have themselves evolved, shifting from seemingly strict liability to – at least general – 
fault-based liability rules. 
This chapter argues that, currently, damages claims arising from water disputes 
follow consistently the general frameworks of liability for nuisance and abnormally 
dangerous conduct outlined in chapters 2 and 3. As a general rule reparation claims 
depend on the averment and proof of fault (section 2). Yet when a use of water 
                                                
 
 
5 Ferguson (n 3) points out statutes regulating fishing, public undertakings, public health and burgh 
police (370-376), and water supply (394) all containing provisions designed to control and prevent 
pollution of water. 
6 Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876. See J C C Broun, The Law of Nuisance in Scotland (1891) 169. 
7 Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) (Scotland) Act 1951; Control of Pollution Act 1974; Environment 
Act 1995; Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003. See Gordon & Wortley, Land 
Law §§ 6-41 to 6-51 for an overview of the evolution of this statutory regulation. 
8 Drainage of Lands Act 1847; Land Drainage (Scotland) Act 1930; Land Drainage (Scotland) Act 
1941; Land Drainage (Scotland) Act 1958; Flood Prevention and Land Drainage (Scotland) Act 1997; 
Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act 2009 
9 Flood Prevention (Scotland) Act 1961; Flood Prevention and Land Drainage (Scotland) Act 1997; 
Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act 2009. 
10 Spray Irrigation (Scotland) Act 1964; Natural Heritage (Scotland) Act 1991; Water Environment 
(Consequential and Savings Provisions) (Scotland) Order 2006. 
11 Reservoirs Act 1975; Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act 2009; Reservoirs (Scotland) Act 2011. 
12 Water (Scotland) Act 1980; Water Resources (Scotland) Act 2013. 
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creates a risk that reaches the relevant level, liability follows the special regime 
provided for abnormally dangerous conduct, that is, a strict liability rule. 
Accordingly, despite the dissenting voices raised recently, the traditional reading of 
the Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corp13 case is correct: it provides for a strict 
liability rule in the case of an alteration of the natural course of a water stream, 
though not because it interferes with riparian rights, as traditionally stated, but 
because it creates the level of risk that justifies the imposition of such rule, and insofar 
as it creates such level of risk. It follows, therefore, that not only the alteration of a 
watercourse, but in fact any operation involving water that creates the relevant level 
of risk, is subject to this rule (section 3). 
This chapter is limited to uses of water naturally running through or present in 
the parties’ land. Artificial channels, on the one hand, stand in a different position 
from natural streams, in that the rights of the parties are normally determined by 
reference to the terms under which they make use of the channel and the water 
running in it.14 On the other hand, the artificial introduction of water into land and 
buildings through, e.g., pipes has generated a significant amount of litigation, yet it 
does not require the particular accommodation that is needed for uses of water as a 
natural resource, and indeed is not different from the artificial introduction of other 
elements, such as gas or electricity. 
 
2. THE GENERAL RULE: FAULT-BASED LIABILITY 
 
Damages claims for harm caused by uses of water are mostly of one of two types. In 
the first type, pursuers seek reparation for the harm sustained as a consequence of 
pollution of water, i.e. an interference with the “quality” of water. The harm 
complained of is normally of one of two classes: physical damage to property or 
economic loss.15 In the second and certainly the most common type of claim, 
pursuers seek reparation for the harm caused by an activity or operation carried out 
                                                
 
 
13 Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corp 1917 SC (HL) 56. 
14 See, e.g. Irving v Leadhills Mining Co (1856) 18 D 833; Heggie v Nairns (1882) 9 R 704; and Strachan v City 
of Aberdeen (1905) 12 SLT 725. 
15 In a limited amount of cases, the defender claimed both types of injury: see e.g. Collins v Hamilton 
(1837) 15 S 895 and Young & Co v Bankier Distillery Co (1893) 20 R (HL) 76. 
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by the pursuer that alters or interferes with the natural flow of water, either a defined 
watercourse or surface water. The class of harm in this type of claim is normally 
physical damage sustained by property as a consequence of the mechanical action of 
water, though economic loss derived from the permanent diversion of a stream has 
also been claimed.16 
In modern Scots law, these disputes have been categorised in three different 
ways: as belonging to the doctrine of common interest; to the law of nuisance; or to 
no specific category, especially in a few nineteenth century cases where physical 
injury was the harm sought to be repaired, and where decisions relied on the more 
general notion of “wrong”. The particular case of damage caused by operations of 
drainage of surface water, however, has remained a separate category, except when 
the complaint is about pollution of such water. 
The argument presented here is straightforward: one can question whether the 
categorisation of certain disputes is correct, and one can even question whether the 
liability rule associated with each of these categories is adequate, but the inevitable 
conclusion as to the basis of liability in the current taxonomy is that liability is fault-
based. Over the last thirty years, disputes over uses of water have been consistently 
categorised as nuisances,17 and during the same period, liability for nuisance has 
been considered fault-based on the authority of RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v 
Strathclyde Regional Council18 and Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd.19 Drainage of surface water, 
despite having survived so far the expansive trend of nuisance, makes no exception 
regarding the applicable rule, which remains in line with the fault-based liability rule 
associated with nuisance. Each of these categorisations and their respective liability 





                                                
 
 
16 Hood v Williamsons (1861) 23 D 496. 
17 See section 2.2.1 below. 
18 RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17. 
19 Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95. 
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2.1. Water uses as breaches of common interest 
 
2.1.1. The doctrine of common interest 
 
Highlighting its vulnerability to interference, Reid pointed out that “[i]n the use and 
enjoyment of […] running water naturally present within his boundaries, a 
proprietor is peculiarly at the mercy of his neighbour”.20 Running water creates a 
situation where a landowner, in using and enjoying his property can quite easily 
affect in a substantial manner his neighbour’s use and enjoyment of his own, and, at 
the same time, the former is susceptible to the same substantial interference by the 
latter’s use and enjoyment. These remarks can be extended to “standing” water: 
landowners surrounding a loch can equally, though perhaps less easily, interfere with 
each other’s enjoyment of property. Given the particular nature of water, the law of 
property developed a special doctrine that seeks to regulate private – and especially 
conflicting – uses of water: the doctrine of common interest. “Common interest, […] 
is applied to that right arising from mutual interest in a subject which, although not 
amounting to common property, vests the parties interested with certain rights which 
they may legally vindicate”.21 Consequently, it creates a network of reciprocal rights 
and obligations, positive and negative, whereby the parties interested in the same 
subject can restrict each other’s use and enjoyment of property in order to protect 
their own. The doctrine, in Reid’s view, has four main characteristics: “(1) [it] is a 
type of real condition; (2) it is found only where required by the physical proximity of 
benefited and burdened property; (3) it is ‘tacit’, arising automatically by operation of 
law; and (4) finally, […] it is ‘open-textured’”.22 It applies primarily to two types of 
subject: water and tenements.23 
The relevant aspects of its application in the context of tenements, specifically 
to withdrawal of support disputes, are discussed in chapter 5.24 In turn, a recent work 
has addressed in detail the history and content of the doctrine as applicable to 
                                                
 
 
20 Reid, Property § 282. 
21 G Watson (ed), Bell’s Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland (7th edn, 2012) 204. 
22 K G C Reid, “Common Interest. A Reassessment” (1983) 28 JLSS 428 at 429. 
23 See Reid, Property §§ 232-239, 282-290 and 307. For other subjects, see ibid (n 22) at 431. 
24 See chapter 5 sections 2.1.5 and 2.1.6. 
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water,25 so such aspects will not be revisited here, except for some points that are 
relevant for the topic under discussion, particularly for the types of cases that most 
commonly give rise to damages claims. 
The key aspects of this doctrine in their most common application, i.e. the case 
of running water,26 are contained in what has been described as “the most important 
single contribution to the development of the law of riparian rights”:27 Lord Neaves’ 
speech in the 1864 Inner House decision in Bicket v Morris,28 where two opposite 
riparian proprietors held a dispute about certain building operations performed by 
the defender on his half of the bed. Lord Neaves, in describing “the protection of the 
natural flow”,29 distinguished between the rights of successive proprietors and the 
rights of opposite proprietors. As to the former, he explained that 
 
An upper heritor, after enjoying the use of the water which passes through his lands, has 
nothing more to do with it, unless some operation below shall operate to his prejudice by 
making it regorge, or stagnate, or decrease in velocity or freedom of flow within his property. A 
lower heritor has this interest in the stream, that in passing through the lands of others it shall be 
transmitted to him undiminished in quantity, unpolluted in quality, and unaffected in force and natural direction 
and current, except in so far as the primary uses of it may legitimately operate upon it within the lands of the 
upper heritor.30 
 
With regard to opposite proprietors, after delimitating ownership over the bed or 
alveus of the river, he added that 
 
besides this ordinary right of property […] they have a common interest arising from another 
right, as they have each a right in the water, not of property -for certainly aqua profluens is not 
the subject of property as long as it is running. […] But each heritor, as it passes, has a right of 
an incorporeal kind to the usufruct of that stream for domestic purposes and for agricultural 
purposes, and, it may, be also for other purposes, subject to certain restrictions. This right in 
the general current of the stream gives him an interest in the whole of the alveus, and for this 
obvious reason, that no operation can, by the nature of things, be performed upon one half of 
the alveus, that shall not affect the flow of the water in the whole. […] Now the common 
interest, therefore, amounts to a right of preventing anything that shall palpably affect the water…31 
 
                                                
 
 
25 J Robbie, Private Water Rights (2015), ch 5-7. 
26 For its application to lochs, see ibid §§ 6.56-6.58. 
27 Reid, Property § 282. 
28 Morris v Bicket (1864) 2 M 1082 at 1092-1093, affirmed by the House of Lords: Bicket v Morris (1866) 4 
M (HL) 44. 
29 Robbie (n 25) §§ 7.33-7.35. 
30 Morris v Bicket (n 28) at 1092, emphasis added. 
31 Ibid at 1092-1093, emphasis added. 
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Many of the cases discussed in this chapter could be characterised as a breach of 
common interest. Certainly cases where a lower riparian owner claims to have 
suffered economic harm or damage to his property as a consequence of the pollution 
of a stream could fall within the emphasised section of the first paragraph transcribed 
above, in that water is allegedly not being transmitted “unpolluted in quality”. Yet, as 
will be explained, damages claims of this type are rarely framed in those terms and 
they do not fit the typical opposition between primary and secondary uses that 
prevails in interdict cases.32 
More problematic are cases where the pursuer claims to have suffered physical 
damage to his property as a consequence of the action of water resulting from the 
defender’s operations on the stream. An alteration or interference with the course of 
a stream might constitute a breach of common interest in the case of both successive 
and opposite riparian owners, as highlighted by the emphasised sections of the 
paragraphs transcribed above. Yet some cases cannot be analysed in these terms 
simply because the pursuer is not a riparian owner. Certainly his property can be 
affected by the operations that a riparian owner has developed altering the natural 
flow of the stream, normally causing a flood. But as a neighbouring proprietor whose 
land is not adjacent to such watercourse, it is not possible to assert that he had 
common interest rights that entitled him to have that flow protected. 
This was the case, for instance, in MacFarlane v Lowis33 and Pirie and Sons v 
Magistrates of Aberdeen.34 Most notably, the pursuer in the now controversial35 leading 
case of Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corp36 was not a riparian owner: the burn ran 
through the defenders’ land and as a consequence of their operations, altering the 
burn’s natural channel, it became incapable of dealing with a heavy rainfall, causing 
a flood. The water reached a road that was at the lowest level of the land, and flowed 
down this road to reach the pursuers’ property. In this type of cases, the doctrine of 
common interest cannot provide a basis for liability. 
                                                
 
 
32 See p 186 below. 
33 Macfarlane v Lowis (1857) 19 D 1038. 
34 Pirie and Sons v Magistrates of Aberdeen (1871) 9 M 412. 
35 The case is the centre of the discussion in section 3 below. 
36 Caledonian Rly Co v Greenock Corp (n 13). 
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In any event, even for those situations where defender and pursuer are both 
riparian owners, damages claims have not in practice been based upon common 
interest,37 as with pollution cases. 
 
2.1.2. The basis of liability for breach of common interest 
 
The affected riparian owner, in enforcing common interest rights, can claim damages 
as one of the available remedies.38 In practice, however, common interest is rarely 
enforced in this way. As Robbie points out, damages claims were infrequent in the 
early case law,39 and the picture is similar in modern law: of the damages claims 
associated with uses of water, very few are actually based upon the infringement of 
common interest rights. This hinders any conclusive statement about the basis of 
liability. The doctrine of common interest in the context of water seems to have been 
used mainly as a tool to stop or prevent certain uses of water rather than to deal with 
their aftermath. 
This is clearly reflected in the foundation for damages claims arising from 
damage caused by the alteration of watercourses: they are not based on common 
interest, and this was the case even after the law was clarified by Morris v Bicket, which 
undoubtedly considered this type of operation as a breach. To an extent, this is 
consistent with the core object of the doctrine and the reason why it developed: the 
natural flow is protected primarily in order to make sure that all riparian owners can 
make full – or the fullest possible – use of the water.40 Cases where physical harm of 
property is alleged depart from this logic, and this might be the reason why the 
doctrine is not invoked in them. 
As to cases of water pollution, the few modern damages claims are not now 
concerned with the destruction of the primary (i.e. domestic) purposes of water, but 
mostly with competing uses for manufacturing purposes in streams or rivers where 
primary purposes are either already destroyed or not affected whatsoever, making the 
                                                
 
 
37 See below. 
38 Reid, Property § 290; Robbie (n 25) § 7.93-7.95. 
39 Robbie (n 25) § 7.93. 
40 See p 183 above. 
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question of increase of pollution the key in determining whether common interest has 
been breached. The case of Collins v Hamilton translated this question into whether 
there was a nuisance,41 a perspective that is discussed below.42 In Ewen v Turnbull’s 
Trs, in turn, the discussion concentrated on the form of the issue – whether it should 
include the contribution of other tenants higher up the stream – and other 
contractual aspects. The issue approved included the term “wrongfully”, which, as 
will be explained below, is a reference not necessarily indicative of the basis of 
liability,43 and the point is not discussed further in the case. 
The leading House of Lords case of Young & Co v Bankier Distillery Co44 is a 
peculiar one, in that the quality of the water of the river was affected in a very 
specific way by the water discharged from the defender’s mineral works: primary 
purposes were preserved, but the water was rendered harder and, therefore, not 
suitable for distillery purposes. It could hardly be said that there was a material 
increase of pollution, if there was any pollution at all.45 Yet the court found for the 
pursuer. The case, however, is criticised for not really reflecting a strict common 
interest approach to riparian owner’s rights.46 Moreover, the infringement of 
common interest in the case seems to have been determined not only by the 
alteration of this very special quality of the water, but also by the fact that the 
defenders were artificially introducing water to the stream, altering not only its 
quality but also its quantity.47 The House of Lords confirmed the award of damages 
for the injury caused to the pursuer’s machines, but reference to or discussion of any 
fault on the part of the defender are absent both from the Court of Session’s and the 
House of Lords’ decisions, suggesting that liability for infringing common interest 
might be strict. 
                                                
 
 
41 Collins v Hamilton (n 15) at 902 per Lord Cockburn. 
42 See section 2.2.1. 
43 See section 2.3.2. 
44 Young & Co v Bankier Distillery Co (n 15). 
45 Commenting on the case, Rankine equated the introduction of water that destroys an established 
manufactory purpose to the introduction of a chemical substance that alters the natural quality of the 
water: Rankine, Land-Ownership 563. 
46 Robbie (n 25) § 7.17. See, however, a case note published at the time, defending the correctness of 
the decision based on the irrelevance of the preservation of primary uses when the defender’s activity 
is not itself a primary use: J C C Broun, “Bankier Distillery Co v John Young & Co (Note)” (1894) 6 JR 85 
at 86. 
47 Reid, Property § 286. 
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Pointing in the opposite direction, the defenders were considered not to be 
liable for the economic loss caused to the pursuer’s paper mill business in the case of 
Edinburgh and District Water Trs v Sommerville & Son Ltd precisely because no negligence 
could be attributed to them.48 
There is a further damages case that was argued on the basis of common 
interest, but does not fit the two main groups of cases here identified: Hood v 
Williamsons.49 The case was one of consumption of water for cattle watering purposes 
(primary use) on the part of the defender, depriving the pursuer’s mill of water power 
and the ability to thrash a year’s crop of grain. Yet this case does not provide any 
assistance because the defender was not found liable, as he was entitled to consume 
the water for primary purposes and there was no proof he had done otherwise. No 
discussion can be found in the decision about the defender’s potential liability if, for 
instance, he had consumed the water for secondary purposes, or wasted the water not 
consumed for primary purposes. 
Consequently, damages claims based on the doctrine of common interest, apart 
from being exceptional, do not provide a clear picture of the basis of such liability. At 
one time, the position seemed to be that liability was strict.50 Nevertheless, the 
common position nowadays is that liability for infringement of common interest is 
fault-based,51 according to the Inner House decision in Thomson v St Cuthbert’s 
Cooperative Association Ltd52 and further Sheriff Court authority following this 
decision.53 These cases, admittedly, were concerned with the infringement of 
common interest in the context of withdrawal of support in tenements. It has been 
questioned whether the case of Thomson was correctly decided,54 and the idea that 
                                                
 
 
48 Edinburgh and District Water Trustees v Sommerville & Son Ltd (1906) 8 F (HL) 25, esp at 31 per Lord 
Macnaghten, which is altogether surprising when contrasted with his earlier opinion in Young & Co v 
Bankier Distillery Co (n 15) at 78, where no reference to any fault can be found. 
49 Hood v Williamsons (n 16). 
50 Law Reform Committee for Scotland, Thirteenth Report: The Law relating to Civil Liability for Loss, Injury 
and Damage caused by Dangerous Agencies Escaping from Land (1964) §§ 7 and 16. 
51 Reid, Property § 366; Robbie (n 25) § 7.94. 
52 Thomson v St Cuthbert’s Cooperative Association Ltd 1958 SC 380 
53 Kerr v McGreevy 1970 SLT (Sh Ct) 7; Doran v Smith 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 46. 
54 Reid (n 22) at 434. 
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fault-based liability would deprive the doctrine of common interest from any content 
with regard to liability still resonates.55 These aspects are discussed in chapter 5.56 
 
2.2. Water uses as nuisances 
 
2.2.1. Water disputes as nuisances: an evolution 
 
From the two main types of cases identified above, water pollution cases were the 
first to be treated as nuisances, in the late eighteenth century. As Whitty points out, 
“[t]he intrusion of nuisance into the domain of water rights in Scotland begins with 
the two distillery cases of 1791”.57 These are the cases of Miller v Stein58 and Russell v 
Haig,59 where the defenders in both cases were interdicted from discharging the 
refuse originated by their distilleries into the streams running through the respective 
pursuers’ lands, on the basis that such discharge constituted a nuisance insofar as it 
destroyed the stream’s primary uses. 
Thereafter, most cases of water pollution throughout the nineteenth century 
consistently followed this pattern: they were disputes between neighbours making 
competing uses of water, where one sought to interdict the other’s use, alleging that it 
was a nuisance, either because it destroyed some uses of the water – normally 
primary uses – or it affected the amenity of the land. The very few cases of damages 
claims based upon pollution of water, however, were not consistently treated as 
nuisances until the early twentieth century,60 and even since then it is possible to find 
occasional exceptions.61 
Alterations of or interferences with the natural course of a stream did not enter 
the realm of nuisance until later in the twentieth century, with the case of Gourock 
                                                
 
 
55 Robbie (n 25) § 7.94. 
56 See p 234 below. 
57 N R Whitty, “Water Law Regimes” in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in 
Scotland, vol 1 (2000) at 465. 
58 Miller v Stein (1791) Mor 12823. 
59 Russell v Haig (1791) Mor 12823. 
60 From the case of Fleming v Gemmill 1908 SC 340 onwards. 
61 See East Lothian Angling Association v Haddington Town Council 1980 SLT 213 and the more recent case 
of Southesk Trust Co Ltd & Elsick Farms Ltd v Angus Council [2006] CSOH 6. 
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Ropework Co Ltd v Greenock Corp,62 but virtually no exceptions can be found since that 
time. The consequence of this incorporation is that these disputes are now governed 
by two sets of previous case law: cases that fit their factual pattern but were not, at 
their time, considered to be nuisances; and cases that qualify as nuisances in its more 
traditional sense, where no physical harm to property is caused. 
 
2.2.2. The basis of liability in nuisance 
 
The conceptual treatment of water disputes as nuisances brings with it the 
application of the nuisance liability rule. 
The issue of the basis of liability in nuisance and the difficulties that it has 
created have been discussed in chapter 2, so the particulars are not revisited here. It 
is nowadays accepted that liability in nuisance is fault-based according to the House 
of Lords decision in the leading case of RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional 
Council.63 But before this decision, the matter was not settled and there was indeed 
authority pointing towards a rule of strict liability. 
After RHM Bakeries, the case of Argyll and Clyde Health Board v Strathclyde Regional 
Council highlighted the need to clarify what amounted, in this context, to an averment 
of fault. In the case, the court pointed out that it was not enough to plead simply 
“fault” or “lack of care” to make a case relevant: it was necessary to specify facts from 
which a fault inference could be made.64 Further clarification, particularly as to the 
forms of fault that could be pleaded, came with the Inner House decision in Kennedy v 
Glenbelle Ltd: fault encompasses not only negligence, but also other forms of fault, 
ranging from malice to engaging in dangerous conduct.65 
This evolution is reflected in the way damages claims have been decided: if 
before RHM Bakeries it was possible to find some cases where, at least, the basis of 
liability was not clear,66 after this decision liability has been treated consistently as 
                                                
 
 
62 Gourock Ropework Co Ltd v Greenock Corp 1966 SLT 125. 
63 RHM Bakeries (n 18) at 39-45 per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton. 
64 Argyll & Clyde Health Board v Strathclyde Regional Council 1988 SLT 381 at 383. 
65 Kennedy (n 19) at 99-100 per Lord President Hope. 
66 See, e.g. Fleming v Gemmill (n 60) and Hanley v Edinburgh Magistrates 1913 SC (HL) 27. 
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fault-based.67 Moreover, between RHM Bakeries and Kennedy cases were based in 
negligence as the relevant form of fault, but after Kennedy, pursuers started exploring 
the other forms of fault offered, particularly recklessness and intention as knowledge 
of the certainty of harm.68 
 
2.3. Water uses as “wrongs” 
 
2.3.1. Fault and wrong 
 
A few nineteenth century cases were not categorised under the particular labels of 
nuisance or breach of common interest. Instead, they were discussed in light of the 
notion of “wrong”, that is, they addressed the question of whether there was a wrong 
or whether the defender had acted wrongfully, especially in cases where the harm 
complained of was physical damage to property.69 The implications of requiring 
wrongfulness70 or including wrongfulness in the issues,71 are not entirely clear, 
however. 
Unlike jurisdictions where a separate requirement of – objective – unlawfulness 
or wrongfulness must be fulfilled, such as German72 and South African law,73 Scots 
law does not feature a separate wrongfulness requirement. Some writers have sought 
to equate wrongfulness with fault. Hogg has argued that “for conduct to be wrongful 
it must exhibit fault on the part of the wrongdoer”.74 This seems to be in line with 
Guthrie Smith’s views: even though in the opening pages of his treatise he identified 
                                                
 
 
67 Nobles Trustee’s v Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd 1988 SLT 662; Hugh Blackwood (Farms) Ltd v Motherwell 
District Council 1988 GWD 30-1290; Logan v Wang (UK) Ltd 1991 SLT 580; G A Estates Ltd v Caviapen 
Trustees (No 1) 1993 SLT 1037; Anderson v White 2000 SLT 37; Summers v Crichton Unreported (1 
December 2000); Viewpoint Housing Association Ltd v City of Edinburgh Council 2007 SLT 772; [2007] 
CSOH 114; Black Loch Angling Club v Tarmac Ltd 2012 SCLR 501; and Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish 
Ministers 2015 GWD 7-134; [2015] CSOH 21. 
68 See Anderson (n 67) and Esso Petroleum Co Ltd (n 67). 
69 Samuel v Edinburgh & Glasgow Railway Co (1850) 13 D 312; Ewen v Turnbull’s Trustees (1857) 19 D 513; 
Macfarlane v Lowis (n 33) 
70 As in Samuel v Edinburgh & Glasgow Railway Co (n 69) at 313 per Lord Cockburn. 
71 As in Ewen v Turnbull’s Trustees (n 69) at 515; and Macfarlane v Lowis (n 33) at 1040. 
72 B S Markesinis and H Unberath, A Comparative Introduction to the German Law of Torts (2002) 79-83; K 
Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (T Weir tr, 3rd edn, 1998) 599. 
73 J C van der Walt and J R Midgley, Principles of Delict (3rd edn, 2005) § 103; J Neethling and J M 
Potgieter, Neethling - Potgieter - Visser Law of Delict (7th edn, 2006) ch 3. 
74 M Hogg, Obligations (2nd edn, 2006) §§ 3.04-3.05. 
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as a legal wrong any violation of the duty not to injure the rights of other members of 
society,75 later pages stated that the obligation of reparation arises from the illegality of 
an act, “and there can be no violation of the precept alterum non laede in any other 
way”.76 “An illegal act may be—1. An act directly contrary to the law (damnum 
directum dolosum). 2. An act legal in itself, but illegally done, i.e. through negligence or 
imprudence (damnum culposum)”.77 In other words, in looking for dole or culpa, he seems 
to contend that the violation of the duty is wrongful because there is fault. 
Other contemporary accounts advance a different answer, however, and one 
that is more in line with Guthrie Smith’s initial definition of a wrong. In Birks view, 
for instance, the key element of a wrong is the breach of a duty.78 But duties can be 
legally designed so that they might or might not require fault for their breach.79 As 
Stevens has pointed out in the exposition of his “rights model” of English tort law, 
“[j]ust as not all blameworthy conduct is wrongful, not all wrongful conduct is 
blameworthy”.80 
This view is consistent with contemporary Scottish accounts of delictual 
liability. For Walker, “wrongfulness consists solely in the actual or potential 
infringement of a legally protected interest vested in the complainer”,81 but 
subsequently remarked that the notion of “wrong” is unhelpful, and is not a 
requirement but actually a consequence of delictual conduct.82 In the particular 
context of nuisance, in turn, Whitty submitted more clearly that wrong is not the 
same as fault and “can exist independently of fault”.83 
Moreover, delictual remedies are awarded in Scotland, in some circumstances, 
for wrongs in the absence of fault. For instance, the key requirement of interdict is 
precisely a wrong done or threatened, and the remedy is indeed seen as one to stop 
                                                
 
 
75 Guthrie Smith, Reparation 2. 
76 Ibid 7. 
77 Ibid 8. 
78 P Birks, “The Concept of a Civil Wrong” in D G Owen (ed), The Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 
(1997) at 37, emphasis added. 
79 Ibid at 42. 
80 R Stevens, Torts and Rights (2007) 99. 
81 Walker, Delict 36. 
82 Ibid 37. 
83 Whitty, “Nuisance” (reissue) § 90. 
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or prevent wrongs,84 yet no fault is required. This is quite commonly seen in 
operation in nuisance cases.85 
The conclusion is that the notions of wrongfulness and wrong are unhelpful in 
shedding light upon the basis of liability, i.e. whether liability is fault-based or strict. 
 
2.3.2. The basis of liability for wrongs 
 
Consequently, the fact that the cases identified above required wrongfulness or 
included the notion of wrongfulness in the issue does not mean that in those cases 
liability was fault-based – nor strict. It is necessary to turn to other elements in the 
case to elucidate the basis of liability. There is, however, no identifiable pattern. 
In the case of Samuel v Edinburgh & Glasgow Railway Co the judges were sceptical 
towards liability based solely upon the occurrence of the flood damage, and directed 
that the issue should include inquiry as to the adequacy of the works instructed by the 
defenders.86 In Ewen v Turnbull’s Trs the main discussion focused on the materiality of 
the pollution87 and no reference to any aspect of fault was considered. Finally, the 
case of MacFarlane v Lowis does not contain a discussion of fault, though Lord 
President McNeill’s dictum seems to associate wrongfulness with the way in which 
the operations were performed, rather than their harmful result.88 
 
2.4. Drainage of surface water 
 
2.4.1. The right to drain surface water and the duty to receive it 
 
Avoiding the labels previously discussed, drainage of surface water remains to this 
day largely a separate category, with the exception of the case where the complaint is 
                                                
 
 
84 H Burn-Murdoch, Interdict in the Law of Scotland: with a Chapter on Specific Performance (1933) 1 and 86. 
85 See RHM Bakeries at 44 per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton. Whitty, however, argues that in these cases 
the interference is intentional, or at least becomes intentional when the defender finds out about the 
claim: Whitty, “Nuisance” (reissue) § 94. 
86 Samuel v Edinburgh & Glasgow Railway Co (n 69) at 315. 
87 Ewen v Turnbull’s Trustees (n 69) at 516 per Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis. 
88 Macfarlane v Lowis (n 33) at 1039-1040. 
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for pollution of such water, which is treated as a nuisance in line with other cases of 
pollution of water.89 
According to Reid, surface water is that “which arises in the course of nature, 
whether from the sky or from neighbouring land, and which then lies on the surface 
of land without occupying any definite channel”.90 The rights and duties associated 
with drainage of surface water are outlined by Erskine: 
 
Where two contiguous fields belong to different proprietors, one of which stands upon higher 
ground than the other, nature itself may be said to constitute a servitude on the inferior 
tenement, by which he is obliged to receive the water that falls from the superior. If the water 
which would otherwise fall from the higher grounds insensibly, without hurting the inferior 
tenement, should be collected into one body by the owner of the superior, in the natural use of 
his property, for draining his lands, or otherwise improving them, the owner of the inferior 
tenement is, without the positive constitution of any servitude, bound to receive that body of 
water on his property, though it should be endamaged by it. But as this right may be overstretched in 
the use of it, without necessity, to the prejudice of the inferior grounds, the question, How far it may be extended 
under particular circumstances? must be arbitrary.91 
 
Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis, commenting on this paragraph in the case of Campbell v 
Bryson, identified in the emphasised sentence the “proper qualification” of the 
doctrine:  
 
if the inferior heritor complains that the superior heritor is unduly pressing his right, and 
making the servitude intolerable to him, he will have the right to come to the Court with his 
complaint, and the Court will be entitled to regulate the matter between the two upon 
equitable terms.92 
 
These two formulations remain the main authority on the point93 and are cited in 
modern cases.94 It must be noted that this authority categorises the doctrine as a 
“natural” servitude, an inaccurate label according to the modern understanding and 
regulation of servitudes.95 
                                                
 
 
89 Hugh Blackwood (Farms) Ltd (n 67). 
90 Reid, Property § 340. 
91 Erskine, Institute 2.9.2, emphasis added. 
92 Campbell v Bryson (1864) 3 M 254 at 260. 
93 See Rankine, Land-Ownership 514; Reid, Property § 339; Gordon & Wortley, Land Law § 6-62). Other 
Institutional writers who address the point are less frequently cited as authority: Bankton, Institute 
2.7.30; and Bell, Principles §§ 968-969. 
94 Noble’s Trs (n 67) at 664; Logan (n 67) at 584. 
95 Reid, Property § 442. 
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Drainage operations can give place to two types of claims: the inferior 
proprietor’s claim that the operations performed by the superior are increasing the 
burden placed on him by law, or the superior proprietor’s claim that the operations 
performed by the inferior are preventing him from exercising his right to drain. The 
superior proprietor is not bound to drain the land; he is free to use the surface water 
present in his land, subject to the limitation of aemulatio vicini.96 There is authority to 
the effect that he is the owner of such water.97 Consequently, apart from operations 
in aemulationem, the inferior proprietor cannot raise a claim for being deprived of 
surface water that would have naturally flowed to his land. 
In both cases, the pursuer can ask for interdict and/or damages, and for both 
remedies the common requirement is the one identified by Erskine and Lord Justice-
Clerk Inglis: the right must have been overstretched or unduly pressed. The meaning 
of this requirement is not entirely clear, and the Lord Ordinary (Prosser) in the case 
of Logan v Wang attempted an explanation: 
 
[F]or a pursuer to succeed with such a claim, it would in my view be for him to aver and prove 
not merely that there have been damaging consequences from the development in question, 
and not merely that the consequences for him might be described as “intolerable”, but that the 
actions of the superior heritor are themselves open to criticism as being an undue pressing of 
his rights, “without necessity” in the sense of being unreasonable or gratuitous. It may indeed be that the 
actions must amount to actings in aemulationem vicini…98 
 
The dictum points to necessity and reasonableness of the operations as the criteria to 
determine whether the right is overstretched or unduly pressed. The requirement for 
actings to be in aemulationem, however, renders the success of most claims impossible: 
the standard is “unduly high”.99 Moreover, aemulatio can be seen in itself as a form of 
fault (i.e. by definition requiring malice),100 rendering any further requirement of 
fault superfluous. Yet, as explained below, fault is required for damages claims as a 
separate requirement. 
 
                                                
 
 
96 Ibid § 338. 
97 Crichton v Turnbull 1946 SC 52, though Gordon & Wortley, Land Law § 6-61 point out that this 
solution is criticised. 
98 Logan (n 67) at 584, emphasis added. 
99 Reid, Property § 340 n 12. 
100 See chapter 2 section 3. 
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2.4.2. The basis of liability for drainage of surface water 
 
In the first type of claim, namely where the inferior proprietor argues that the 
operations performed by the superior proprietor in draining his land are causing him 
damage, modern case law has clearly identified fault as a separate requirement from 
that of undue pressing of the right. 
The point is discussed in Noble’s Trustees v Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd.101 
According to the Lord Ordinary (Jauncey), Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis’ explanation of 
Erskine’s formulation in Campbell v Bryson – acknowledging the affected landowner’s 
right to come to the court with the complaint – did not mean necessarily that the 
defender would be held liable to pay damages. There was, in his view, no reason to 
differentiate for these purposes between nuisance and this “servitude”, so fault should 
be required if the remedy sought by the pursuer is damages.102 It can be observed 
that the Lord Ordinary maintained the category of drainage of surface water 
separate from nuisance, despite treating them as equivalent regarding the basis of 
liability. 
The judgment in Logan v Wang simply confirmed the requirement of fault by 
reference to Noble’s Trs,103 as the key discussion in the case was about the other 
requirement of the claim. Yet there is one noteworthy aspect: in confirming the 
requirement of fault, the Lord Ordinary (Prosser) referred also to RHM Bakeries as 
authority. This reference raises the question whether he considered the nuisance rule 
to be applicable to the case and, more generally, whether the category of surface 
water will be able to resist the expansion of nuisance. The reference, however, might 
be justified given that Lord Jauncey in Noble’s Trs also cited RHM Bakeries as 
authority.104 But the reference in Noble’s Trs was intended to substantiate a different 
point: it sought to highlight RHM Bakeries’ reference, in turn, to the English case 
Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan105 as authority for the proposition that interdict and 
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damages can have different requirements, making it possible to require fault for the 
latter without doing so for the former. 
As to the second type of claim, namely where the superior proprietor holds that 
the operations performed by the inferior proprietor are preventing him from 
exercising the right to drain the surface water, there is no clear authority. In Plean 
Precast Ltd v National Coal Board,106 this claim was made, and the defender was held 
strictly liable. Yet the case was not treated as an infringement of the right to drain 
surface water, but rather as a case of alteration of a natural (defined) watercourse: the 
surface water drained into a natural stream, and this stream was culverted and 
diverted.107  
There seems to be no reason to differentiate between the claim raised by the 
inferior proprietor and that of the superior heritor with regard to the rights under 
analysis and, given that the decision in Plean Precast Ltd was based on rules applicable 
to a different factual setting, there is no authority supporting a departure from the 
general fault-based liability rules. Extending the argument advanced in Noble’s Trs, 
there are no reasons to treat nuisance and this case differently. 
 
2.5. Overview: convergence of liability rules. 
 
The analysis developed so far brings out, in the first place, the issue of the relation 
between nuisance and the doctrine of common interest.  
Whitty points out that “[s]everal commentators treat pollution of streams as 
part of nuisance, so that alteration of flow infringes common interest whereas 
deterioration of quality is nuisance”,108 but then holds that the relation is better 
described as one of overlap, where common interest is reserved only for riparian 
owners whereas nuisance would protect owners that do not hold such status.109 
Within the area of overlap, there is a contrast between the respective applicable 
rules. It is believed that the plus quam tolerabile test from nuisance might provide a 
                                                
 
 
106 Plean Precast Ltd v National Coal Board 1985 SC 77. 
107 The case is discussed below: see section 3.1. 
108 Whitty (n 57) at 460-461, references omitted. 
109 Ibid at 461 n 389. 
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more flexible standard than the primary/secondary uses distinction from common 
interest,110 but setting the threshold of liability at a higher level, with the consequence 
that relief that is not available under nuisance might be so under common interest.111 
The support for this contention is scant, though the case of Young & Co v Bankier 
Distillery Co112 seems to lend some support: in terms of the law of nuisance, the case 
would likely have failed due to the hypersensitivity of the particular activity carried 
out by the pursuer (whisky distilling). It is doubtful, however, that the case was 
correctly decided under the rules of common interest,113 leaving the contention 
rather unsupported. 
Nevertheless, whatever the relation between the two doctrines, it does not make 
a difference with regard to the basis of liability. These doctrines have evolved to 
reach a convergence: both under nuisance and under common interest, liability is 
nowadays, at least as a general rule, fault-based, whatever the criticism of this rule in 
each realm. Consequently, from the perspective of the requirement of fault, it does 
not make a difference which is cited as the basis of the claim. 
The only possible difference would be determined by the scope of application 
of Kennedy. If Kennedy is to be regarded of general application, beyond the realm of 
nuisance – which seems to be implied in the wording of Lord President Hope’s 
dictum114 – then the conclusion is that it makes no difference to invoke one or the 
other doctrine. If, on the other hand, Kennedy is restricted to nuisance only – which so 
far has been its only field of application in practice115 – it might actually be easier to 
obtain damages under this doctrine in its current state. As argued in chapter 2, the 
way in which the Kennedy model has been understood leads to the conclusion that 
liability based on recklessness or on intention as knowledge comes very close to strict 
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111 Reid, Property § 299; Robbie (n 25) § 7.58. 
112 Young & Co v Bankier Distillery Co (n 15). 
113 See p 187 above. 
114 Kennedy (n 19) at 99: “Culpa which gives rise to a liability in delict may take various forms”, 
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consideration” of culpa from Kennedy is also discussed in the section on general principles of delict in H 
L MacQueen and Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson: The Law of Scotland (13th edn, 2012) § 25.07. 




liability, for constructive knowledge of the likelihood or the certainty of damage, 
respectively, is considered as sufficient.116 
Now, the question would be of consequence only if the overlap of the two 
doctrines left outside its scope an area of “common interest-not-nuisance” where 
pursuers could not resort to the advantages of the broad understanding of fault in 
nuisance. But this does not seem to be the case. Indeed, in Whitty’s description, the 
contrary holds good: the overlap leaves, for non-riparian owners, an area of 
“nuisance-not-common interest”. Consequently, for breaches of common interest, 
nuisance rules appear always to be available. 
This, however, is not the case in the context of drainage of water. It has been 
explained that liability arising from an infringement or “overstretching” of the right 
to drain surface water is fault based,117 so in this sense, the rule is in line with 
nuisance and common interest rules. But the question remains whether, in claiming 
damages associated with harm caused in drainage operations, the pursuer can benefit 
from the advantages of the Kennedy formulation. If surface water drainage disputes 
end up being absorbed by nuisance, the question becomes irrelevant, but as long as 
the disputes are dealt with as a separate category, the issue can be of great practical 




In sum, it is possible to identify, in the first place, a taxonomical convergence: most 
disputes over uses of water are treated today as nuisances, with the exception of 
disputes arising from drainage operations. In the second place, there is also a 
convergence with regard to the basis of liability, this time including disputes arising 
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3. THE EXCEPTION: STRICT LIABILITY FOR ALTERATION OF WATERCOURSES 
 
In his dictum in RHM Bakeries, Lord Fraser identified the one decision that seemed to 
be at odds with the general fault-based liability rule advanced for nuisance: the case 
of Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corp.118 In his analysis of the decision, some dicta 
seemed to have supported a strict liability rule, whereas others appeared to have 
relied on fault. In any case, he regarded the decision as inapplicable to the facts in 
RHM Bakeries, where no natural stream diversion was under discussion. “It may be”, 
he continued, 
 
that that case should be regarded as laying down a special rule applicable only to the case of 
person who interferes with the course of a natural stream. If so, it is contrary to a general 
principle of the law of Scotland and, in my opinion, the rule should not be extended beyond 
the precise facts of that case.119 
 
The next landmark nuisance case, Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd, simply confirmed the status 
of “possible exception” of the Caledonian Rly Co rule.120 
The status of this possible exception has been the object of recent discussion: 
after several decades of being considered a case of strict liability, its position has been 
substantially challenged. The traditional (section 3.1) and the new (section 3.2) view 
of the case are explored here, in order to argue that it is still possible to maintain the 
traditional – strict liability – view of Caledonian Rly Co, albeit not its traditional 
explanation. This conclusion is reached partly by identifying difficulties in the reasons 
advanced to justify a fault-based view, but fundamentally by agreeing with the last of 
these reasons, while at the same time offering a different construction of it: alteration 
of a watercourse can, in the relevant circumstances, be considered “conduct causing 
a special risk of abnormal damage” in the sense of the Kennedy catalogue of types of 
fault,121 or “abnormally dangerous conduct”, as labelled in chapter 3. Yet liability 
based upon this particular type of conduct, as argued in that chapter, and contrary to 
what Kennedy states, is more accurately described as strict liability (section 3.3). 
                                                
 
 
118 Caledonian Rly Co v Greenock Corp (n 13). 
119 RHM Bakeries (n 18) at 42. 
120 Kennedy (n 19) at 98. 
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Consequently, the rule should not be limited to the alteration of watercourses (section 
3.4). These conclusions, unfortunately, have not yet been tested judicially (section 
3.5). 
 
3.1. The traditional view of the Caledonian Rly Co case 
 
The facts in Caledonian Rly Co were discussed in chapter 3.122 As explained, most of 
the discussion was focused on whether there had been damnum fatale in the case. Yet 
the dicta contain relevant statements about the basis of the defenders’ liability, an 
aspect that is addressed in more detail here. 
Possibly the speech that contains the strongest suggestion that liability was strict 
is the Lord Chancellor’s (Finlay).123 He considered that the law applicable to an 
interference with the natural course of a stream was that stated in Kerr v Earl of 
Orkney,124 as discussed and approved by the House of Lords in the case of Tennent v 
Earl of Glasgow.125 These cases, in his view, justified the proposition by Rankine, 
according to which 
 
The sound view seems to be, that even in the case of an unprecedented disaster the person who 
constructs an opus manufactum on the course of a stream or diverts its flow will be liable in 
damages, provided that the injured proprietor can show – (1) that the opus has not been fortified 
by prescription; and (2) that but for it the phenomena would have passed him scathless.126 
 
This paragraph contains what appears as a rule of liability based solely upon 
causation, without consideration of the defender’s fault. Rankine’s proposition was 
also approved in Caledonian Rly Co by Lord Dunedin as an accurate statement of the 
law.127 
Lord Shaw’s dictum can also be read as lending support for a strict liability 
rule. In his view, “[a] person making an operation for collecting and damming up the 
water of a stream must so work as to make proprietors or occupants on a lower level 
                                                
 
 
122 See p 110 above. 
123 Caledonian Rly Co v Greenock Corp (n 13) at 59-63. 
124 Kerr v Earl of Orkney (1857) 20 D 298. 
125 Tennent v Earl of Glasgow (1864) 2 M (HL) 22. 
126 Rankine, Land-Ownership 376. 
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as secure against injury as they would have been had nature not been interfered 
with”.128 And the same can be said of Lord Wrenbury’s speech, when he states that 
“[t]o construct a reservoir on your own land is a lawful act. To close or divert the 
natural line of flow so as to render it less efficient is not. It has never been held that in 
such a case there is not liability”.129 Lord Parker’s dictum, on the other hand, focuses 
on the question about damnum fatale, without making relevant remarks about the basis 
of liability.130 
These dicta served as the ground for the dominant doctrinal view – at the time 
of RHM Bakeries – of Caledonian Rly Co as supporting a strict liability rule.131 Notably, 
the Law Reform Committee for Scotland recognised in their Thirteenth Report that 
Caledonian Rly Co interpreted and applied the rule in Kerr v Earl of Orkney as one of 
strict liability.132 
The view had its detractors. Glegg’s editor explained the rule as “a strong 
presumption of negligence”, highlighting that in all cases of novum opus there was 
actually fault on the defenders.133 Walker, in turn, despite labelling it as a “strict 
liability” rule, described it as an “imposition of a high standard of care […] coupled 
with a ready presumption of fault where harm has resulted”, a rule that might be 
regarded as risk-based yet developed out of fault liability.134 In his view, Lord Shaw’s 
contention that there was no difference between English and Scots law in this 
point135 might have been true “in result, but is not so in legal principle”.136 It is worth 
noting that the Law Reform Committee adopted the position described by Walker 
more generally for the escape of dangerous agencies, but kept Caledonian Rly Co 
separate as a case of strict liability.137 The explanation was, in the words of the 
                                                
 
 
128 Ibid at 65-66. 
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137 See p 119 above. 
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Committee, that “in all these cases, in which natural streams were involved, the cause 
of action was based on an infringement of the various proprietary rights and interests 
established by law, and not on failure to take reasonable care”.138 No clear 
justification was offered for the exception, and the issue seems doubtful for, as has 
been mentioned, the pursuer in Caledonian Rly Co was not a riparian owner.139 It is 
likely that these dissenting views, especially that of Walker who is indeed cited in the 
decision,140 influenced the opinions in RHM Bakeries. 
The courts, in turn, seemed to have fallen in with the dominant view of the 
case as the application of a strict liability rule. Two Outer House cases lent support to 
this view. First, in Stirling v North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board,141 damage to the 
pursuers’ property was caused by the breach of a river embankment and subsequent 
flooding that resulted, in turn, from the discharge of waters by the defenders after an 
“abnormal” rainfall. The court considered that the law as stated in the Caledonian Rly 
Co case was applicable to the facts under discussion, according to which, approving 
and applying Kerr, “liability lay in the fact that the damage would not have occurred 
had the stream been left in its natural condition”, under reference to the Lord 
Chancellor’s and Lord Dunedin’s approval of Rankine’s proposition.142 
Consequently, liability was regarded as based on causation and, on this very ground, 
the pursuers failed: they did not attempt to prove that, if nature had been left 
undisturbed, the flood would not have happened. It could be objected that if the 
pursuers had not failed on causation, we do not know with certainty whether the 
court would have required fault, but this is unlikely since the case adopted the 
Caledonian Rly Co rule without any qualification. 
It must be noted that in this case, the flow was not “altered” in the same way it 
was in Caledonian Rly Co: water was added to it. Yet the Court considered that the rule 
in Caledonian Rly Co was equally applicable since the operations increased the natural 
burden of a watercourse. 
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The facts of the second case are closer to those in the Caledonian Rly Co case: in 
Plean Precast Ltd v National Coal Board,143 a stream had been culverted, and the culvert 
became blocked and collapsed at the point where it diverted the natural course, 
flooding the pursuer’s land. The court concluded that but for the existence of the 
culvert, damage would not have happened,144 and having “interfered with the 
natural course of things”, the defenders were liable according to Caledonian Rly Co and 
the previous case of Hanley v Edinburgh Magistrates145.146 The finding of liability was 
further grounded in the nuisance branch of the Inner House decision in RHM 
Bakeries,147 in which liability was based solely upon causation. 148 The latter judgment, 
however, was reversed in the House of Lords, affirming, as mentioned above,149 the 
fault requirement for damages claims in nuisance. It has been questioned, in 
consequence, whether the finding of liability in Plean Precast Ltd would survive the 
House of Lord decision in RHM Bakeries,150 but it must be noted that the latter 
decision undermines only one of the two grounds for liability: that of nuisance. The 
other ground – the rule from Caledonian Rly Co – was recognised in the RHM Bakeries 
case itself as a possible exception. 
In sum, there was at the time of RHM Bakeries, with some exceptions, doctrinal 
and judicial support for the strict liability view of the rule in Caledonian Rly Co. After 
RHM Bakeries, however, both doctrinal and judicial support started to decline. What 
before was mostly identified by scholars as an application of strict liability started not 
long after to be considered only as a “possible exception” to the fault rule established 
by RHM Bakeries,151 or even “likely [to be] dependent upon culpa”.152 Only 
Zimmermann and Simpson still considered the case to be undoubtedly one of strict 
liability, even though it rested uneasily with RHM Bakeries and its restrictive scope 
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seemed to an extent unjustified.153 Courts, on the other hand, seemed reluctant to 
part with the strict liability rule, although the two cases in which the rule was 
considered were Outer House cases and did not actually apply it. 
The facts in the case of G A Estates Ltd v Caviapen Trustees (No 1)154 were similar 
to those in Caledonian Rly Co: a stream was diverted and culverted but after a heavy 
rainfall the culvert proved insufficient to carry the whole water of the stream 
increased by the rainwater drainage. The affected proprietors, defenders in a claim 
for certain payments under a contract, filed a counterclaim against the pursuer 
seeking to recover the cost of preventative works for further flood. The Lord 
Ordinary (Coulsfield) explained the rule of liability as follows: 
 
As was explained in RHM Bakeries, in a case of nuisance the liability of the occupier of land 
from which the agency escapes is based upon fault, and derives from the construction of the 
opus manufactum. The reasoning is that, in a case in which there is liability, either the work could 
not be constructed in such a way as to avoid harm to a neighbouring property, in which case 
there was fault in building it at all, or the work was built negligently. The liability, therefore, 
does not arise simply from the fact that the agency escapes on an occasion or occasions, but 
from the action of constructing the opus manufactum. Similarly, in my view, any strict liability arising 
from interference with the flow of a stream must arise from the action of constructing the work which interferes.155 
 
Lord Coulsfield recognised the difficulty in applying nuisance principles due to the 
fact that the culvert was, at the time of the flood, situated in the land of the defenders 
– the affected proprietors, who had in turn bought the land from the pursuers with 
the culvert already completed. There was further difficulty in the fact that the work 
was built for the benefit of both parties,156 and there was “likely to be even greater 
difficulty in applying any principle of strict liability”, so that this issue was left to be 
decided after proof. 157 Consequently, the court seemed to have distinguished 
between the nuisance rule of fault-based liability, and a possibly applicable strict 
liability rule. The distinction is, however, somewhat odd, for it grounds liability for 
nuisance in the construction of an opus manufactum, a notion that has traditionally 
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been precisely linked to a special – stricter – regime of liability,158 whereas it remains 
silent as to the scope of the possible strict liability. The defenders had presented as 
one of the grounds of their claim (statement 5) the fact that the pursuers had 
interfered with the course of the stream, arguing that this was the cause of the 
overflow and subsequent damage. In analysing this ground, Lord Coulsfield stated 
that  
 
The purpose of that paragraph is, as I understand it, to plead a case of absolute liability 
founding on the decision in Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corporation on the view that, in the 
circumstances of this case, such liability may be enforced without proof of negligence, 
notwithstanding the decision in RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council.159 
 
It is possible, therefore, to argue that when his Lordship distinguished between the 
nuisance rule and the possible strict liability rule, the ground for the latter was 
precisely the rule from Caledonian Rly Co, as distinguished from the rule in RHM 
Bakeries, despite the fact that Caledonian Rly Co was not mentioned afterwards when 
laying down the liability rules. 
Not too long after, a new case appeared where the pursuers partly founded 
their claim on the Caledonian Rly Co rule: the case of Inverness Harbour Trs v British 
Railways Board.160 Its facts, however, were rather different from those in Caledonian Rly 
Co: the defenders built a railway viaduct over the river Ness, and during a state of 
high flow one of the viaduct piers was undermined as a result of scour, causing the 
collapse of the viaduct and subsequent damage to the pursuers’ harbour structures. 
Apart from averments of negligence on the part of the defenders in the viaduct’s 
maintenance, the pursuers argued that by tipping stones around the piers in the 
process of building it, the defenders created a novum opus manufactum that altered the 
flow of the river and created a danger of serious harm for which they were 
responsible. They invoked the application of the rule in Caledonian Rly Co which, in 
their view, “was a case of a novum opus manufactum which was not dissimilar to the 
present case”. 
Lord Kirkwood, however, dismissed the application of Caledonian Rly Co: 
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In a case involving damage caused by a novum opus manufactum, other than a case where the facts 
are virtually identical to those in the Caledonian Railway case, I am satisfied that the basis of any 
liability on the part of the defender will be culpa.161 
 
Thus, Lord Kirkwood defined the scope of the Caledonian Rly Co rule in an extremely 
restrictive way. Alteration of the course of a stream is not enough; the facts must be 
“virtually identical” to those in Caledonian Rly Co, and it is clear they were not in this 
case: the alteration of the course was effected in a different way, the phenomenon 
that ultimately triggered the accident was a different one, and the damage was 
caused by a different “agent” (not water itself, but the materials from the collapsed 
bridge). What is notable from the brief paragraph transcribed is, however, that he 
considered this rule not to be one of culpa. 
Consequently, these two cases went no further than recognising the existence of 
the rule, without actually applying it: in the first case, its applicability was left to be 
determined after proof; whereas in the second case, it was regarded as not applicable 
at all. Accordingly, these cases lend a weaker support for the strict liability view of 
Caledonian Rly Co than the two cases decided before RHM Bakeries.162 
 
3.2. The modern view of the Caledonian Rly Co case 
 
It is in this context that a substantial challenge to the traditional strict liability view of 
the Caledonian Rly Co case was advanced. In his article entitled “Strict Liability and 
the Rule in Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corporation”,163 Gordon Cameron 
submitted not only that liability in the Caledonian Rly Co type of case is fault-based as 
in any nuisance case, but also that the damages award in the case of Caledonian Rly Co 
was itself based upon fault. The contention has found subsequent doctrinal support: 
while Gordon and Wortley assert that the strict nature of liability is now “not entirely 
clear” by reference to this argument,164 Whitty concludes that Cameron’s research 




162 Stirling v North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board (n 141) and Plean Precast Ltd v National Coal Board (n 106). 
163 G D L Cameron, “Strict Liability and the Rule in Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corporation” (2000) 
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“points strongly to the view that the Caledonian Rly Co case is not a true exception” to 
the general fault-based liability rule.165 Consequently, it is necessary to evaluate this 
argument in order to determine whether we can still accept the existence of an 
exceptional strict liability rule in this type of case or whether instead it should be 
dealt with under the general nuisance rule. 
It is possible to identify four independent reasons advanced by Cameron to 
support his argument: the authority cited in Caledonian Rly Co is seen now as fault-
based; the defenders were indeed found negligent; the speeches do not conclusively 
support strict liability; and the defenders were also at fault in a different sense. Each 
reason is explained briefly below. 
 
3.2.1. The decision in Kerr was based on fault 
 
As has been mentioned above, the decision in Caledonian Rly Co was based upon the 
earlier decision in Kerr, and it is believed to have adopted and applied a strict liability 
view of the latter case.166 In Cameron’s argument, however, this view is inconsistent 
with the modern House of Lord’s view of Kerr as fault-based, as advanced in RHM 
Bakeries:167 if the real basis of liability in Kerr was fault, then it is problematic to justify 
the strict liability view of Caledonian Rly Co in its application of Kerr.168 
 
3.2.2. The defenders were actually negligent 
 
Secondly, Cameron highlights that the way in which the Caledonian Rly Co case was 
reported obscured the fact that the Lord Ordinary had indeed found negligence on 
the part of the defenders.169 The main ground of the defenders’ appeal was damnum 
fatale, that is, they attacked causation. The fact that they failed and their liability was 
upheld creates the impression that liability was solely based on causation, but this was 
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not the case. The remarks about the basis of liability were, in his view, “only 
secondary matters arising from the ‘contingency plan’ of the appellants”.170 
 
3.2.3. The dicta does not necessarily support strict liability 
 
Thirdly, the impression that liability was solely based upon causation would be 
further assisted, in his view, by some remarks made by the judges in their speeches 
that seemed to support strict liability, where in fact they did not necessarily do so. In 
a detailed analysis of each of the speeches, he finds some key elements which would 
actually point towards liability based in negligence: the references to the “deficiency” 
of the culvert to carry off the water of an extraordinary yet foreseeable rainfall, 
present in the dicta of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Shaw and Lord Wrenbury, are 
interpreted as setting out breach of a duty of care;171 and the discussion by the Lord 
Chancellor of whether the defender was to be liable even for extraordinary events is 
seen as a discussion of the standard of care.172  
 
3.2.4. The defenders were at fault apart from negligence: 
unlawfulness per se 
 
Finally, Cameron submits that, besides being negligent, the defenders were at fault in 
a different way. Lord Shaw’s statement about the defenders not being entitled to 
perform the operations in the first place – reported only in the Appeal Cases173 – is 
interpreted as a finding of a form of fault different from negligence: what he calls 
“unlawfulness per se”.174 A similar view is attributed to Lord Wrenbury175 and, to an 
extent, to the Lord Ordinary, though the view of the latter judge is linked to the rules 
of drainage of surface water.176 Lord Shaw and Lord Wrenbury’s view of 
unlawfulness is considered to be close to a form of fault contemplated in the 
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distinction laid out in Chalmers v Dixon,177 Edinburgh Railway Access and Property Co v John 
Ritchie & Co178 and Noble’s Trs v Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd:179 performing 
operations of which the natural result is harm and where no amount of care can 
prevent its occurrence. This form of fault, in his view, is the one identified by Lord 
President Hope in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd as “conduct causing a special risk of 
abnormal damage”.180 The decision was, therefore, “doubly” fault-based. 
 
3.3. An alternative view 
 
The argument presented by Cameron is difficult to challenge: he offers four premises 
each of which, independently, would justify his conclusion. A different reading is, 
however, proposed here. It is argued that it is still possible to recognise a strict 
liability rule, precisely for the fourth reason advanced by Cameron, except a different 
view of such reason is offered: the form of fault consisting of conduct causing a 
special risk of abnormal damage, considered in Kennedy, is not accurately described as 
a form of fault. The first three of Cameron’s reasons are discussed before in order to 
argue that they are not fatal to the proposal here presented. 
 
3.3.1. Caledonian Rly Co adopted a strict liability view of Kerr 
 
Cameron’s first argument is built as follows: the strict liability view of Caledonian Rly 
Co is based upon its application of a strict liability view of Kerr. Kerr is now, according 
to RHM Bakeries, considered to have been based upon fault. Therefore, the strict 
liability view of Caledonian Rly Co is no longer justified. 
It is irrefutable that Lord Fraser in RHM Bakeries did explain Kerr on the basis of 
fault, relying on dicta from both the Outer House and the Inner House decisions in 
the latter case.181 One could, however, question whether he was justified in doing so: 
he recognised that there were dicta in the Inner House decision that seemed to 
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support a strict liability rule, and dismissed such dicta simply by saying that there 
were also dicta pointing in the opposite direction. In this context, the election of one 
over the other seems not to be entirely warranted. At best, if fault was indeed the 
basis of the decision, it was a case of implied or presumed fault, since it was not 
proved in the case.182 
In any case, even if one is willing to accept Lord Fraser’s explanation of Kerr as 
based on a finding (or presumption) of fault, this does not mean that the House of 
Lords in Caledonian Rly Co had such a view of Kerr. The dicta in Caledonian Rly Co, in 
fact, seem to indicate the contrary, and this was acknowledged by Lord Fraser in 
RHM Bakeries, when he conceded that Caledonian Rly Co approved from Kerr the 
dictum that seemed to apply strict liability.183 One could, of course, argue that the 
court in Caledonian Rly Co applied the wrong view of Kerr, but it would still be the 
adopted view and the decision has not been overruled. Moreover, the House of 
Lords, having had the chance in RHM Bakeries to overrule Caledonian Rly Co, or at 
least to explain it in fault terms as it did with Kerr – especially since the court found in 
Caledonian, just like in Kerr, dicta pointing in both directions –, chose to do neither, 
allowing that it might remain in place as a possible, though restricted, exception. 
 
3.3.2. The irrelevance of the defenders’ negligence 
 
In Cameron’s view, the report of Caledonian Rly Co omits that the defenders were 
indeed found negligent, an aspect that was not discussed before the House of Lords. 
The discussion in this court was mainly concerned with the defence of damnum fatale, 
that is, with the requirement of causation, and not the requirement of fault, which 
had been satisfied earlier in the process. 
It may well be that the defenders were indeed negligent and that the Lord 
Ordinary’s decision was based in this circumstance, as it appears from his opinion.184 
                                                
 
 
182 An analysis of these dicta is can be found in p 106 above. 
183 RHM Bakeries (n 18) at 42. 
184 See e.g. the paragraph transcribed by Cameron (n 163) at 373-374: “The defenders may have been 
entitled to improve their property by culverting the stream and raising the level of the park, but they 
could easily have done that, if they had exercised reasonable care, without danger to anybody. […] I doubt 
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Fault-based liability is obviously always open for a pursuer to claim. But that would 
not preclude the court from recognising an equally applicable strict liability rule. The 
correct question, in other words, is not whether there was fault, but whether fault was 
required. For this question, the fact that there is a finding of negligence is, 
technically, irrelevant: strict liability is not liability without fault, but liability regardless 
of fault.185 Therefore, what would truly answer this question is the determination of 
whether the House of Lords discussed the requirement of causation as the sole basis of 
liability and confirmed the damages award accordingly, or only as one of the 
requirements of liability in the assumption that the other requirements – especially 
fault – were already satisfied. And here is where the dicta seem to be inconclusive. 
 
3.3.3. The dicta is not supportive of fault-based liability either 
 
The suggestion that the dicta do not necessarily support strict liability is also 
advanced by Lord Fraser in RHM Bakeries: certain dicta in Caledonian Rly Co can be 
read as supporting strict liability, whereas other dicta seem to ground liability in 
culpa.186 Cameron identifies two specific elements that point in the latter direction: 
the references to the deficiency of the culvert and the discussion of whether the 
defender was liable for extraordinary events. In his view, these elements refer 
respectively to a breach of the duty of care and to the standard of care, notions that 
belong to fault, particularly, to negligence.  
Arguably, however, those elements can also be read as referring to causation 
and the determination of whether there was a damnum fatale, a view that is consistent 
with the fact that these two aspects were precisely the issues under discussion in the 
case. Deficiency, in this view, is not an indication of the defenders’ negligence but an 
element of their causal contribution to the accident. The discussion about the 
defenders having to respond for extraordinary events, in turn, seeks to draw the line 
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
whether the defenders ever considered what effect their interference with the stream and alteration of the levels was likely to 
have in very heavy floods” (emphasis added). 
185 See p 21 above. 
186 RHM Bakeries (n 18) at 42. 
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between what is a damnum fatale and what is not, that is, whether the established 
causal link was broken by the rainfall. 
 
3.3.4. “Unlawfulness per se” is not a form of fault 
 
The last argument advanced by Cameron is interesting because it departs from the 
previous ones, based upon negligence, and proposes a different form of fault: 
“unlawfulness per se”. He remarks that, according to certain dicta, the defenders were 
at fault, apart from negligence, merely for altering the course of the stream; they 
“acted unlawfully in altering the lie of the land so as to make the public highway the 
natural conduit for any overflow”.187 The reasons why he considers this operation 
unlawful are twofold: it breached the limitations imposed on the right to drain 
surface water and it created a particular type of danger. 
The first reason is based on the opinion of the Lord Ordinary (Dewar), who 
seems to have considered the defenders’ operation as an unreasonable increase of the 
pursuer’s burden to receive surface water given the position of his land.188 The 
opinion is rather puzzling, since the water that reached the pursuer’s land was not, or 
at least not only, surface water: the harm was caused by the overflow of a stream, that 
is, water that flowed in a defined channel. The point was not revisited in the House 
of Lords’ decision, which focused on the alteration of this channel. Nevertheless, even 
if one accepts the surface water rule as the basis of the Lord Ordinary’s decision, it is 
not clear how this constitutes in itself a form of fault. It has been explained above that 
liability for drainage of surface water requires fault as a separate requirement from 
that of undue pressure of the right.189 Arguably, the current position might have not 
been so clear at the time Caledonian Rly Co was decided. Yet from Lord Dewar’s very 
opinion it appears that the defender’s liability is based upon the fact that they did not 
exercise “reasonable care”,190 terminology that points to negligence as the basis of 
liability. Therefore, though the defenders’ operations might have been unlawful – or 
                                                
 
 
187 Cameron (n 163) at 373. 
188 Ibid at 373-374. 
189 See p 196 above. 
190 See n 184 above. 
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“wrongful”, in the sense discussed above191 – in that they unduly pressed the right to 
drain surface water, that is not equivalent to a finding of fault. 
The second and more compelling reason for the operation’s unlawfulness is 
considered to be closer to the opinions of Lords Shaw and Wrenbury: the defenders 
were not entitled to execute them in the first place because flood was foreseeable. 
Consequently, Cameron considers that, in altering the course of the stream, the 
operation can be described as one where no amount of care can prevent harm in the 
sense outlined by the line of cases led by Chalmers v Dixon,192 which corresponds with 
the last category of fault contemplated by the Inner House in Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd:193 
they created a special risk of abnormal damage. 
There is considerable strength in this argument. The defenders undoubtedly 
created a significant danger, which called for the application of Kerr, and assuming 
that this danger was of a level that made it relevant in the sense of Chalmers, i.e. where 
due precautions would not prevent injury,194 Kennedy’s reading of this type of 
operations would be that there is a different form of fault or, more precisely, implied 
fault. 
Whitty warns that this is technically an “impure taxonomic category” 
compared to the other forms of fault from the Kennedy catalogue, in that it is 
determined by reference to the gravity of the harm rather than the mental 
element.195 This thesis’ argument, however, goes further: this notion of implied fault 
is in reality a label for strict liability.196 Cameron himself remarks that “[i]t may well 
be that this form of liability in Scots law does not differ significantly from the modern 
application of the rule in Rylands in English law, modified as it has been by Cambridge 
Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather”.197 The Cambridge Water Co198 case determined that 
liability based upon the strict liability rule in Rylands v Fletcher199 was conditioned by 
                                                
 
 
191 See section 2.3.1 above. 
192 Chalmers (n 177) at 464 per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff. 
193 Kennedy (n 65) at 99 per Lord President Hope. 
194 See p 129 above. 
195 Whitty, “Nuisance” (reissue) § 93. 
196 See the full argument in chapter 3 section 3. 
197 Cameron (n 163) at 375, reference omitted. 
198 Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264. 
199 Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 
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the requirement of foreseeability of harm. The fact that foreseeability of harm is 
required, however, does not turn a strict liability rule into a fault-based one.200 
A different form of unlawfulness is advanced by Robbie, in a view that seems to 
go back to the traditional explanation of the rule. In discussing damages as a remedy 
for breach of common interest, and highlighting the “paradox” of having strict 
liability under the exceptional rule from Caledonian Rly Co and a fault-based liability 
rule for common interest, she regrets that “it is not sufficiently highlighted in the case 
law or commentary that interfering with the natural flow of a river is a wrong in itself 
(albeit under common interest)”,201 referring to Cameron’s discussion of 
unlawfulness. It is not clear what the remark intends to suggest with regard to fault, 
but it must be noted, as it has been above,202 that the case of Caledonian Rly Co was not 
one between riparian owners,203 so it can hardly be said that the pursuer had 
common interest rights to enforce. 
More generally, this contention might be coloured by the subject matter of the 
author’s work: she is concerned with common interest, and certainly any breach of 
common interest can be qualified as a “wrong”, for if this were not the case, it is 
difficult to see why the law would provide any remedy. But this does not mean that 
all remedies are available, particularly damages. If what is meant here is that, because 
the alteration of a watercourse is a wrong in itself, fault is not necessary – or, perhaps, 
fault is implied –, then any breach of common interest would be susceptible of the 
same analysis. But this is not the case under the main current position, which the 
author accepts (though not without hesitation): fault is required as a general rule.204 
The same is true in nuisance: even if it is a wrong that calls for the application of an 
interdict, damages claims require fault. 
The view proposed here, therefore, seems to be close in substance with 
Cameron’s analysis of this issue, though he remains on the side of the orthodox view 
in considering that the creation of the relevant level of risk is a form of fault or, more 
                                                
 
 
200 See p 22 above. 
201 Robbie (n 25) § 7.95. 
202 See above nn 35-36 and the accompanying text. 
203 See p 185 above. 
204 See p 188 above. 
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precisely, an implication of fault. The position here advanced challenges that notion, 
holding that this is simply a strict liability rule. 
 
3.4. Caledonian Rly Co in the wider context of dangerous activities 
 
The conclusion reached above leads inevitably to a further question: is the rule from 
Caledonian Rly Co, then, limited only to alteration of watercourses, as RHM Bakeries so 
strongly contends?  
If one takes the view that the reason why the alteration of a watercourse 
deserves special treatment is that it creates a certain level of risk, in the sense of 
Kennedy’s “implied fault”, then there is no reason to constrain its application strictly to 
this particular set of facts. However, this argues for both expanding and restricting 
the scope of application of the rule. 
On the one hand, in the words of Zimmermann and Simpson, “if […] the ratio 
underlying Caledonian Railway is sound it can hardly be confined to one specific 
situation”.205 And the ratio for the special treatment is not that there is something 
specific to alteration of watercourses that makes it wrong in the sense indicated by 
Robbie, i.e. a breach of common interest,206 nor that the interference with nature is 
in itself deserving of a special treatment. The ratio is based upon risk. Consequently, 
any use of water – or, indeed, any use of property – that creates the relevant level of 
risk should be treated in the same way. The strict confinement of the rule in the 
terms outlined by RHM Bakeries is, in this sense, relaxed by Kennedy, expanding its 
application. 
On the other hand, the rule should be applied only if the relevant level of risk, 
in the sense discussed in chapter 3, is reached. If it is not, then the fact that the 
specific operation was the alteration of a watercourse in itself should be irrelevant, 
and general fault rules should apply. 
 
3.5. Subsequent case law 
                                                
 
 
205 Zimmermann and Simpson (n 153) at 630. 




Since Cameron’s research was published, there has been virtually no case that serves 
to test these conclusions. There is only one case where the facts resemble those of 
Caledonian Rly Co: the case of Viewpoint Housing Association Ltd v City of Edinburgh 
Council,207 where a stream was culverted by the roads authority, and its insufficiency 
caused the flood of the pursuers’ land. The pursuers’ damages claim was founded 
both in negligence and nuisance, yet they later argued that a case based on strict 
liability would remain open if fault could not be proved. The Lord Ordinary 
(Emslie), however, had a different view: such a case was not open for the pursuers 
since the defenders had no fair notice of it. If the pursuers wanted to hold this 
“fallback” position, a minute of amendment would be required.208 What seems to be 
implied is that strict liability was not excluded as a matter of principle, but only 
because it was not properly pleaded. Consequently, and in line with the previous 
post-RHM Bakeries cases of G A Estates Ltd209 and Inverness Harbour Trs,210 the court 
appears to have recognised the existence of the rule, but did not apply it in the case. 
Commenting on this case, Cameron reaffirmed his view of the Caledonian Rly Co case, 
arguing that its relevance for the Viewpoint Housing case ought to have been only the 
recognition of a duty of care on the part of a public body building or in occupation 
and control of works on watercourses.211 But this leaves Lord Emslie’s comments 
unexplained except for the implication that they were plainly mistaken given the 




In sum, despite recent doctrinal challenges, the liability rule in Caledonian Rly Co may 
be viewed as one of strict liability, not because it relies on an infringement of the 
                                                
 
 
207 Viewpoint Housing Association (n 67). 
208 Ibid at § 22. 
209 G A Estates Ltd (n 67). 
210 Inverness Harbour Trs (n 160). 
211 G D L Cameron, “Interference with Natural Watercourses: Nuisance, Negligence and Strict 
Liability” (2008) 12 EdinLR 105 at 108. 
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rights of riparian owners, but because operations of this class create a specific level of 
danger that attracts this type of liability. 
 
4. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
 
In conclusion, the damages claims originating from disputes over uses of water 
largely reproduce the set of rules outlined and discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of this 
thesis, that is, liability rules provided for nuisance and damage caused by abnormally 
dangerous conduct. 
First, it has been shown that, despite the varied categorisation of disputes over 
uses of water – as breach of common interest, nuisance, breach of the right to drain 
surface water, or simply “wrongs” – the treatment of these disputes has evolved 
towards convergence, not only with regard to their categorisation but also with 
regard to the applicable liability rule. Thus, these disputes are now consistently dealt 
within the nuisance framework, with the sole exception of disputes about drainage of 
surface water, which have remained a separate category so far. At the same time, all 
the categories have reached the same solution as to the requirement of fault for 
damages claims: fault must be averred and proved, according to the cases of Thomson 
in the context of breach of common interest; RHM Bakeries and Kennedy in the case of 
nuisance; and Noble’s Trustees for damage caused by drainage of surface water. In this 
particular sense, it does not make a practical difference to resort to one or the other 
category – when more than one is available – as none will relieve the pursuer from 
the requirement of fault. It might make a difference, for the case of surface water, if 
the scope of Kennedy is restricted to nuisance only. 
Second, the evaluation developed here suggests that we can still consider the 
rule applicable to the alteration of a watercourse as a strict liability rule. It is possible 
to raise some questions about Cameron’s view on Caledonian Rly Co being based on 
fault, but there is a section of his argument that seems unquestionable: the facts of 
Caledonian Rly Co would most likely fit what today is qualified as an implied fault 
under the authority of Kennedy, namely conduct causing a special risk of abnormal 
damage. Yet in the view held in this thesis, this implied fault is, indeed, a disguised 
strict liability rule. The necessary consequence is that the strict liability rule from 
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Caledonian Rly Co is not confined to the particular set of facts that were present in the 
case, but actually to any case where the relevant level of risk is created. Caledonian Rly 










The second group of disputes between neighbours that receive special treatment 
concerns withdrawal of support. This group, however, unlike the previous group – 
disputes over uses of water, discussed in chapter 4 – does not conform to the general 
framework outlined in previous chapters. 
Damages claims for harm caused by withdrawal of support are governed by 
three sets of rules. The first set is called here the “basic rules” of support, namely a set 
of rules that are applicable specifically and exclusively to this type of dispute. The 
second set is that applicable to liability by virtue of non-delegable duties of care, a 
more general category that finds in support disputes one of its main fields of 
application. Finally, the law of nuisance is held to be equally applicable to liability 
derived from support disputes. 
The main argument presented in this chapter is that damages claims for 
withdrawal of support should be subject to the same general legal framework that 
applies to other disputes between neighbours. A survey of these three sets of rules will 
show, however, that they are not. The basic rules of liability for withdrawal of 
support contain a distinction between liability rules that is no longer justified (section 
2). Rules on non-delegable duties provide an apparent but rather unsatisfactory 
solution (section 3). As a consequence, the approach advocated here is to subject 
support disputes to the wider framework set in chapters 2 for nuisance and chapter 3 
for abnormally dangerous conduct (section 4). 
 
2. THE BASIC RULES 
 
The basic rules that govern the so-called right to support vary according to the 
interaction of two elements. On the one hand, they vary depending on the type of 
property being supported, that is, whether it is land or a building – or a section of a 
building – and, in the first case, whether that land has, in turn, buildings or structures 
erected on its surface. On the other hand, they vary according to the relative physical 
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position of the property being supported with regard to the object providing such 
support, namely whether what is provided or withdrawn is subjacent or adjacent 
support. From the interaction of these two types of elements we obtain a set of six 
factual settings. The respective sets of rules for each of these factual settings result, in 
turn, from the combination of legal and policy considerations (section 2.1). 
It will be noted that, from the perspective of the fault requirement for damages 
claims, the first four factual settings are covered by a strict liability rule, whereas in 
the remaining two, liability is fault-based. Nowadays, however, the distinction based 
upon these criteria does not seem justified, for two reasons. First, the diverse legal 
nature of the right to support in the different contexts does not sufficiently justify the 
diversity in the existing rules. Secondly, the economic reason that underpinned the 
strict liability rule for the first four settings has lost its relevance in the current 
economic and legal scenario. The element that might justify a strict liability rule 
today, i.e. risk, does not provide a reason to discriminate between the different types 
of properties supported, but most likely one to discriminate between different levels of 
risk. A better approach, therefore, is to impose common rules of liability for all cases 
of withdrawal of support when the right to support exists, regardless of the type of 
property or its relative situation (section 2.2). 
 
2.1. Six factual settings 
 













FACTUAL SETTING NATURE OF THE RIGHT CORRELATIVE OBLIGATION LIABILITY RULE 
Subjacent support of 
unencumbered land 
Traditional view: natural 
right, incident to 
ownership. Modern view: 
delictual protection of 
property. 
Negative obligation. Strict liability. 
Adjacent support of 
unencumbered land 
Ditto. Ditto. Ditto. 
Subjacent support of 
encumbered land 
Traditional view: acquired 
right; servitude. Modern 
view: same nature as 
support of unencumbered 
land. 
Ditto. Ditto. 
Adjacent support of 
encumbered land 
Ditto. Ditto. Ditto. 
Subjacent support of 
(sections of) buildings 




Adjacent support of 
buildings 




Separate gables & 
common gable built on 




2.1.1. Subjacent support of unencumbered land 
 
Withdrawal of subjacent support of land is not discussed by the Institutional writers 
or other earlier commentators, and there is almost no case law until the nineteenth 
century,1 when it became a critical issue due to the great development of coal mining 
activities. Most of the authority upon which the principles of the common law of 
support are based belongs, indeed, to the second half of the nineteenth century and 
the resolution of controversies between mineral proprietors and surface proprietors, 
when the extraction activities developed by the former caused the surface of the land 
to subside. In the present day, the common law principles have declined in 
importance, not only due to the contraction of coal mining activity but mainly as a 
consequence of extensive statutory regulation enacted during the twentieth century.2 
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Reid, the principles remained relevant for mining 
                                                
 
 
1 Rankine, Land-Ownership 488. 
2 Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946; Coal-Mining (Subsidence) Act 1957; Coal Mining 
Subsidence Act 1991; Coal Industry Act 1994. 
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activities outside the scope of the statutory regulation as well as for different activities, 
such as tunnelling.3 
The question of whether the surface owner has a right to have his land 
supported by the land below has not been controversial when the land is kept in its 
“natural state”, that is, when no buildings or structures are erected on the surface. 
Slightly more – though perhaps not sufficiently – controversial has been the question 
about legal nature of this “right”. The traditional view is that the right to support is a 
natural right, incident to ownership.4 Scottish legal literature and case law rarely go 
further than formulating general statements to the same effect,5 with the exception of 
Reid, who adopts a clear position on the point,6 and Rennie, who remains cautious.7 
These general statements about it being “a natural right”, however, do not really tell 
us anything about its nature. Instead they tell us, as pointed out by Reid,8 about the 
way in which this right is born, i.e. its origin: it does not have to be acquired; it exists 
by operation of the law, whenever there is ownership of land. More illustrative of the 
actual nature of the right are some of the – mostly English – cases that are frequently 
cited as authority for the natural right “nature” of support: in both Humphries v 
Brogden9 and Bonomi v Backhouse,10 the right was regarded as a restriction on the 
neighbour’s use of his own property, based on the principle of sic utere tuo non laedas 
alienum. This is consistent with what Reid considers to be the nature of the right to 
                                                
 
 
3 Reid, Property § 252. One of the last cases of withdrawal of subjacent support of land decided by 
courts was, in fact, concerned with a railway tunnel: Rogano Ltd v British Railways Board 1979 SC 297. 
4 Rankine, Land-Ownership 489; D R Stewart, A Treatise on the Law of Mines, Quarries, and Minerals in 
Scotland (1894) 166; J Carmont, “Support” in J L Wark (ed), Encyclopedia of the Laws of Scotland, vol 14 
(1932) § 678; and Walker, Delict 946, among others. 
5 A more developed discussion can be found in South African literature. See, e.g., J R L Milton, 
“Lateral Support of Land: a Natural Right of Property” (1965) 82 SALJ 459; J R L Milton, “The Law 
of Neighbours in South Africa” [1969] Acta Juridica 123 at 199-200; J D van der Vyver, 
“Expropriation, Rights, Entitlements and Surface Support of Land” 105 SALJ 1; and A J van der 
Walt, The Law of Neighbours (2010) 96-113. This discussion in the South African context is limited only 
to adjacent support, for horizontal division of ownership is not possible in this jurisdiction. Subjacent 
support has here a different nature: it is a servitude. 
6 Reid, Property §§ 254-258. 
7 R Rennie, Minerals and the Law of Scotland (2001) 60-63. Additionally, Rennie mentions Gordon’s 
position on the subject, yet the source cited in this connection does not appear to be directly in point: 
it refers to the chapter on water in W M Gordon, Scottish Land Law (2nd edn, 1999). 
8 Reid, Property § 254. 
9 Humphries v Brogden (1850) 12 QB 739 at 744. 
10 Bonomi v Backhouse (1858) EB&E 622 at 637 per Whightman J, and 639 per Coleridge J. The decision 
was reversed by the Exchequer Chamber, yet only on the point about the moment in which the claim 
arises; and this last decision was confirmed in Backhouse v Bonomi (1861) 9 HL Cas 503. 
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support: it is simply “one aspect of the general rule that one must not injure the 
property of one’s neighbour”, an obligation founded in delict. This position, in his 
view, is expressed in most Scottish cases,11 unlike the other two alternative 
explanations of the right as common interest and implied servitude.12 The 
entitlement to support is, in other words, ancillary to the right of ownership (or 
possibly that of a tenant under a lease13). Infringement of the correlative obligation 
on the part of neighbours to provide support triggers delictual liability. In this sense, 
it is equivalent to the right not to be affected by a nuisance. Scots cases of withdrawal 
of support over the last fifty years suggest that these are not just seen as equivalent, 
but that withdrawal of support is indeed a form of nuisance,14 and English authors 
tend to agree in that withdrawal of support is actionable in nuisance.15 Nevertheless, 
the term “right to support” will continue to be used here as shorthand for this form of 
delictual protection of ownership, that is, the right of the surface owner to be 
compensated when his property has been damaged as a consequence of withdrawal 
of support caused, in turn, by the operations performed by lower proprietor. This 
protection includes the right to interdict these operations before harm has occurred, 
provided that the requirements of an interdict are fulfilled. This chapter, however, 
focuses on liability in damages once harm has occurred, for the object of this thesis is 
the requirement of fault in damages claims. 
The obligation that correlates with this right is construed only in negative 
terms: the landowner can only claim compensation for damage caused by the lower 
proprietor’s active interference with the existent support. He cannot claim 
compensation for the lower proprietor’s failure to take positive steps to provide 
support.16 
                                                
 
 
11 Reid, Property § 256. In the same sense, though in a rather brief statement, J M Halliday, Conveyancing 
Law and Practice, vol 2 (I J S Talman ed, 2nd edn, 1997) § 34-05 explains that damages are based on the 
sic utere principle. 
12 Reid, Property §§ 255 and 257. 
13 Reid, Property § 258. 
14 See p 254 below. 
15 See, e.g., R Megarry and W Wade, The Law of Real Property (C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon eds, 
8th edn, 2012) § 27-027; and K Gray and S F Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th edn, 2009) § 1.2.24 n 1. 
16 Rogano Ltd (n 3) at 302; Reid, Property § 253; Gordon & Wortley, Land Law § 5-83. 
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It is generally accepted nowadays that liability for withdrawing support is 
strict,17 according to what is considered the leading modern authority: Angus v National 
Coal Board.18 This, however, does not seem always to have been the case. The early 
treatises on the law of delict by Guthrie Smith and Glegg discussed the rights 
between surface owners and minerals owners in the context of negligent use of 
property.19 Glegg expressly stated that the minerals owner would be liable if harm 
resulted “from want of usual and reasonable precautions, or due care and 
diligence”.20 Most of the early case law points in the same direction: cases such as 
Bald’s Trustees v Alloa Colliery Ltd,21 Hamilton v Turner,22 and Mid and East Calder Gas-Light 
Co v Oakbank23 clearly relied on fault, whereas other cases such as Howie v Campbell24 
and Muirhead v Tennant25 based liability on the notion of “improper working”.26 
Possibly the first indication of a change towards strict liability can be found in a 
case where the contract between the parties included a clause excluding liability and 
the court considered that, despite the exclusion, liability for improper working of land 
was still open for the pursuer.27 The implication seems to be that the liability that was 
effectively excluded by the clause must have been strict. Other cases thereafter 
seemed to suggest that liability would be strict, but in these cases there were no 
damages claims, so no compensation was awarded based on this possibly strict 
liability rule.28 The case of Aitken Trustees v Rawyards Colliery Ltd,29 however, was 
indeed a case where damages were claimed and awarded without any discussion of 
                                                
 
 
17 T B Smith, Short Commentary 527 n 4; Walker, Delict 947; Reid, Property § 253; Rennie (n 7) 82; H L 
MacQueen and Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson: The Law of Scotland (13th edn, 2012) § 34.21. 
18 Angus v National Coal Board 1955 SC 175. 
19 Guthrie Smith, Reparation ch XI, s I is entitled “Injuries caused by the negligent use of real 
property”; Glegg, Reparation ch XII, s II considers mining issues as a natural use of property, subject to 
the duty to take precautions. 
20 Glegg, Reparation 264. 
21 Bald’s Trustees v Alloa Colliery Ltd (1854) 16 D 870 at 875 per Lord President Colonsay. 
22 Hamilton v Turner (1867) 5 M 1086 at 1095 per Lord President Inglis. 
23 Mid and East Calder Gas-Light Co v Oakbank Oil Co Ltd (1891) 18 R 788 at 792 per Lord M’Laren. 
24 Howie v Campbell (1852) 14 D 377 at 378. 
25 Muirhead v Tennant (1854) 16 D 1106 at 1108 per Lord President Colonsay. 
26 In some of these cases, land was actually encumbered with buildings. But, as will be explained, the 
right is said to operate in the same way and is subject to the same rules as in the case of bare land: see 
p 232 below. 
27 Buchanan v Andrew (1873) 11 M (HL) 13 at 20 per Lord Chancellor Selborne. 
28 Daniel Stewart’s Hospital Governors v Waddell (1890) 17 R 1077 at 1082 per Lord Young; and Bank of 
Scotland v Stewart (1891) 18 R 957 at 968 per Lord Adam. 
29 Aitken’s Trustees v Raywards Colliery Co Ltd (1894) 22 R 201. 
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fault. This seems to be the decision that induced Glegg’s change of opinion: by the 
second edition of his treatise, the reference to “want of usual and reasonable 
precautions, or due care and negligence” disappeared from the text, and although he 
kept the reference to Hamilton v Turner, he added to the same note the case of Aitken 
Trs. By the turn of the century, the scales seemed to be inclined towards strict liability 
until the matter was settled conclusively by the mid-twentieth century in the case of 
Angus v National Coal Board, where liability was unanimously and explicitly held to be 
strict.30 
It is possible to identify in the early cases a growing concern on the part of the 
courts for the fact that mineral owners, in order to obtain the full benefit of the 
minerals, could just simply bring down the land and the houses31 where surface 
owners lived, especially since according to some methods utilised widely at the time 
and considered “proper” modes of working, it was impossible or very difficult to 
obtain all the minerals without causing this harmful result.32 This might have been at 
the root of the development of the strict liability rule: the consideration that mineral 
owners were developing a highly lucrative activity without assuming the risks 
involved. It was not possible to make their fault-based liability effective because their 
conduct was, according to the activity standards at the time, considered 
appropriate.33 Consequently, courts reacted imposing strict liability as the price to 
pay, a price that ultimately was not seen as too high considering the level of profits 
that the activity yielded. 
Nevertheless, the case of Angus, which contains the modern reaffirmation of the 
strict liability rule, did not seem to ground the rule in this sort of consideration. The 
dicta suggest that the justification of such liability was simply that support was 
considered to be an “incident of property”. The owner has the right to have his land 
                                                
 
 
30 Angus (n 18) at 181 per Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson, and 182 per Lords Mackintosh and Birnam. 
31 The reference to houses here, where unencumbered land is discussed, is explained by the fact that, 
when the right to support exists, the same principles apply in both contexts: see p 232 below. 
32 See Hamilton v Turner (n 22) at 1100 per Lord Ardmillan; Buchanan v Andrew (n 27) at 20 per Lord 
Chancellor Selborne; Neill’s Trustees v William Dixon Ltd (1880) 7 R 741 at 748 per Lord Gifford; and 
Daniel Stewart’s Hospital Governors v Waddell (n 28) at 1082 per Lord Young. 




supported, and liability arises simply because such right has been interfered with.34 
This reasoning is, at best, unconvincing, and the point is revisited below.35 
Moreover, Angus itself was not a case of support in the sense discussed here but 
a personal injuries claim. Damages were claimed by the widow of an agricultural 
worker whose death was caused by the subsidence of the field in which he was 
working. Consequently, damages were not sought to compensate harm to land or 
buildings there erected and, for this reason, the case was not seen as one based on the 
right to support.36 Compensation was refused and the remarks on the nature of the 
liability rule were, strictly speaking, obiter dicta. As the leading authority, therefore, it 
rests on rather weak grounds. 
 
2.1.2. Adjacent support of unencumbered land 
 
In contrast with subjacent support, which was not considered by the Institutional 
writers, adjacent support of land was indeed considered by Bell: 
 
Although a proprietor may, to the very verge of his property, dig his ground and remove the 
earth (§ 965), he is not entitled to do any direct injury to his neighbour; or to take away the 
support of his property; or to occasion reasonable apprehensions of danger; […]37 
 
The authority cited by Bell, however, is not specific to this type of support but mostly 
to support in the context of tenements, except for the case of Robertson v Strang,38 
where liability was imposed without much discussion on the basis of such liability. 
Nevertheless, since the early development of the principles applicable to 
subjacent support it was considered that they were equally applicable to adjacent 
support,39 and authors have echoed consistently such statements.40 This is consistent 
with Scots law’s recognition of ownership of “separate tenements”:41 property in land 
                                                
 
 
34 Angus (n 18) at 181 per Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson, and 182 per Lord Mackintosh. 
35 See p 241 below. 
36 Angus (n 18) at 181 per Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson, and 182 per Lord Mackintosh. 
37 Bell, Principles § 970. 
38 Robertson v Strang (1825) 4 S 5. 
39 Caledonian Railway Co v Sprot (1856) 2 Macq 449 at 452 per Lord Chancellor Cranworth. 
40 From Rankine, Land-Ownership 489 to Gordon & Wortley, Land Law § 5-82. 
41 Reid, Property § 207. 
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admits not only vertical but horizontal division; thus proprietors of, for instance, the 
minerals that lie underneath my land, are my neighbours in the same sense as 
proprietors of land adjacent. Consequently, the nature of the right and the extent of 
its correlative obligation are considered to be the same in the case of subjacent and 
adjacent support, and liability is equally strict.42 
 
2.1.3. Subjacent support of land encumbered with buildings 
 
The traditional view of the right to support from subjacent strata when buildings or 
structures have been erected on the surface of land is that this right is not natural but 
acquired: the surface proprietor must have granted, expressly or impliedly, such 
right.43 As to the nature of the right, the most common explanation was that it is a 
servitude,44 although in most cases this nature was presented in a false opposition, 
that is, the right was seen as a servitude – actually pointing out its nature – as 
opposed to a natural right – which refers to the right’s origin. With regard to its 
content, this servitude is considered to be similar to the Roman law servitude oneris 
ferendi,45 and is positive in character.46 
The main debates that developed both doctrinally and judicially were 
concerned with the circumstances in which a grant of such servitude could be said to 
have occurred, particularly an implied grant, and the matter was seen mainly as one 
of contractual interpretation. The basic principle was enunciated in Caledonian Rly Co 
v Sprot:  
 
                                                
 
 
42 Although it is possible to identify here, just as in the case of subjacent support, early cases that seem 
to have been solved by reference to fault: see, e.g., Campbell’s Trustees v Henderson (1884) 11 R 520 at 
525 per Lord Young. 
43 Rankine, Land-Ownership 496; Stewart (n 4) 170; Carmont (n 4) § 705; Smith, Short Commentary 527. 
44 Rankine, Land-Ownership 496; Stewart (n 4) 170-171; Carmont (n 4) § 705; Walker, Delict 948; 
Halliday (n 11) § 34-05; N R Whitty, “Reasonable Neighbourhood: the Province and Analysis of 
Private Nuisance in Scots law. Part II” (1983) 28 JLSS 5 at 15. 
45 Rankine, Land-Ownership 496. See p 237 below for more details on the servitude oneris ferendi. 
46 Ibid, though the positive character of this “servitude” is mentioned explicitly only since the second 
edition of his treatise: J Rankine, The Law of Land-Ownership in Scotland. A Treatise on the Rights and Burdens 
Incident to the Ownership of Lands and other Heritages in Scotland (2nd edn, 1884) 409; the positive nature also 
mentioned in Stewart (n 4) 180 and Carmont (n 4) § 706. 
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[A]ll which a grantor can reasonably be considered to grant, or warrant, is such a measure of 
support subjacent and adjacent as is necessary for the land in its condition at the time of the 
grant, or in the state for the purpose of putting it into which the grant is made.47 
 
When buildings existed already at the time of the grant, the issue was not seen as 
problematic,48 except in cases where these buildings were replaced for new ones.49 
The main controversy referred to buildings erected after the grant, and the key 
question to determine if the owner was entitled to have them supported was whether 
the buildings were covered by the purpose of the contract,50 or more generally, 
whether they were in the contemplation of the parties.51 Yet in some cases, courts 
went further: they considered that landowners were entitled to make reasonable use 
of their land, which included building on the surface, and this did not cause the right 
to support to be lost.52 It is not clear whether this can be simply considered as the 
operation of the natural right to support or, on the contrary, it is a generally implied 
(acquired) right to support for such reasonable erections.53 
Later cases, however, seemed to imply that in fact the right to support land 
encumbered with buildings was generally afforded as a matter of common law, and 
the parties could renounce it.54 Based on these cases and those cited above,55 Reid 
put forward the modern view on the origin and nature of the right to support land 
encumbered with buildings, namely that Scots law does not actually distinguish, as 
English law does,56 between this land and land in its natural state. Moreover, the 
restriction on the right to support where there has been excessive building, although 
                                                
 
 
47 Caledonian Railway Co v Sprot (n 39) at 451 per Lord Chancellor Cranworth. 
48 Like, for instance, in the case of Gibson v Farie 1918 1 SLT 404. 
49 E.g. Aitken’s Trs (n 29); Barr v Baird & Co (1904) 6 F 524. 
50 Rankine, Land-Ownership 501, like in the case of Aitken’s Trs (n 29) where the land was acquired for 
the purpose of building. 
51 Stewart (n 4) 178, like in the case of Hamilton v Turner (n 22) where building the houses was indeed an 
obligation contemplated in the lease. 
52 Hamilton v Turner (n 22) at 1095 per Lord President Inglis, 1098 per Lord Deas, and 1100 per Lord 
Ardmillan; Bain v Duke of Hamilton (1867) 6 M 1; Neill’s Trs (n 32) at 745 per Lord Ormidale. 
53 Gordon & Wortley, Land Law § 5-91. Carmont (n 4) § 710 was inclined to the latter position, which 
in his view only applied when the defender had granted the surface and retained the minerals. 
54 Barr v Baird & Co (n 49) at 529 per Lord President Kinross; and Dryburgh v Fife Coal Co Ltd (1905) 7 F 
1083 at 1098 per Lord Kyllachy. 
55 See n 52. 
56 Despite the traditional assertion of the identity of both laws in, e.g., Caledonian Railway Co v Sprot (n 
39) at 461 per Lord Chancellor Cranworth; Buchanan v Andrew (n 27) at 17 per Lord Chancellor 
Selborne; and William Dixon Ltd v White (1883) 10 R (HL) 45 at 46 per Lord Blackburn. 
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often mentioned, does not seem actually to have been applied.57 Consequently, both 
the origin of the right and its nature must remain the same as in the case of bare 
land: the right is natural, i.e. it arises together with ownership, and its primary 
significance is as a source of delictual liability. From the few support cases of the last 
half century, however, the only one that discussed the nature and origin of this 
support, Rogano Ltd v British Railways Board, does not lend support for such a view, 
since it considered that the right of support for built-upon land was not a natural 
right, but had the nature of a servitude that had to be acquired by express or implied 
grant, and possibly by prescription.58 The point does not seem to be resolved in the 
literature,59 but case law’s broad construction of the notion of implied grant suggests 
that, perhaps, it only disguises the recognition of a general natural right to support, in 
the line of Reid’s view. 
Less prominently than the debates just outlined, the possibility of acquiring the 
right by prescription has also been discussed. Rankine was initially inclined against 
this notion,60 yet by the second edition of his treatise, and apparently because he 
recognised the nature of the right as a positive servitude following Dalton v Angus,61 he 
accepted the possibility, since all positive servitudes could be acquired in this way.62 
Positive servitudes can, nowadays, be acquired by prescription according to the 
express provision contained in s 3 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 
1973.63 This view, of course, relies on the concept of support as a servitude and 
makes sense only in the context of support as an acquired right. Accordingly, the 
view has been contested more recently, based on the fact that damages for 
withdrawal of support can be claimed under the doctrine of nuisance, which would 
render acquisition by prescription unnecessary.64 
                                                
 
 
57 Reid, Property § 260. 
58 Rogano Ltd (n 3) at 301. 
59 A summary of the positions in this debate can be found in Rennie (n 7) 63-68. 
60 In the first edition of his treatise: J Rankine, The Law of Land-Ownership in Scotland. A Treatise on the 
Rights and Burdens Incident to the Ownership of Lands and other Heritages in Scotland (1879) 380-382. 
61 Dalton v Angus (1881) 6 App Cas 740. 
62 Rankine, Land-Onwership (n 46) 411-413. The same view is held by Stewart (n 4) 180-181 and 
Carmont (n 4) § 713. 
63 The required possession period is 20 years: s 3(2) Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. 
64 Whitty (n 44) at 16, questioning the authority of Dalton v Angus (n 61) in Scots law. 
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In any case, the difference between the natural right to subjacent support of 
unencumbered land and the acquired right to subjacent support of built-upon land 
was said to lie only in their origin. The extent and consequences of such rights were 
considered to be the same,65 so in this sense, all the principles about subjacent 
support to unencumbered land would apply equally in this context. This is the reason 
why most of the authority cited to justify the principles for support of bare land 
actually consists of cases where land was built upon. Similarly, the right to support in 
regard to land with buildings erected on the surface is of the same nature and origin 
as that for land in its natural state. Consequently, the obligation correlative to the 
right to support of land encumbered with buildings is negative only, and liability is 
strict, according to the current leading authority. 
 
2.1.4. Adjacent support of land encumbered with buildings 
 
The principles applicable to this type of support result from the combination of two 
assimilations: on the one hand, the assimilation between subjacent and adjacent 
support indicated in factual setting 2.1.2, and, on the other, the assimilation between 
support of bare land and that of land encumbered with buildings indicated in factual 
setting 2.1.3. 
The consequence is that, once again, the obligation is negative, and liability for its 
breach, strict. 
 
2.1.5. Subjacent support of (sections of) buildings 
 
If support of land was of primary importance during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, support within tenements took over this position to become the 
main source of support disputes from the second half of the twentieth century 
onwards. In urban settings, buildings divided by floors and flats are commonplace.66 
                                                
 
 
65 Rankine, Land-Ownership 496; Stewart (n 4) 171; Carmont (n 4) § 707. The authority cited these 
authors in support this contention were the cases of Bonomi v Backhouse (n 10); Caledonian Railway Co v 
Sprot (n 39); and Dalton v Angus (n 61). 
66 This has been the case in Scotland since as early as the sixteenth century: K G C Reid, “The Law of 
the Tenement. New Thoughts on Old Law” (1983) 28 JLSS 472 at 472. 
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This particular setting can be the source of several issues between neighbours, one of 
which is, more specifically, the treatment of possible harmful consequences caused to 
flats located in upper floors by the operations carried out by an occupier of a lower 
floor. This and other issues between tenement neighbours are addressed by the law of 
the tenement, which is today statutorily regulated by the Tenements (Scotland) Act 
2004 (henceforth, T(S)A). 
The idea that lower flats must bear the weight of and serve as the support 
structure for upper flats was recognised by Stair,67 Erskine,68 Hume,69 and Bell.70 
Bell, in fact, gave its title to what has been identified as the basis of the obligation to 
provide subjacent support in the context of tenements: the doctrine of common 
interest.71 
The doctrine of common interest has already been mentioned in chapter 4, 
mostly with regard to its application in the context of disputes over uses of water.72 
Since the doctrine of common interest has now been abolished for the purposes of 
the law of the tenement, as we will see,73 no detailed account of it is offered here.74 It 
is enough to say that, in general, the doctrine determined the rights and obligations 
of tenement owners with regard to the sections of the tenement that they did not own 
individually.75 More particularly, in relation to support, common interest gave upper 
proprietors the right to have their properties supported by lower proprietors’.76 This 
right to support, however, was different to that which exists in the previous four 
factual settings, in two fundamental aspects. 
First, the obligation that correlated to the support based upon common interest 
was not construed only in negative terms, but also had positive content: the upper 
proprietor not only could require the lower proprietor to refrain from doing anything 
                                                
 
 
67 Stair, Institutions 2.7.6. 
68 Erskine, Institute 2.9.10. 
69 Hume, Lectures 226. 
70 Bell, Principles § 1086. 
71 The origin in this context is, however, traced back to Stair: K G C Reid, “Common Interest. A 
Reassessment” (1983) 28 JLSS 428 at 428. 
72 See chapter 4 section 2.1. 
73 See p 235 below. 
74 For a traditional description see Rankine, Land-Ownership ch XXXIII, largely intact since the first 
edition. For a more contemporary view, see Reid, “Common Interest. A Reassessment” (n 71). 
75 See Reid, Property § 232. 
76 Ibid § 271. 
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that could interfere with the existent support – and be compensated if he did – but 
could also demand that he take positive steps in order to provide such support, that 
is, to keep his property in a condition to maintain adequate support.77 
Secondly, liability for breaching these obligations was fault-based. The point 
was not clear and, indeed, available authority seemed to point to strict liability,78 
until the decision in Thomson v St Cuthbert’s Cooperative Association Ltd.79 The pursuer in 
this case based her claim on two alternative grounds: common interest and fault.80 
With regard to the first ground, she argued, inter alia, that requiring fault in this 
context would deprive the doctrine of common interest of any relevant content, as it 
would leave the matter to be entirely regulated by the law of negligence. Lord 
Mackintosh, however, rejected this view, explaining that 
 
[t]he doctrine of common interest creates a special area of community within which mutual 
rights and duties are owed, and makes into neighbours to whom duties are owed parties who 
otherwise under the general law of negligence as now developed in, for example the case of 
Donoghue v Stevenson, would not be treated as such.81 
 
According to this dictum, the doctrine of common interest seems to dispose of the 
question of duty of care in negligence. It is difficult to see, however, how the general 
law of negligence would provide a different answer: given the features of these 
disputes, arising in the context of close and circumscribed physical proximity and 
where physical harm is most likely foreseeable, it is likely that a duty of care would be 
identified in such context in any event. In this sense, it seems that in fact the doctrine 
of common interest does not add anything to the general rules of liability for damage 
to property, and Reid suggested, some years later, that the case was actually wrongly 
decided.82 
The Thomson case was one of breach of the positive obligation of support. Two 
subsequent Sheriff Court cases clarified that the fault-based liability rule applies also 
                                                
 
 
77 Reid, Property § 233. 
78 Reid, “Common Interest. A Reassessment” (n 71) at 434. 
79 Thomson v St Cuthbert’s Cooperative Association Ltd 1958 SC 380. 
80 Ibid at 381. 
81 Ibid at 397-398, reference omitted. 
82 Reid, “Common Interest. A Reassessment” (n 71) at 434-435. 
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to the breach of the negative obligation: the cases of Kerr v McGreevy83 and Doran v 
Smith.84 In both cases, the pursuers argued that although there was no “absolute 
duty” to provide support, there was a duty not to interfere with support, and liability 
for the breach of this duty did not require fault.85 The Sheriffs, however, rejected this 
view. In Kerr v McGreevy, the decision was based on the general principle that liability 
does not arise ex dominio (as stated in Campbell v Kennedy86); and on the fact that the 
decision in Thomson did not make an exception for the negative obligation, identifying 
a “duty to take reasonable care” as corresponding to the right to object to operations 
that might endanger support.87 In Doran v Smith, in turn, the Sheriff simply could not 
find a “valid distinction” between the negative and the positive obligation, making 
the rule from the Thomson case extend to the former.88 
This was the picture at the time the Scottish Law Commission issued its Report 
on the Law of the Tenement,89 which would subsequently lead to the drafting and 
enactment of the T(S)A. 
The T(S)A expressly abolished the doctrine of common interest, at least insofar 
as it applied within the tenement (s 7), yet it is submitted that the act simply restated 
this common law doctrine in statutory form.90 
The content of the positive obligation is regulated in T(S)A, s 8, entitled “Duty 
to maintain so as to provide support and shelter etc.”: 
 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) the owner of any part of a tenement building, being a part that 
provides, or is intended to provide, support or shelter to any other part, shall maintain the 
supporting or sheltering part so as to ensure that it provides support or shelter. 
 
According to s 8(2), however, this duty to maintain is not due “if it would not be 
reasonable to do so, having regard to all the circumstances”, which will happen when 
the building is no longer worth repairing.91 
                                                
 
 
83 Kerr v McGreevy 1970 SLT (Sh Ct) 7. 
84 Doran v Smith 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 46. 
85 Kerr v McGreevy (n 83) at 7; Doran v Smith (n 84) at 47. 
86 Campbell v Kennedy (1864) 3 M 121. 
87 Kerr v McGreevy (n 83) at 8. 
88 Doran v Smith (n 84) at 48. 
89 Scottish Law Commission, Report on the Law of the Tenement (Scot Law Com No 162, 1998). 
90 T(S)A, explanatory note to s 7. 
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The negative obligation, in turn, is regulated in T(S)A, s 9, as a “Prohibition on 
interference with support or shelter” by virtue of which 
 
(1) No owner or occupier of any part of a tenement shall be entitled to do anything in relation 
to that part which would, or would be reasonably likely to, impair to a material extent— 
(a) the support or shelter provided to any part of the tenement building; […] 
 
No reference is made in either provision to the liability rule applicable if the 
obligations there stated are breached and damages are claimed for such a breach. 
The reference to reasonableness in T(S)A, s 8, is linked to the condition of the 
building and whether it is still “worth saving”, not to the standard of care required 
for the maintenance. The Report, in turn, only discussed briefly the liability rule 
applicable to the infringement of the positive obligation, recommending the 
preservation of the common law fault-based liability rule as stated in the case of 
Thomson without the need for an express provision,92 but nothing is said about the 
rule applicable to the breach of the negative obligation. 
There are two roads that can be followed here, and both lead to the same 
conclusion. One road is to accept that the common law rules on liability based upon 
the doctrine of common interest have survived the T(S)A, despite the fact that the 
T(S)A abolished the doctrine and, in restating it, did not include these liability rules. 
This position is supported, at least with regard to the positive obligation, by the 
remarks made in the Report. The other road is to acknowledge that the T(S)A simply 
does not consider special liability rules for the breach of the obligations of support 
and, therefore, one must look at the general liability rules for damage to property. 
Through both roads, we arrive at the same conclusion: liability is still fault-based, as 
it was before the T(S)A. 
 
2.1.6. Adjacent support of buildings 
 
When two separate buildings share a wall, insofar as this wall is built precisely on the 
line of the boundary, the ownership of the wall lies on each proprietor up to the mid-
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
91 T(S)A, explanatory note to s 8(2). 
92 Scottish Law Commission (n 89) § 7.9. 
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point. The part that is not owned, however, is subject to reciprocal common 
interest.93 The doctrine, for this context, was not abolished by T(S)A, s 7, and 
consequently remains in force. By virtue of this common interest, each proprietor is 
subject to both a positive and a negative obligation of support: they must, on the one 
hand, maintain their respective sides of the wall and, on the other hand, avoid doing 
anything that might endanger its stability.94 The cases that provide authority for this 
proposition,95 however, were not damages actions so they do not contain clear 
indications of the liability rule applicable to the breach of such obligations, and the 
literature similarly does not give a clear answer. If the law of common interest did not 
provide for strict liability in the context of tenements, it is difficult to see why it would 
do so in this context. There is no authority suggesting a departure from the general 
rules of liability. 
Now, where the wall is built on one side of the boundary, or where there are 
two separate walls that are in touch with each other, there is wide agreement as to 
the absence of a natural right to adjacent support. Bell recognised the owner’s right 
to prevent his neighbour from resting his building on the former’s wall,96 and authors 
up to the present day have consistently maintained that a servitude of support can be 
acquired by grant, express or implied.97 The possibility of acquiring this servitude by 
prescription has been more controversial.98 
Two Roman law servitudes of support are recognised by Scots law. The first is 
the servitude oneris ferendi, namely the “right in the dominant proprietor to rest the 
weight of his house on the servient proprietor’s wall or pillar”.99 The second is the 
servitude tigni immitendi, which binds the servient proprietor “to permit the dominant 
proprietor to insert a beam or joist in the wall of the servient tenement”.100 It can be 
noted that whereas the first servitude can be properly characterised as one of support, 
                                                
 
 
93 Reid, Property § 223. 
94 Ibid § 225. 
95 Cochran’s Trustees v Caledonian Rly Co (1898) 25 R 572, and more recently Trades House of Glasgow v 
Ferguson 1979 SLT 187. 
96 Bell, Principles § 941.1. 
97 Rankine, Land-Ownership 510; Carmont (n 4) § 719; Reid, Property § 484; Gordon & Wortley, Land 
Law § 5-106. 
98 Rankine, Land-Ownership 510; Carmont (n 4) § 720; Reid, Property § 484. 
99 G Watson (ed), Bell’s Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland (7th edn, 2012) 754. 
100 Ibid 1087. 
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the second is probably better described as a right to encroach.101 Consequently, only 
the first will be considered here. 
This servitude of support is of a positive character:102 it allows a use of the 
servient property by the dominant proprietor which would not be permissible in the 
absence of the servitude, in this case, the use of neighbour’s wall to rest the weight of 
the building, and as a logical consequence, it imposes the negative obligation not to 
interfere with it.103 
As to the imposition of a positive obligation to maintain the wall that provides 
the support, the Institutional writers seemed divided: Stair acknowledged a division 
in opinions but he was inclined to the negative;104 whereas Bankton identified oneris 
ferendi as the only servitude making exception to the general principle that servitudes 
do not impose positive obligations on the servient owner.105 Erskine, in turn, deemed 
this to be the principle “in the common case”, but no reference is made to any 
exceptional case,106 while Bell considered that this particular servitude did, in fact, 
impose the obligation to maintain the wall, although he acknowledged that “an 
opposite doctrine [was] sometimes laid down”,107 and later points out that this 
obligation “with us […] requires a special contract”.108 
Modern literature seems to agree that the servitude oneris ferendi is not, as it was 
in Roman law, an exception to the rule servitus in faciendo consistere nequit, although 
some authors express doubts.109 The doubts are worth considering, for the two cases 
cited as authority for the contention were not, in fact, cases where adjacent support 
of buildings had been withdrawn. In Robertson v Scottish Union and National Insurance Co, 
a street was carried over another street through an arched viaduct and bridge, and 
                                                
 
 
101 T A Ross, Servitudes in the Law of Scotland. Principles, Sources and Influences which have affected the Law 
(1933) 69. 
102 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Real Burdens (Scot Law Com No 181, 2000) § 12.7; D J Cusine 
and R R M Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) § 3.73. 
103 Cusine and Paisley (n 102) § 3.73. 
104 Stair, Institutions 2.7.6. 
105 Bankton, Institute 2.7.7. 
106 Erskine, Institute 2.9.1. 
107 Bell, Principles § 984. 
108 Ibid § 1003. 
109 Reid, Property § 484 considers the point as “doubtful” but is still inclined to the negative; whereas 
Gordon (n 7) § 24-17 does not manifest such doubts; and Cusine and Paisley (n 102) § 3.73 actually 
affirm both answers, though later they reaffirm the negative. 
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the question discussed was whether the maintenance of the arches was an obligation 
of the owners of the solum where they stood or an obligation of the public authority in 
charge of the streets. The court decided that, since the principles of accession did not 
operate in the case, the owners of the solum were subject only to a servitude of 
support, of the nature of oneris ferendi, that did not impose on them the obligation to 
maintain the arches.110 The case of Rogano Ltd v British Railways Board, in turn, was a 
case of withdrawal of subjacent support of land encumbered with buildings, and the 
court, in identifying the nature of support in these cases as a servitude, limited its 
content to the negative obligation based on what the Institutional writers had said 
about the servitude of support.111 Consequently, the reference to oneris ferendi in both 
cases – explicit in the first one, implicit in the second one – was not to the precise 
servitude envisaged by Roman law and adopted in Scotland. This sheds light on the 
real incidence of the servitude oneris ferendi in its strict meaning: there is actually no 
precise authority on the point because this is not the usual way in which terraced or 
semi-detached houses are built. The common practice is to use common gables,112 so 
the importance of the servitude seems to be rather marginal.113 In any event, in the 
absence of direct authority supporting the imposition of a positive obligation, and 
given the rather wide agreement in the literature, it is unlikely that courts faced with 
a dispute of this character would recognise such an obligation. 
With regard to the rule of liability applicable to the breach of the servitude, the 
picture is not much clearer due to the lack of authority, and authors in general do not 
discuss the point.114 Rankine gave the impression that liability in this case would be 
strict, by stating that outside the scope of the servitude, liability is a matter of 
negligence.115 Gordon, however, states more generally that the breach of a servitude 
allows a damages claim “where there has been fault”.116 The case cited by Gordon as 
                                                
 
 
110 Robertson v Scottish Union and National Insurance Co 1943 SC 427 at 439 per Lord Justice-Clerk Cooper, 
and 453 per Lord Wark. 
111 Rogano Ltd (n 3) 302. 
112 Reid, Property § 218. 
113 The reason for its existence in Scotland is most likely historical: the system of urban servitudes was 
adopted as a whole from Roman law. Ross (n 101) 58. 
114 Reid, Property § 482 states generally that damages are available when a servitude is breached; while 
Cusine and Paisley (n 102) do not refer to damages. 
115 Rankine, Land-Ownership 510. 
116 Gordon (n 7) § 24-78. 
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authority for this proposition, though asserting indeed the requirement of fault for 
damages in the case of an “extended use of a servitude right”,117 was not a case of 
breach of servitude: what was being discussed was the right to drain and the 
corresponding duty to receive surface water. In any case, and again in the absence of 
any direct authority, the assumption must be that the general rules are applicable 
and, therefore, liability is fault-based. 
 
2.2. Questioning the difference 
 
It has been seen that four out of the six factual settings described above are covered 
by a strict liability rule, that is, subjacent and adjacent support of bare land and 
subjacent and adjacent support of land encumbered with buildings, whereas in the 
remaining two, i.e. subjacent and adjacent support of (sections of) buildings, liability 
is fault-based. It is submitted here that this distinction is not sufficiently justified, 
neither by the diverse legal nature that the right to support has in each context, nor 
by the policy considerations that underlie such rules. It is suggested that a better 
ground for distinction is that between the general liability rule applicable to nuisance, 
discussed in chapter 2, and the exceptional liability rule applicable to abnormally 
dangerous conduct, discussed in chapter 3. 
 
2.2.1. Diverse legal nature, not necessarily diverse legal rule 
 
As explained in section 2.1, the nature of the so-called right to support has been 
explained as delictual protection of ownership, as a servitude, or as based upon 
common interest, depending on the factual setting. So, intuitively, one could take 
these different explanations of its nature as a justification for the diversity of liability 
rules. 
However, on the traditional view of support for built-upon land, this contention 
does not hold, for its nature as a servitude would be shared with adjacent support of 
buildings in the case of separate walls (oneris ferendi) and, as discussed above, in the 
                                                
 
 
117 Nobles Trustee’s v Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd 1988 SLT 662 at 664. 
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first of these factual settings, liability is strict, whereas in the second, liability is fault 
based. 
The point highlights the lack of proper consideration of support for land 
encumbered with buildings as a servitude. For in the best case, it would be a 
servitude with a particular rule of liability. But in recognising that the only difference 
between support for land in its natural state and support for land covered with 
structures is their origin (natural as opposed to acquired right), the alleged servitude 
of support becomes quite a peculiar servitude that does not “behave” like one, but is 
actually assimilated to what is seen simply as delictual protection of property, 
especially since the restriction on the right to support in cases of excessive building, 
which could be seen as a parallel to, or even a manifestation of, the dominant 
owner’s duty to exercise the servitude civiliter, does not seem to have been applied.118 
Now, if we disregard the servitude theory and consider that the nature is the 
same in support of both bare land and built-upon land, that is, that the right is 
nothing more than delictual protection of property, we are able to draw a line 
between these cases, subject to a strict liability rule, and those based on common 
interest and servitude, i.e. support of buildings, subject to a fault-based liability rule. 
But this is not enough to justify a strict liability rule in the first case, and the reason is 
rather obvious: protection of property through delict does not necessarily translate 
into strict liability, and the best example in the Scottish context is, of course, 
nuisance. If nuisance enjoys the same status as withdrawal of support from the 
perspective of its nature, then why do we have in the first case a strict liability rule, 
and in the second case a fault-based liability rule? First, we must remember that 
before 1985, there was authority supporting a strict liability view of nuisance,119 so 
the strict liability rule for withdrawal of support made sense in such context. 
Secondly, and more importantly, there were policy considerations at the root of the 
development of the strict liability rule for withdrawal of support. 
 
                                                
 
 
118 See p 230 above. 
119 See section 4.1 below. 
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2.2.2. Diverse policy considerations, different liability rules… but not 
as they stand today 
 
The evolution of the liability rules traced in section 2.1 shows a curious result: the 
current basic rules applicable to all these factual settings are generally clear, yet in 
most cases the starting point seems to have been the opposite. Withdrawal of support 
of land, with or without structures built upon the surface, attracts strict liability, but 
this rule was settled with certainty only by the mid-twentieth century. Withdrawal of 
support of buildings, in turn, gives rise to liability only upon proof of fault, yet it is not 
clear, at least in the context of subjacent support, that this was always the way in 
which the doctrine of common interest was understood to operate, and clarification 
was achieved, again, by the mid-twentieth century. 
In the case of support of land, what seems to have justified the migration to a 
strict liability rule was the protection of surface owners against mineral owners who 
would try to obtain the greatest possible benefit from their works, removing every last 
vestige of the minerals even if that would result in the destruction of houses built 
upon the surface.120 The justification was mainly economic: the party obtaining 
considerable profit should also assume the cost of the activity. That justification was 
clearly absent in the context of support of buildings. But nowadays, this concern 
seems to have disappeared. The reasons, then, to subject withdrawal of support in 
tenements to a fault-based liability rule can be noted from the case of Thomson121 and 
from the Report on the Law of the Tenement:122 there simply seemed to be no reason, in 
the opinion of the court and, later, of the Commissioners, to depart from the general 
rules of liability in this case. Contemporary cases of withdrawal of support are caused 
mainly by construction123 and demolition124 operations, activities that are subject to 
administrative regulations and that do not seem to create the economic asymmetries 
created formerly by mining activities. 
                                                
 
 
120 See p 227 above. 
121 Thomson v St Cuthbert’s Cooperative Association Ltd (n 79) esp Lord Mackintosh’s dictum at 395-396. 
122 Scottish Law Commission, Report on the Law of the Tenement (n 89) § 7.9. 
123 E.g. Lord Advocate v Reo Stakis Organisation Ltd 1981 SC 104; Borders Regional Council v Roxburgh District 
Council 1989 SLT 837. 




2.2.3. The suggestion 
 
In a context where the economic asymmetries are no longer a relevant concern, what 
now emerges as the most convincing reason to justify the strict liability rule is the 
potential extensive damage to property and bodily integrity that interfering with 
support could entail, even to the point of destruction or death.  
However, if this risk serves as the justification for a strict liability rule in the 
context of support of land, several questions are left unanswered. First, it is difficult to 
see why this does not extend to the context of support of buildings, where damage 
can be equally extensive. There seems to be no good reason to discriminate between 
a house that loses support and is rendered inhabitable because the neighbour dug a 
hole to set the foundations of his own house, from a flat that loses support and is 
rendered equally inhabitable because the neighbour from the lower floor removed a 
load-bearing wall to create an open-plan layout. Secondly, it is also not clear why the 
rule should be applicable only to the breach of the negative obligation if an omission 
can equally create or perpetuate a significant dangerous situation. Finally, if risk is 
nowadays the only convincing reason that justifies a strict liability rule in the context 
of support of land, the application of the rule to all cases does not discriminate 
adequately between operations that actually have such harmful potential and those 
which do not. 
The suggestion is, therefore, that the more consistent approach would be to 
deal with support issues under the more general framework set out in chapters 2 and 
3, subjecting them to a strict liability rule when the defender’s conduct actually meets 
the requirements to be characterised as abnormally dangerous, just as any other 
conduct with similar harmful potential, and when it does not, to leave their 










The current basic liability rules applicable to withdrawal of support distinguish 
between the different types of property supported and their relative physical position 
in order to determine the basis of such liability. It is arguable that this distinction is 
not adequately justified in the present context: the differing legal nature of the right 
to support in the different contexts does not provide a sound foundation for the 
distinction and the policy considerations that drove the development of the strict 
liability rule are no longer relevant. Consequently, the better approach is to deal with 
damages claims for withdrawal of support just like any other damages claim in the 
context of neighbourhood, reserving a strict liability rule only for withdrawal of 
support that is the consequence of abnormally dangerous conduct. 
 
3. AN APPARENT SOLUTION: NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES 
 
In the present day, landowners rarely engage personally in the execution of 
operations that can endanger support of neighbouring properties. In the normal case, 
they hire a competent professional in order to plan and execute such operations; they 
entrust the operations to an independent contractor. Consequently, most of the 
support disputes that are discussed before courts nowadays are not concerned with 
the application of the basic rules outlined above, which determine the liability of the 
landowner for his own acts and omissions, but actually with the application of the 
rules that determine the landowner’s liability for the acts of his independent 
contractor. The general trend has been to hold the landowner strictly liable by virtue 
of a “non-delegable duty”, an exception to the general rule whereby the employer is 
not liable for the negligence of his independent contractor. 
The recognition of a non-delegable duty in this context creates in practice a 
uniform rule of strict liability for all support disputes. This could be seen as a solution 
for the unjustified distinction identified in the basic rules, and one that is precisely 
based on risk, so there is no need for a change of approach in the sense suggested 
(section 3.1). This is, however, not a satisfactory solution: not only is the solution 
contingent, but also rests on uncertain grounds and can produce results that might be 
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inconsistent with the treatment of dangerous conduct proposed in this thesis (section 
3.2). 
 
3.1. Operation of non-delegable duties in support disputes: a uniform 
strict liability rule 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, employers are not liable for injuries caused by the 
negligence of their independent contractors.125 In the context of withdrawal of 
support, however, there is wide agreement about the existence of an exception to this 
general rule: when the landowner engages in operations that endanger support, he 
has a non-delegable duty whereby he is bound to make sure that damage does not 
occur. This is, indeed, one of the earliest identified cases of a non-delegable duty,126 
and Scottish courts have generally recognised the authority of the English cases of 
Bower v Peate127 and Dalton v Angus128 as the source of this duty. It has also been 
remarked in chapter 3 that the standard position in both English and Scots law is that 
when this non-delegable duty operates, the employer’s liability is strict.129 
In the particular case of support disputes, Scottish courts have relied on two 
lines of justification for the imposition of liability by virtue of the operation of a non-
delegable duty: one that is based upon the dangerous nature of the operations that 
result in withdrawal of support, and one that is based upon the particular nature of 
the duty to support. 
The first line of justification finds its authority in the two abovementioned 
English cases, Bower v Peate130 and Dalton v Angus,131 which were both cases of 
withdrawal of adjacent support of land encumbered with buildings. In the first of 
these cases, Cockburn CJ explained that 
 
                                                
 
 
125 See p 135 above. 
126 P Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective (2010) 122. 
127 Bower v Peate (1876) 1 QBD 321. 
128 Dalton v Angus (n 61). 
129 See 136 above. 
130 Bower v Peate (n 127). 
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a man who orders a work to be executed, from which, in the natural course of things, injurious 
consequences to his neighbour must be expected to arise, unless means are adopted by which 
such consequences may be prevented, is bound to see to the doing of that which is necessary to 
prevent the mischief, and cannot relieve himself of his responsibility by employing some one 
else […] to do what is necessary to prevent the act he has ordered to be done from becoming 
wrongful. There is an obvious difference between committing work to a contractor to be 
executed from which, if properly done, no injurious consequences can arise, and handing over 
to him work to be done from which mischievous consequences will arise unless preventive 
measures are adopted.132 
 
This dictum found approval by the House of Lords in the second of the cases,133 
although the wording of the ruling is slightly different: 
 
When an employer contracts for the performance of work, which properly conducted can 
occasion no risk to his neighbour’s house which he is under obligation to support, he is not 
liable for damage arising from the negligence of the contractor. But in cases where the work is 
necessarily attended with risk, he cannot free himself from liability by binding the contractor to 
take effectual precautions.134 
 
The explanation traditionally given to this justification is one of distribution of risks: 
the operations are executed by the contractor for the benefit of the landowner, so the 
latter should assume the associated costs, not the former.135 
This is the type of justification that has been relied upon in most of the modern 
support cases: Kerr v McGreevy,136 Duncan’s Hotel (Glasgow) Ltd v J & A Ferguson Ltd,137 
Baxter v Pritchard,138 Hamilton v Wahla,139 and Crolla v Hussain,140 which were all cases of 
withdrawal of subjacent support in the context of a tenement; Borders Regional Council v 
Roxburgh District Council,141 a case of withdrawal of adjacent support of land 
                                                
 
 
132 Bower v Peate (n 127) at 326-327. 
133 Dalton v Angus (n 61) at 829 per Lord Blackburn. 
134 Ibid at 831-832 per Lord Watson. 
135 P S Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (1967) 333. 
136 Kerr v McGreevy (n 83) at 7. 
137 Duncan’s Hotel (Glasgow) Ltd v J & A Ferguson Ltd 1974 SC 191 at 196 citing Bower v Peate (n 127), 
Dalton v Angus (n 61), and other English and Scottish nuisance cases. 
138 Baxter v Pritchard 1992 SCLR 780, citing Dalton v Angus (n 61), and Borders Regional Council (n 123). 
139 Hamilton v Wahla 1999 Rep LR 118 at § 20-14, though the reasoning here is different: by instructing 
dangerous operations, the landowner incurred the implied fault identified by Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 
1996 SC 95, yet the result is said to be consistent with Duncan’s Hotel (n 137). 
140 Crolla v Hussain 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 145 at §§ 24-26, relying mainly in Dalton v Angus (n 61), Borders 
Regional Council (n 123), and other cases that decided disputes of a different nature, such as Noble’s Trs (n 
117), and G A Estates Ltd v Caviapen Trustees (No 1) 1993 SLT 1037. 
141 Borders Regional Council (n 123) at 839, citing expressly Lord Watson’s dictum in Dalton v Angus (n 61) 




encumbered with buildings; and Morris Amusements Ltd v Glasgow City Council,142 a case 
of withdrawal of adjacent support of a building. 
The risk-based justification for non-delegable duties, however, has not been 
exempt from criticism. There is, in England, a perceived inconsistency between the 
imposition of strict liability by virtue of a non-delegable duty and the denial of a 
general strict liability rule for extra-hazardous activities.143 Moreover, it is not clear 
what kind of danger justifies the imposition of a non-delegable duty. This can be 
noted from a comparison of the dicta quoted above: while Bower seems to point to the 
source of the danger, regardless of whether it can be avoided, Dalton appears to take 
this last circumstance into account, by confining liability to the case where the works 
are “necessarily attended with risk”, that is, when they are dangerous even if properly 
conducted. The leading case that imposed a non-delegable duty based upon danger, 
although not a support case, Honeywill & Stein Ltd v Larkin Bros (London’s Commercial 
Photographers) Ltd, regarded the origin of the danger as the relevant element: the 
operation had to be dangerous “in its intrinsic” nature, “inherently dangerous”, and 
it did not cease to be so just because, if carefully conducted, damage could be 
avoided.144 More recently, however, the doctrine was characterised, in the case of 
Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Maschinenfabrik Ernst Hese GmbH, as “so unsatisfactory that its 
application should be kept as narrow as possible”, confining it only to “activities that 
are exceptionally dangerous whatever precautions are taken”.145 
In Scotland, the lack of clarity of the concept of “extra-hazardous” or 
“inherently dangerous” activity has indeed been pointed out in some of the cases 
listed above,146 but even in those cases a non-delegable duty was recognised, so the 
courts seem to have considered that operations causing withdrawal of support 
                                                
 
 
142 Morris Amusement Ltd (n 124) at §§ 43-45. 
143 R Stevens, “Non-Delegable Duties and Vicarious Liability” in J W Neyers, E Chamberlain and S 
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somehow fit the category. The most recent case concerning non-delegable duties, 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers, highlighted once again, and with some detail, 
the problematical nature of the notion of “inherently hazardous operation”.147 The 
case was not one of support, yet in discussing non-delegable duties in general, it 
considers that even in the case of support, the justification is danger-based.148 
The second line of justification adopted by Scots courts for the imposition of a 
non-delegable duty in support disputes is based upon the particular characterisation 
of the right to support and its corresponding duty. This rationale was adopted in only 
one case, yet it is the single Inner House case that dealt with the issue of non-
delegable duties in the context of support: the case of Stewart v Malik,149 where 
damages were claimed for withdrawal of subjacent support in a tenement. This case 
reacted to the Outer House judgment in Southesk Trust Co Ltd v Angus Council,150 a case 
of pollution of water, which questioned the existence of the exception in Scots law. 
After giving account of the history of the reception of the exception151 and 
concluding that there had been “a long tradition of [its] acceptance”,152 Lord 
President Hamilton in Stewart submitted that it was not necessary in the case to 
discuss whether this acceptance was well founded, precisely because the case at issue 
was one of support. After explaining that, according to the law of the tenement,  
 
[f]ailure to support does not of itself, without proof of negligence or nuisance, give rise to 
liability in reparation (Thomson v St Cuthbert’s Co-operative Association Ltd) but the obligation of 
support includes an obligation not to carry out operations on one’s property which endangers 
support to other parts of the building[,]153 
 
he concluded that 
 
In Scotland the law of tenement […] casts on the “servient” proprietor a positive duty in 
carrying out works which may affect support to avoid endangering the “dominant” property. 
                                                
 
 
147 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Scottish Ministers 2016 SCLR 539; [2016] CSOH 15 at §§ 16-21. 
148 Ibid at § 19. 
149 Stewart v Malik 2009 SC 265; [2009] CSIH 5. 
150 Southesk Trust Co Ltd & Elsick Farms Ltd v Angus Council [2006] CSOH 6. 
151 Stewart v Malik (n 149) at §§ 10-19. 
152 Ibid at § 22. 
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That duty, which is personal to him, cannot, in my view, be elided by the instruction of an 
independent contractor.154 
 
Consequently Lord Hamilton derived, from the duty to support’s positive and 
personal nature, its non-delegable nature. 
This understanding of the justification of the non-delegable duty in the context 
of support is in line with the subsequent Supreme Court judgment in the English case 
of Woodland v Essex CC.155 In this case, Lord Sumption recognised two categories of 
non-delegable duties: those arising from the dangerous nature of the operations,156 
and those arising from a duty imposed by the common law on the defendant 
 
which has three critical characteristics. First, it arises not from the negligent character or the 
act itself but because of an antecedent relationship between the defendant and the claimant. 
Second, the duty is a positive or affirmative duty to protect a particular class of persons against 
a particular class of risks, and not simply a duty to refrain from acting in a way that foreseeably 
causes injury. Third, the duty is by virtue of that relationship personal to the defendant.157 
 
The non-delegable duty that arises in support disputes was located by Lord Sumption 
within the second category, even though he recognised that it might have been 
explained before in terms of the first category. In his view, the antecedent 
relationship between the parties was that of neighbourhood, from which the positive 
duty derives, duty that is personal to the landowner in his capacity as occupier of the 
land.158 The point is not developed further, however, for the case was not one of 
support. It can be noted that Lord Sumption’s analysis is largely coincident with 
Lord Hamilton’s characterisation of the duty to support in Scots law, except that in 
the latter the first element is not explicit. 
What can be concluded is that, despite the fact that there is no agreement 
about the adequate justification for the imposition of a non-delegable duty in the 
context of support disputes, there is agreement about the fact of its application. Most 
of the cases that have applied it are concerned with subjacent support in tenements, 
but there are reasons to believe that the rule is equally applicable in the other factual 
                                                
 
 
154 Ibid at § 26. 
155 Woodland v Essex CC [2014] AC 537; [2013] UKSC 66. 
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settings. The first reason is, rather obviously, the fact that it has been applied in at 
least two other settings: adjacent support of built-upon land and adjacent support of 
buildings, as indicated above in the list of cases that adopted the risk-based 
justification.159 The second is that, as explained above, when the right to support is 
found in the context of built-upon land, it operates in the same way as it would in 
bare land and, further, there is no relevant distinction between the rules applicable to 
subjacent support and to adjacent support.160 Accordingly, if the non-delegable duty 
is applicable in the context of adjacent support of land encumbered with buildings, 
then it should apply equally for subjacent support of such land, as well as for those 
cases where there are no buildings erected on the surface of the land. In any event, 
when discussing the non-delegable duties, the cases speak generally of the right to 
support, without restricting the application to a particular context. 
If this conclusion is correct, the consequence is that, in practice, there is a 
uniform strict liability rule applicable to landowners for withdrawing support of 
neighbouring property, and a strict liability rule that is almost in every case based 
upon the dangerous nature of the operations instructed by the defender. Most of the 
cases of support in the last 50 years mention expressly that operations were, in fact, 
executed by independent contractors. In the remaining cases, the operations date 
back to over a century,161 or it is simply not specified who executed the works.162 
As a consequence, the suggestion advanced in the previous section is not 
necessary: there is no need for a change of approach, because in practice the 
approach is already different. This is, however, not a satisfactory solution. 
 
3.2. Objections to the solution. 
 
The uniform and mostly risk-based strict liability that arises in practice in support 
disputes by the operation of non-delegable duties is not a satisfactory solution for 
three reasons. 
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3.2.1. Risk-based strict liability is contingent 
 
The first and more evident reason is that, even though this risk-based strict liability 
rule has been applied in a rather uniform pattern, it might not necessarily be so. Its 
application is contingent on the actual employment of independent contractors in 
any given case. But not only is it possible for the landowner to actually engage 
himself in the operations that result in the withdrawal of support, instead of hiring a 
competent contractor (for whatever reason he might find compelling), but it is also 
possible that the landowner is a competent professional himself. In these cases, 
damages claims are subject to the basic rules of support, without any consideration of 
the actual level of risk that they might create. 
 
3.2.2. Danger justification: uncertain grounds 
 
A second line of objections is linked to the results of the application of a non-
delegable duty, in contrast with the results achieved by the application of the 
framework proposed in chapters 2 and 3. These results vary according to which 
justification one adopts. 
It has been explained above that the justification of the imposition of a non-
delegable duty based in danger is problematic because the boundaries of the type and 
level of danger required are by no means clear.163 A survey of the cases shows that, 
when operating on the basis of this line of justification, neither English nor Scottish 
courts are consistent in requiring that danger must be at the level that cannot be 
controlled by the adoption of proper precautions.164 This stands in contrast with the 
treatment proposed in chapter 3 for abnormally dangerous conduct: it will not be 
characterised as such unless the risk created by it cannot be adequately controlled 
through reasonable precautions.165 The scope of application of the non-delegable 
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164 In Scotland, contrast e.g. Morris Amusement Ltd (n 124) § 44 with the more recent Esso Petroleum Co Ltd 
(n 147) § 23. 
165 See chapter 3 section 4.3.1. 
 
 252 
duty rule is – or at least can be – defined more “generously”. The result is that 
certain types of conduct, if performed by the landowner, would fall within the scope 
of chapter 2, namely the fault-based liability rules applicable to nuisance, and not of 
chapter 3, but, if performed by a contractor, could still fall within the scope of 
application of the non-delegable duty rule and, consequently, be subject to strict 
liability. 
Now, this is conceptually not problematic, for the scope of application of these 
rules does not need to coincide. There are, indeed, good reasons to distinguish 
between both situations, apart from the level of risk. As explained in chapter 3, the 
distribution of risks performed by these rules is different: the basic rules of liability for 
withdrawing support distribute the risk of harm between pursuer and defender; 
whereas the non-delegable duty rule distributes such risk between defender and his 
independent contractor. The defender that is made strictly liable by virtue of a non-
delegable duty might be able to recover from his contractor.166 
The issue would be conceptually problematic only if, by employing a 
contractor, the defender could escape the strict liability rule that should apply to his 
abnormally dangerous conduct, but the situation is exactly the opposite: he only 
expands the scope of his possible strict liability by employing a contractor. In other 
words, any conduct that would be considered abnormally dangerous would also be 
enough to justify the application of a non-delegable duty, and the point would only 
become problematic if the position as between the two types of rules were to be 
reversed. 
Yet the problem here is not about the scope of application of the rule. The 
problem is about the stability of the rule, both in its continued existence and 
justification. For even when most of the Sheriff Courts and Outer House decisions 
have accepted the application of a non-delegable duty when activities are inherently 
or necessarily dangerous,167 the Inner House simply acknowledged this as a fact, 
without issuing an opinion on whether it was sufficiently justified in Scots law.168 The 
solution provided by non-delegable duties is effective insofar as courts continue to 
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recognise the existence of the rule and its risk-based justification. Yet the cases of 
Stewart v Malik and Woodland v Essex CC seem to show a trend in higher courts that 
departs from this line of justification in the context of support, to favour the 
alternative “duty-based” justification. And this justification can produce results that 
are inconsistent with the ones achieved by the application of the framework outlined 
in chapters 2 and 3. 
 
3.2.3. Duty-based justification: inconsistent with abnormally 
dangerous conduct 
 
The second line of justification, which is that adopted by the Inner House in Stewart v 
Malik169 and by the Supreme Court in the English case of Woodland v Essex CC,170 
relies on the alleged positive nature of the duty to support. This might make sense in 
England, where relatively recent authority has concluded that the duty to support is, 
indeed, generally positive, even when the supported property is land.171 In Scotland, 
however, the duty is said to comprise, in most contexts, merely a negative 
obligation.172 There is a positive obligation to support only in the contexts of 
tenements and of common gables built on the boundary line, so the imposition of the 
non-delegable duty would be justified only with regard to this obligation. 
Even in the contexts where there actually is a positive obligation, the non-
delegable duty would not apply when what is breached is the negative obligation, 
which would be the case every time the landowners employs a contractor to do 
anything but repairs aimed at preserving support, which was, paradoxically, the case 
in Stewart v Malik. Yet the court, in this case, considered that the non-delegable duty 
rule was equally applicable, so we must conclude that it is the existence of the positive 
obligation and not its breach that justifies the application of the rule or, alternatively, 
that breaching the negative obligation entails necessarily a breach of the positive 
obligation, i.e. that interfering with support entails a failure to provide it. 
                                                
 
 
169 Ibid at § 26. 
170 Woodland v Essex CC (n 155). 
171 Stevens (n 143) at 351, referring to Holbeck Hall Hotel Ltd v Scarborough Borough Council [2000] QB 
836. 
172 See sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.4 above. 
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The consequence is evident: the nature of the duty has nothing to do with the 
level or kind of danger that the conduct involves. It is difficult to see how this 





In conclusion, even though the mechanism of non-delegable duties seems to afford a 
practical alternative to the suggestion advanced in section 2.2.3 above, this solution is 
not satisfactory, for it is a solution that is contingent on the employment of 
independent contractors, and whatever the justification adopted for it, the results are 
problematic: on the risk-based justification, due to uncertainty; on the duty-based 
justification, due to inconsistency with the abovementioned suggestion. 
 
4. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT 
 
It has been argued in this chapter that withdrawal of support should be subject to the 
general framework set in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. This section considers the 
results that this application would produce and contrasts them with the basic rules of 
support, highlighting where these results would be different under each of these sets 
of rules. 
 
4.1. Withdrawal of support and nuisance 
 
The law of nuisance has been considered applicable to withdrawal of support 
consistently since the 1970s, either totally or partially.173 Over time, however, this 
circumstance has had a mixed reception, because of the consequences it entails for 
the basis of liability. 
 
                                                
 
 
173 Contrast, e.g., Macnab v Mcdevitt (n 162), which treats as nuisance a case of withdrawal of support in 
a tenement, with Reo Stakis (n 123), which sees the categories as overlapping. 
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4.1.1. Withdrawal of support as a nuisance before RHM Bakeries 
 
The Inner House in the case of Lord Advocate v The Reo Stakis Organisation,174 a case of 
withdrawal of adjacent support of land encumbered with buildings, recognised that 
nuisance and withdrawal of support were overlapping categories. In the decision, 
Lord President Emslie held that 
 
[i]t is no doubt the case that in some instances an occupier whose property suffers such damage 
may find himself with a remedy both under the law of nuisance and upon the basis of 
infringement of an acquired right of support, but it is by no means unusual to find that more 
than one right of action is available upon the same set of facts. The comment [that the law of 
support would be superfluous], in short, does not impress us for there are many sets of 
circumstances in which the law of support has an important role to play where there is no 
possibility of an action founded on nuisance. The law of support in relation to buildings is part 
of the law of heritable rights. The law of nuisance on the other hand is part of the law of 
neighbourhood. A right of support once acquired for a building may be vindicated by the 
heritable proprietor thereof for damage which is in no way attributable to any act on the part 
of the proprietor for the time being of the subjects obliged to afford that support. A right of 
support, too, can provide a remedy in appropriate circumstances where the injured proprietor-
occupier cannot establish that the damage suffered is plus quam tolerabile. There are many other 
examples which we see no advantage in rehearsing here, and these examples include instances 
in which a remedy under the law of nuisance may lie where either no right of support exists or 
no infringement of such a right is in issue.175 
 
There are several statements in this dictum that are questionable. The distinction 
between “the law of heritable rights” and “the law of neighbourhood” is by no means 
clear, and it is also not clear what concrete consequences should be derived from it. 
Further, the distinction between withdrawal of support and nuisance based upon the 
person from whom damages can be claimed relies on the exclusion of liability of 
occupiers or tenants in the case of support, an issue that is at least debatable in the 
case of support of land,176 and certainly inaccurate in the context of tenements since 
the enactment of the T(S)A.177 
At the time, however, the dictum generated resistance for different reasons. By 
the time Reo Stakis was decided, the controversy about the basis of liability in nuisance 
                                                
 
 
174 Reo Stakis (n 123). 
175 Ibid at 110. 
176 Compare Gordon & Wortley, Land Law § 5-116 with Reid, Property § 262. 
177 T(S)A s 9(1) imposes the restriction of withdrawing support upon the owner and the occupier. 
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was not yet settled,178 and in the case the court considered it to be strict liability. 
Consequently, whether one treated the case as one of support or as one of nuisance, 
the liability rule would be the same: one of strict liability. Yet that result, in Gordon’s 
view, would only be acceptable if there was, in fact, a right to support in the first 
place, which was not necessarily the case when buildings had been erected on the 
land. By allowing a nuisance claim when the law of support would not allow one, the 
pursuer could circumvent the restrictions of the law of support and obtain damages 
without proof of fault,179 in circumstances where the logical result is that he would 
need to turn to the law of negligence. 
If Reid’s view about support of land encumbered by buildings were adopted, 
such problem would not arise. In his view, the right to support exists in this context 
naturally (not by acquisition)180 and, therefore, its withdrawal would justify the 
imposition of strict liability. Both support and nuisance would provide the same 
answer. But Gordon proposed a different solution: he suggested that the assessment 
of the tolerability of the interference had to be made by reference to the right held. In 
this way, if the pursuer did not have the right to support, the interference could 
hardly be characterised as plus quam tolerabile.181 The solution, however, came in a 
different form, as will be explained below. 
A further issue noted at the time, in this case by Reid, was the consequence of 
understanding withdrawal of support as a nuisance in the context of tenements. 
According to the understanding of the common interest doctrine in the case of 
Thomson,182 liability for withdrawing subjacent support of upper flats was fault-based. 
Nuisance rules, however, would give the pursuer the better alternative of strict 
liability. Reid did not consider this as a negative result, since in his opinion it was 
questionable that Thomson was correctly decided in the first place.183 But this result 
would not last long. 
 
                                                
 
 
178 The settlement would come four years later: see p 257 below. 
179 W M Gordon, “The Boundaries of Nuisance. Issues Raised by the Reo Stakis case” (1981) 26 JLSS 
333 at 334-335. 
180 See p 230 above. 
181 Gordon, “The Boundaries of Nuisance. Issues Raised by the Reo Stakis case” (n 179) at 335. 
182 Thomson v St Cuthbert’s Cooperative Association Ltd (n 79). 
183 Reid, “Common Interest. A Reassessment” (n 71) at 435-436. 
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4.1.2. Withdrawal of support as a nuisance after RHM Bakeries 
 
Four years after the decision in the Reo Stakis case, the dispute about the basis of 
liability in nuisance was finally settled in RHM Bakeries: damages claims require 
averment and proof of fault.184 
This decision provided a solution for the problem identified by Gordon: now, 
liability in nuisance having been settled as fault-based, the inconsistency does not 
arise, since even if withdrawal of support is considered to be also a nuisance, nuisance 
rules would not provide for strict liability where support rules would not do so. In the 
context of support of buildings, in turn, the decision aligned the nuisance rule with 
the support rule. 
Therefore, if before RHM Bakeries there were two available liability rules for 
withdrawal of support of buildings – the fault-based liability rule from support and 
the strict liability rule from nuisance, after RHM Bakeries this possibility disappeared, 
but persisted in the other contexts of support where nuisance would provide a fault-
based liability rule and support would provide a strict liability rule. 
As a consequence, in the context of support of buildings, subjecting disputes to 
nuisance rules does not change anything with regard to the basis of liability, for both 
sets of rules – basic rules and nuisance rules – provide the same answer. The change 
would be effected in the other contexts, namely support of land, in its natural state or 
with structures built upon the surface. Here, dismissing the basic rules in favour of an 
exclusive application of the nuisance rules would entail a shift from strict liability to 
fault-based liability. 
There is, in the latter contexts, a further and very important consequence of 
treating withdrawal of support as a nuisance: it can extend the content of the right to 
support, from the negative obligation to the positive obligation. There is a line of 
English and Australian authority,185 accepted in Scotland,186 supporting the 
                                                
 
 
184 RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17 at 42 per Lord Fraser of 
Tullybelton. 
185 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880; Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645; Leakey v National 
Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty [1980] QB 485. 
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contention that a landowner is liable for his failure to eliminate a nuisance that has 
been created in his land by nature or third parties and of which he has acquired 
knowledge.187 This would expand the content of the right to include the positive 
obligation in all cases where it was not already recognised by the basic rules: a 
landowner would be liable not only if, in actively engaging in activities in his land, he 
withdraws support of his neighbour’s land and causes damage, but also if support is 
withdrawn due to an event or condition not created by him but which he knew about 
and failed to correct. 
 
4.2. Withdrawal of support as the result of an abnormally dangerous 
conduct 
 
The proposal here outlined does not entail ruling out strict liability completely when 
support is withdrawn. In fact, this liability rule should be applied when the conditions 
discussed in chapter 3 are met by the conduct that has withdrawal of support as a 
consequence, namely, when it is an abnormally dangerous conduct in the sense there 
described. 
Many of the mining cases discussed in this chapter that were subjected to strict 
liability by virtue of the basic rules would have been solved in the same way under 
this approach: given that the methods employed were considered to be “proper” 
modes of working even when they involved the removal of all the minerals,188 it is 
arguable that those cases fit the description of an abnormally dangerous conduct, for 
the risk of grave physical damage – i.e. subsidence of the land, destruction of houses 
and/or personal injury – is not adequately controlled by proper precautions. 
The truly significant shift would take place in the currently more relevant 
context of support of buildings, for it involves the recognition of a strict liability rule 
for cases where currently only fault-based liability is believed to be available. It is 
important to note that, according to the argument presented in chapter 3, 
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
186 Especially Sedleigh-Denfield (n 185). See Watt v Jamieson 1954 SC 56; Plean Precast Ltd v National Coal 
Board 1985 SC 77; RHM Bakeries (n 184); Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 1987 SC (HL) 37; Kennedy 
(n 139); and Canmore Housing Association Ltd v Bairnsfather (t/a B R Autos) 2004 SLT 673, among others. 
187 See chapter 2 section 5.2.3. 
188 See p 227 above. 
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abnormally dangerous conduct does indeed attract strict liability, so all that would be 
needed for the shift to take place is an acknowledgment of conduct resulting in 
withdrawal of support as abnormally dangerous when the relevant conditions are 
met. This stands in contrast with the argument presented above in connection with 
nuisance rules, which is a normative argument aimed at the dismissal of the basic 
liability rules for withdrawal of support of land. 
It must be noted that the definition of abnormally dangerous conduct does not 
distinguish between acts and omissions. In this sense, just like the nuisance rules, the 





In conclusion, the approach here proposed, namely to deal with support disputes 
simply under the general framework proposed in previous chapters for nuisance and 
abnormally dangerous activities, would introduce some relevant changes with regard 
to the basis of liability. Most notably, nuisance rules would, in principle, exclude strict 
liability for withdrawing support of land, unless the conduct can be characterised as 
abnormally dangerous. Conversely, the rules on abnormally dangerous conduct 
would admit the possibility of strict liability in the context of support of buildings. 
 
5. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
 
As discussed above, the basic liability rules applicable to disputes regarding support, 
in their current formulation, are not adequately justified. It is argued that these 
disputes should be resolved according to the rules applicable to nuisance and 
abnormally dangerous conduct outlined in chapters 2 and 3. 
In practice, a similar result is achieved through the application of non-
delegable duties of care, which are pervasive in the support context. This solution, 
however, is not satisfactory, for not only is it contingent on the involvement of an 
independent contractor, but also, depending on the justification adopted for such 
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duty, might be unsustainable over time or produce results that are inconsistent with 
the treatment here advocated. 
The result of the approach proposed here is that disputes arising from 
withdrawal of support of land would no longer be subject to a strict liability rule 
unless the conduct causing such withdrawal could be characterised as abnormally 
dangerous. Moreover, withdrawal of support of (sections of) buildings could indeed 
be subject to such a strict liability rule provided that the same characterisation can be 
made, contrary to the fault-based liability rule that applies today regardless of the 










This thesis has presented an argument as to the basis of liability for damages claims 
in the context of neighbour law. It contends that such claims are subject to a set of 
two rules: a general fault-based liability rule applicable to nuisance, and a special 
strict liability rule for abnormally dangerous conduct. Chapter 1 explains what is 
meant in this thesis by fault-based and strict liability. Both of these rules, however, 
are problematic and require clarification with regard to their content and scope. 
The first of these rules, discussed in chapter 2, derives from the leading cases of 
RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council1 and Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd.2 
While the first of these decisions established the general requirement of fault, the 
second adopted the so-called fault continuum: a catalogue of several available forms of 
fault that are connected to one another by an underlying spectrum of likelihood of 
harm. This formulation, imported from the American Rest (2d), features several 
issues requiring clarification and adjustment. 
The first form of fault in this continuum, namely malice in the sense of improper 
motives, appears as a form of fault with a rather limited role, given its practical 
shortcomings. Intention in the sense of acting with the purpose of inflicting harm, in 
turn, seems to be omitted by the model, but it is only logical to consider it as an 
admitted form of fault. 
Possibly the most salient problem with this model is that the evolution of the 
notions of intention in the form of knowledge of certainty of harm and of 
recklessness, as seen in subsequent case law and legal literature, points to these forms 
of fault as in fact disguising forms of strict – or, in the best case, stricter-than-normal 
– liability: by allowing the establishment of knowledge constructively. Insofar as the 
“mental state” component for these forms of fault is one of pure knowledge, liability 
might therefore be based solely upon a standard of foreseeability of harm. This plays 
against the aim of RHM Bakeries. Consequently, if full adherence to the fault principle 
                                                
 
 
1 RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SC (HL) 17. 
2 Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd 1996 SC 95. 
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is to be achieved, it seems that only actual knowledge should be admitted in order to 
demonstrate these forms of fault. 
Negligence, in contrast, is less problematic than it seems. As a form of fault – as 
opposed to the “delict of negligence” – it can be accommodated within the context of 
nuisance, contrary to claims in the literature. There is no incompatibility between the 
reasonable care test from negligence and the plus quam tolerabile test from nuisance. 
Moreover, addressing negligent nuisance under nuisance rules does not entail 
circumventing the limitations that are traditionally associated with the law of 
negligence. 
More generally, it is arguable that the very notion of the fault continuum is not 
particularly helpful in explaining the links between the different forms of fault, and is 
even misleading. On the one hand, some of these forms are completely independent 
of any notion of likelihood of harm. On the other hand, those that actually depend 
on this notion, are not exclusively dependent on it, nor are they all conclusively 
attached to a particular level of likelihood. 
The second liability rule, discussed in chapter 3, is that applicable to what in 
Kennedy v Glenbelle Ltd is called conduct causing a special risk of abnormal damage. A 
detailed analysis of the category’s sources and its subsequent application and 
discussion showed that both the nature of the liability rule and its scope of application 
– i.e. the definition of the boundaries of the category – are unclear. 
As to the first aspect it is argued that, despite its orthodox characterisation as a 
form or implication of fault, this conduct attracts in fact strict liability. Fault-based 
accounts, relying on the notions of heightened standard of care, fault presumption, res 
ipsa loquitur, and even recklessness, proved to be insufficient in providing a satisfactory 
explanation of the acknowledged strict-liability-like effects of this rule. 
Further, this orthodox view of the rule’s nature has obscured the fundamental 
need for a clear definition of the boundaries of this type of conduct, starting from the 
very terminology. Based on the available authority and general principles of delictual 
liability, it was argued that this conduct is better labelled simply as “abnormally 
dangerous”, and is defined as one that creates a high risk of grave physical damage 
which remains at such a level even if reasonable precautions are taken, provided that 
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the conduct is not one of common usage and that the defender has actual or 
constructive knowledge of the level of risk his conduct entails. 
This two-rule model also explains the operation of liability imposed in cases of 
disputes arising from uses of water naturally running or present on land, discussed in 
chapter 4. 
On the one hand, and despite the fact that disputes over uses of water have 
been subject to different categorisations, the current trend is clear: they are generally 
treated as nuisances, with the exception of disputes arising from drainage operations. 
Moreover, all these categories have reached the same solution with regard to the 
basis of liability: damages are based on the averment and proof of fault. What 
remains open is whether in the case of harm caused by drainage operations, the 
pursuer can benefit from the advantages of the fault model that has been so far 
applied only in the context of nuisance. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that the traditional view of liability for 
interfering with the natural course of a stream, notably applied in the case of 
Caledonian Rly Co v Greenock Corp,3 is correct: it does attract strict liability. And this is so 
precisely because it is an application of the second, special rule of liability for 
abnormally dangerous conduct, discussed above. This entails not only challenging 
the traditional explanation of this strict liability rule as grounded in the existence of 
riparian rights, but also partially challenging more recent accounts that seek to 
demonstrate that liability in these cases, and in the particular decision in Caledonian 
Rly Co, is based upon fault. 
There is, however, a second group of specific disputes that does not fit the two-
rule model presented in this thesis: those arising from withdrawal of support, 
discussed in chapter 5. 
Fault-based and strict liability rules in this context depend on the type of 
property being supported and its physical position in relation to the supporting 
property. It has been argued that the distinction based on these elements is not 
adequately justified in the modern law and that the better and more logical approach 
                                                
 
 
3 Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corp 1917 SC (HL) 56. 
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would be to resolve support disputes following the model here proposed, according to 
the level and type of risk created by the defender’s conduct. 
In practice, a result consistent with the proposed approach has been achieved 
through the application of the notion of non-delegable duties of care on the part of 
the landowner when the interfering operations are performed by an independent 
contractor. This solution, however, is not adequate. First, it is contingent on the 
operations actually being performed by such a contractor, which will not necessarily 
always be the case. Secondly, the operation of the non-delegable duty is problematic 
for these purposes on whatever line of justification one adopts: on the risk-based 
justification, the boundaries and even the continued existence of the duty are 
uncertain; on the duty-based justification, it can produce results that are inconsistent 
with the proposed approach. 
The adoption of this approach would mean a shift in the basis of liability for 
the different types of support disputes. Withdrawal of subjacent or adjacent support 
of land, with or without structures built on the surface, would no longer be subject to 
a strict liability across the board: it would depend on whether the operations were 
characterised as abnormally dangerous conduct. Likewise, withdrawal of subjacent or 
adjacent support of (sections of) buildings would not necessarily be subject to the 
current fault-based liability rule that does not take into account the nature and level 
of risk that these operations can create: the strict liability rule for abnormally 
dangerous conduct should be equally applicable, provided that the relevant 
conditions are met. 
In sum, the two-rule model of liability proposed in this thesis represents a 
unified framework that cuts across the subdivisions of neighbour law, adopting a 
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